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Chapter 1  
Introduction  
1.1 Motivation 
Remember the last time you made an online purchase without having previously seen the real 
physical product. Consumers frequently do this, for example, when they order food from a 
new restaurant or purchase a device that is not available in physical stores. If you are in 
academia, then it is probably easier to remember booking a room in a hotel you have not 
visited before, as is usually the case when going to a conference. This should be an easy 
choice, even more so if recommended conference hotels are available. All you need to do is 
search for information about the available options and then select the one that you think is 
best. Performing this search online gives you easy access to large amounts of information 
about the alternatives – you can check not only prices and hotel amenities, but also pictures, 
ratings, and reviews. However, acquiring all the available information about the alternatives 
involves time you probably prefer to spend in a different way. Therefore, you focus your 
attention primarily on information relevant for your choice at the time.  
What information is relevant differs both within the same consumer over time and 
between consumers at the same point in time, as it depends on their specific needs and goals. 
For example, PhD students pay more attention to the price of the hotel room and the 
possibility of sharing it with a colleague, as this is relevant given their budget constraints. 
Those who need to present early in the morning are more likely to focus on distance to the 
conference venue, while others might find information about airport connections and hotel 
amenities most relevant.  
These examples show that different consumers pay attention to different information, 
even when making a choice from the same set. More importantly, the information that 




“book this room” or “buy this brand”. Such differences in attention to information about the 
alternatives can be observed in many domains and are in no way specific only to academics 
booking a hotel room for a conference. As consumers aim to make a purchase, they search for 
those alternatives that are aligned with their preferences and inspect the information that is 
most relevant for their goal. This means that the search for information that precedes 
consumer choice is closely linked to what consumers find useful, important, relevant. 
Companies such as Google, Amazon, and Facebook, integrate this in their machine learning 
algorithms that personalize search results, offer product recommendations, or deliver targeted 
ads, with the final goal of influencing the choices that their users make. 
Consumer choice models and theories rest on various assumptions about information 
search and brand choice. First, information search prior to brand choice indicates what the 
consumer knows about the brands. Second, consumer preferences are revealed only by the 
choice of brand, not by the sequence of (micro) choices regarding what information to 
examine from moment-to-moment. This implies that it is impossible to predict what brand a 
consumer is going to choose in the absence of prior preference measurements (e.g. previous 
choices, preference ratings). As a result, current search-and-choice models can only offer a 
“choice post-mortem” on why the consumer chose a certain brand. This limits our 
understanding of how consumers make a brand choice and of the role that sequential 
information acquisition plays in decision making. This dissertation addresses this challenge 
and provides a model that infers consumer and brand-specific utilities from how the 
consumer inspects the alternatives during a single choice. This differs from standard choice 
models that specify brand utility as a weighted sum of product attributes and that need 





1.2 Eye Movements and Attention 
The three empirical essays in this dissertation all use eye movements as indicators of 
information acquisition and attention processes (Pieters and Wedel 2007). When consumers 
inspect brands on a display, they make eye movements called saccades. During saccades, the 
gaze is rapidly redirected (20-50 msec.) between different locations on the display, while 
vision is actively suppressed to prevent blurring (Hutton 2008). Between saccades, the eyes 
are relatively still (for about 200-400 msec.) and focused on a specific location in space. 
These brief moments between saccades are called fixations and it is during these moments 
that the consumer acquires, by reading, the information presented on the corresponding area 
of the display (Rayner 1998).  
Eye-movement data provide spatiotemporal information: (1) what areas of the display 
are inspected, (2) the moments when this takes place, and (3) the duration of these moments. 
This has three implications. First, eye-fixations during a task indicate which areas of the 
display the consumer attends to. Second, the sequence of eye-fixations and saccades reflects 
the moments when consumers are interested in the specific information presented at different 
locations on the display. While consumers aim to inspect relevant information, areas that 
contain salient stimuli can attract their attention (van der Lans, Pieters, and Wedel 2008a). If 
such salient stimuli do not provide task-relevant information, consumers do not inspect them 
further and move their eyes to other areas. This relates to the third implication. Namely, that 
the amount and pattern of eye movements reflect what information in areas of the display is 
relevant for what the consumer aims to achieve during the task. In the previous conference 
hotel example, a consumer who aims to choose an alternative that is well connected to the 
airport inspects information about travel time and airport-shuttle services more than hotel 
amenities (i.e., what is inspected). While stimuli such as pictures and review ratings 




place), they are not directly relevant to the consumer and receive a lower number of eye-
fixations (i.e. duration of attention) than other, more relevant, areas.  
The link between eye movements and goal-directed, or top-down, attention is 
supported by studies in scene viewing, advertising (Pieters and Wedel 2007; Wedel, Pieters, 
and Liechty 2008), and search (van der Lans, Pieters, and Wedel 2008b). For example, 
participants instructed to memorize ads allocate more attention to the body text, pictorial, and 
brand design objects than participants instructed to explore the ads freely, while those 
following a brand-learning goal attend more to the body text but reduce their attention to 
pictorial design (Pieters and Wedel 2007). The effect of processing goals on attention is 
manifest even when the design of the display could lead to more homogenous attention 
patterns between consumers who inspect it. The results of an eye-tracking study that 
decomposed the effects of brand salience on search show that about two thirds of brand 
attention is goal-directed while only one third is stimulus-driven (van der Lans et al. 2008b).  
To summarize, previous studies show that eye movements are closely linked to the 
goal that participants have. Therefore, eye movements reflect how consumers divide their 
goal-directed attention between the brands on display. During choice, consumers move their 
eyes from moment to moment in order to inspect the information displayed in different 
locations. This implies that the sequence of eye movements reflects three important aspects of 
attention: selection (what was attended), pattern (at what moments), and duration (for how 
long). Let  be the number of eye movements1 of consumer  on the display area 
corresponding to brand 2 at moment , where = 1 at the start of the choice task and =  
at the end of the task, when brand choice is expressed. We use  to indicate the sequence 
                                                            
1 The type of eye-movements (e.g. fixations, saccades) used in each of the empirical essays is defined in the 
respective chapter. 
2 The level at which eye movements and attention are modelled can easily be changed (e.g. in Chapter 4 we use 




( , … , ) of eye movements of consumer  on the display area corresponding to brand  
from the start of the task and until moment . We formalize the link between eye movements 
( ) and attention ( ) in equation 1. More specifically, the sequence of eye movements of 
consumer  on the display area corresponding to brand  up to moment  reflects the attention 
allocated to the brand ( ): 
 = + . (1) 
Brand and consumer characteristics that are expected to influence attention can be 
included in the model (  and , respectively) and their effects are captured by  and 
. For example, brands that the consumer is already familiar with (e.g. based on prior 
ownership) are expected to attract more attention initially as they are easier to recognize than 
yet unknown brands. In line with prior research, consumer characteristics such as decision 
goals are expected to influence attention. Then, consumer and brand specific attention is: 
 = + + . (2) 
The three essays in this dissertation specify that eye movements are not perfect 
indicators of attention by accounting for unobserved sources of heterogeneity ( , e.g. 
consumers relying on different types of information, such as textual or pictorial (van der Lans 
et al. 2008a)) and measurement error ( , discussed in detail in sections 2.2.1 and 3.2.1).  
Equations 1 and 2 formalize the link between eye movements and attention, the first 
component of our model. Figure 1.1 offers a visual representation of the model and 
summarizes which links are tested in the three empirical essays (Chapters 3, 4, and 5). 
 
1.3 Attention, Brand Choice, and Moment of Choice 
Standard choice models assume that consumers use all the available information to calculate 
the utility of each brand and then select the best alternative in the set. However, consumers 




Figure 1.1 Framework of this thesis: eye movements, attention, utility, and choice 
 
Note: Examples of brand characteristics: prior brand ownership (Chapter 2); position on display (Chapters 2 and 
3); and attribute levels (Chapter 4). Examples of consumer characteristics: smartphone ownership (Chapter 2); 
between subjects manipulated information complexity (Chapter 2), decision goals (Chapters 3 and 4), and time 
pressure (Chapter 4). 
To avoid repetition, the following terms are used interchangeably in this dissertation: (1) brand, (choice) 
alternative, and (choice) option; and (2) attributes, (brand) characteristics, (brand) features. One brand 
corresponds to one alternative presented on the screen. If two or more alternatives have the same brand name, 
but different other attributes (e.g. iPhone XR and iPhone XS Max), the model considers them as different brands 














Brand Choice ∗ ∗ = max,…,  
Moment of Choice 
 ∗ >  
Brand Utility 
 
Ch 2, 3, 4 Ch 3  = consumer 
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time on a display (e.g. attribute by brand matrices commonly used by comparison websites 
and online retailers). This is supported by observational data that covers weeks of online 
search (Bronnenberg, Kim, and Mela 2016) and controlled studies that facilitate information 
acquisition by presenting brands side-by-side (Meißner, Musalem, and Huber 2016; Shi, 
Wedel, and Pieters 2013).  
Before consumers visually inspect the display, they are uncertain about the specific 
brands and attributes that they are going to see, even though they might have an expectation 
about them. For example, consumers who click ‘Compare’ while browsing the Apple store 
for an iPhone (Figure 1.2) can expect to see information about attributes such as camera, 
battery, and price for a limited number of models. However, they are uncertain about the 
exact location where this information is presented and the specific attribute levels that 
correspond to each of the models. To the extent that consumers find an attribute important or 
are interested in one of the models, they benefit from reducing uncertainty about it. Then, 
they use their eyes to find the area where that information is displayed and inspect it. Section 
1.3.1 describes four types of uncertainty that consumers experience during choice, and how 
these are accounted for by previous research where the role of attention is implied. 
What consumers choose to inspect is aligned with what they find important and what 
impacts their decision. Failing to account for what information consumers inspect during 
choice leads to biased measurements of their preferences and incorrect inferences about their 
decision process. This has motivated the development of new theories and models, such as 
sequential sampling models (SSM) and rational inattention theory (RIT) on which the essays 
in this dissertation build on (SSM and RIT described in 1.3.2 and 1.3.3). In section 1.3.4 we 






Figure 1.2 “Compare” section at apple.com/iphone 
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1.3.1 Uncertainty during Brand Choice 
When choosing one brand from a set of several multiattribute alternatives, consumers can be 
uncertain about: (1) the description of a brand on a specific attribute, (2) the importance of an 
attribute, (3) the overall utility of a brand, and (4) which of the brands has the highest utility 
in the set. For a consumer who wants to purchase a bike, the four types correspond to the 
following questions: (1) what is the material of the frame (e.g. aluminum, carbon fiber, steel) 
or the model/type of the derailleur3, (2) how important is the material of the frame, or the 
derailleur, (3) what is the total utility that the consumer would derive from bike A, and (4) 
which of the bikes in the set provides the best utility. While type I can be resolved by reading 
the description of the bikes, this might not be enough for types 2-4. In order to understand the 
importance of an attribute (type II), the consumer needs to understand what benefits it 
provides (e.g. maintenance, performance). Benefits are usually not explained next to 
attributes and often require specific knowledge about the product category. Even for bike 
enthusiasts who have information about all the bike characteristics and know their 
importance, a test ride is needed to determine if the bike size and configuration is a good fit 
(type III uncertainty). Hence, resolving type II-IV uncertainties might require prior 
experience with the category, learning through consumption or test-driving a product before 
purchase, in addition to careful inspection of the information on display. 
 Type I: Uncertainty about the description of a brand on a specific attribute. Before 
acquiring any information about a brand, consumers are uncertain about its attributes. After 
inspecting some of the attributes, consumers can form expectations for the remaining ones, to 
the extent that these are correlated. For example, after discovering that a digital camera has 
exceptionally good video recording performance, a consumer can expect a higher price. 
However, the consumer can only be certain of this after inspecting the price of that digital 
                                                            




camera. In this example the consumer can easily reduce uncertainty by reading the 
information on display. However, there are situations when this is more difficult to achieve. 
For example, when attribute information is in an unknown language (e.g. tourists shopping in 
a foreign country) or when buying in a completely new category (e.g. first-time parents 
shopping for baby products). 
 Information that consumers do not know cannot influence their evaluation of a brand. 
For example, consumers consider the contribution of the CPU to the utility of a laptop only if 
they know that information. Hence, accounting for what brand information consumers use to 
evaluate the brands improves preference measurements (Meißner et al. 2016; Yang, Toubia, 
and de Jong 2015).  
Type II: Uncertainty about the importance of an attribute. Even though consumers are 
certain about the description of a brand on a specific attribute, they can be uncertain about its 
contribution to the brand’s utility. For example, after learning that brand A has a battery life 
of 36 hours, consumers can be uncertain about the benefit of this level of battery life. 
Consumption benefits are more difficult to evaluate for consumers who make a purchase in a 
new category or for an experience good (Bronnenberg and Dubé 2017). When this type of 
uncertainty is present, consumers use other sources of information to evaluate the utility of 
the choice alternatives, such as advertising (Erdem, Keane, and Sun 2008; Kotowitz and 
Mathewson 1979). Hence, companies can help consumers resolve or even prevent this type of 
uncertainty by providing cues (e.g. banner ads) that help consumers to remember previously 
seen advertisements for products in the respective category. 
Type III: Uncertainty about the overall utility of a brand. Even when consumers have 
all the brand information and know the subjective value that they derive from each of the 
attributes, they can be uncertain about its overall utility. For example, if the brand is 




if there are interactions between attributes or some of the attributes are difficult to trade off 
(Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998).  
Models of sequential search and choice, as well as learning models, account for this 
type of uncertainty. Search and choice models assume that consumers have an expectation of 
the utility provided by the attributes of the brand prior to search but are uncertain about the 
realized utility (Kim, Albuquerque, and Bronnenberg 2010). During search, consumers 
resolve this uncertainty one brand at a time. Learning models account for consumers having 
incomplete information about attributes that they discover over time. Because learning 
models usually account for product quality as an overall attribute, we discuss them in relation 
to type III uncertainty and not the previous two. An important characteristic of this class of 
models is that consumers learn about the quality of one brand, but this knowledge does not 
directly influence the utility of the other brands. In contrast, if consumers reduce type II 
uncertainty (e.g. a consumer updates price sensitivity), then all the brands are impacted. In a 
review of the literature, Ching, Erdem, and Keane (2013) discuss four key dimension that 
characterize different types of learning models. One of these dimensions is the source of 
information consumers use to learn about attributes over time. For example, consumers can 
learn by consuming the product (i.e. after purchase), but they can also learn from exogenous 
signals of quality such as advertising. Similar to RIT, learning models assume that the 
reduction in consumer uncertainty is independent of the order or the timing of these 
exogenous signals.  
Type IV: Uncertainty about which brand has the highest utility in the set. The 
previous three types of uncertainty are at the level of an attribute and/or brand, while type IV 
is at the choice set level and is related to the difference in utility between the brands. Two or 
more brands can have similar levels of utility because (1) their attributes are similar or (2) 




(1) choosing the colour of a smartphone or laptop – while essentially unimportant and 
irrelevant, the consumer needs to resolve this uncertainty, and (2) one brand is expensive and 
offers high quality, while the other is cheaper but has lower quality. Consumers faced with 
such a difficult trade off can switch towards a more simple decision strategy (e.g. 
lexicographic rule, satisficing) (Luce, Payne, and Bettman 2000) and thus eliminate the 
difficulty of choosing the best brand in the set, or can put more effort into differentiating the 
brand utilities.  
1.3.2 Sequential Sampling Models (SSM) 
SSMs have been used primarily to understand processes that take place during perceptual 
decisions (Ratcliff 1978), such as whether a visual stimulus displays a square or not, or 
whether it displays a chair or a table. Recent developments, such as the attentional drift-
diffusion model (aDDM) (Krajbich, Armel, and Rangel 2010; Krajbich and Rangel 2011) and 
multialternative decision field theory (MDFT) (Roe, Busemeyer, and Townsend 2001), have 
generalized the model to value-based choice. The core assumption of these models is that 
participants’ sequential sampling of information influences how evidence in favor of the 
choice alternatives accumulates until a threshold is reached and choice is expressed (Ratcliff 
and Smith 2004). This implies that alternatives that are fixated on more frequently are more 
likely to be chosen.  
While there are several classes of SSMs, of which the aDDM and MDFT are just two 
examples, these models share the following three components: drift rate, decision threshold, 
and starting point. The drift rate is the average amount of evidence accumulated per unit of 
time. The decision threshold is the amount of evidence that needs to be accumulated in order 
for choice to be expressed. The starting point captures prior preferences for one of the choice 
alternatives. The aDDM specifies that brands accumulate evidence at a higher rate when they 




al. 2010). This implies that brands accumulate evidence even when they are not looked at, 
albeit at a lower rate. aDDM applications use a consumer-invariant decision threshold that is 
fixed prior to the start of the decision process and remains constant throughout the task. 
Because these models require measurements of preference ratings for all of the items that 
participants choose between, it is straightforward to adjust the starting point accordingly. 
However, this is not needed in practice as participants are asked to make choices between two 
or at most three simple items (e.g. chocolate bars, snacks) with similar preference ratings 
(Krajbich et al. 2010; Krajbich and Rangel 2011). The elementary nature of these choices 
makes it possible to ask participants to do hundreds of choice tasks, which are needed to fit 
the models. While such applications offer valuable insights into the “computational and 
psychological processes that guide simple choices” (Krajbich et al. 2010, p. 1296), it is not 
immediately obvious how they can be extended to complex choices between multi-attribute 
brands for which no prior preference measurements are available. 
Applications of the aDDM focused on choice between simple alternatives (e.g. 
snacks) that participants know and like (Krajbich et al. 2010; Krajbich and Rangel 2011). 
Because participants choose between alternatives that they are already familiar with, the tasks 
are more similar to perceptual decision making or brand search than they are to brand choice. 
Specifically, they only need to identify what brands are on display and choose the one that 
they assigned a higher preference rating. Then, the two or three brands on display should 
have similar attention shares. We use the term fair share to refer to the share of attention that 
specific areas of the display (e.g. brands, attributes) are expected to receive if participants use 
eye movements only for information acquisition. 
The aDDM literature uses the term choice bias to indicate that “controlling for value 
differences, the probability of choosing an item should increase with the excess time for 




more likely to fixate on items that they prefer and thus allocate a larger share of their 
attention to items that they eventually choose. To clarify, bias is used in the sense of 
inclination or interest in some items and does not imply that participants make an error in 
how they allocate attention or what brand they choose.  
Decision field theory, originally developed for decision making under uncertainty 
(Busemeyer and Townsend 1993) has been extended to value-based choice (Roe et al. 2001). 
Similar to the aDDM, models in the multialternative decision field theory class (Roe et al. 
2001) assume that choice alternatives accumulate evidence until a threshold is reached and 
choice is expressed, and that this accumulation process is modulated by attention. In addition, 
to be estimated, both theories require repeated choices per consumer (Berkowitsch, 
Scheibehenne, and Rieskamp 2014). While the aDDM is specified for unidimensional stimuli 
(Krajbich et al. 2010), such as chocolate bars or snacks, MDFT models focus on choice 
between alternatives described by multiple attributes, such as cars. Then, attention influences 
which attribute is under focus at the specific time. The model assumes that attention operates 
like a filter that selects the attribute on which the brands are compared from moment-to-
moment. Importantly, at every moment during choice, after attention selects an attribute of 
interest, all the brands are inspected and compared on that dimension (Roe et al. 2001). So 
far, these models have primarily been used to simulate choice behavior and test whether 
MDFT is able to explain context effects (e.g. similarity, attraction, compromise).  
1.3.3 Rational Inattention Theory (RIT) 
RIT argues that because information acquisition is costly, it is rational for consumers to not 
pay attention to information that is less relevant for their choice. Then, consumers maximize 
utility given the limited information they have about the choice options. This leads to 
situations when “limits on attention impact choice” (Caplin and Dean 2015, p. 2183) and 




information. Recent developments in this literature provide analytical models of optimal 
information-processing behavior (Matějka and McKay 2015; Steiner, Stewart, and Matějka 
2017) that as far as we know have not been tested empirically for value-based choice. 
Consumer behavior that is aligned with RIT satisfies two assumptions: no improving 
attention cycles (NIAC) and no improving action switches (NIAS) (Caplin and Dean 2015). 
The first assumption, no improving attention cycles, specifies that decision makers’ attention 
allocation is rationalized by a cost function. The second assumption, no improving action 
switches, implies that consumers’ choice of action is optimal given the information gathered. 
So far developments of these models have focused on analytical results that test if 
participants adjust their attention and actions in response to changes in incentives in line with 
predictions derived from the NIAC and NIAS assumptions. In order to be implemented, these 
tests require state-dependent stochastic choice (SDSC) data (Caplin 2016; Caplin and Dean 
2015). SDSC data comprises of: (1) a set of actions that the consumer chooses from, (2) the 
utility of each of these actions in different states of the world, (3) the consumer’s prior belief 
about the true state probabilities, and (4) the probability of observing different information 
signals given the true state of the world. A working paper on empirical tests of RIT offers a 
more concrete example of SDSC data (Dean and Neligh 2019). This paper uses an 
experiment in which participants are presented with 100 red and blue balls on the screen and 
then choose between two actions. The payoffs of the actions depend on the fraction of red 
balls on the screen (the true state of the world). Participants know the prior probability of the 
possible true states and can determine the state by counting the balls on the screen. 
Systematic manipulations of the true state of the world and of the payoffs should lead to 
changes in the strategies that participants use to choose an action. Changes that are in line 




1.3.4 Towards a Theory of Rational Attention (TRA) 
Prior preference measurements at the consumer level are not easily accessible, especially for 
complex brands that are infrequently purchased. This creates a significant challenge in 
implementing the aDDM or RIT models for the type of brand choices that are common in 
marketing applications, as both these classes of models require prior measurements of 
consumer preference (the true state in RIT models corresponds to the utility match between 
the participants’ underlying preferences and the characteristics of the brands in the set). 
This dissertation offers a solution to this challenge, as we describe in this section. Our 
approach makes it possible to describe and quantify the role of eye movements in reflecting 
otherwise unobserved attention processes that are closely linked to the moment-to-moment 
accumulation of utility that takes place during brand choice. In neither of the three empirical 
essays do we (as researchers) a priori know the true underlying distribution of the state of the 
world (the utility match between each participant and brand on display). It is reasonable to 
assume that prior to any fixations on the display, participants do not know these utilities 
either, except when they would know which brands they are going to see and know them 
sufficiently well to have an estimate of their utilities. However, to the extent that consumer 
behavior is in line with RIT, both the allocation of attention between the brands and the 
resulting choice are utility maximizing. This implies that consumers postpone brand choice as 
long as they derive more utility from inspecting the brands than from selecting one of them as 
their final choice. Our model incorporates this by specifying two types of utilities (brand 
( ) and search ( )) that consumer  compares at every moment = 1, … , . 
If the consumer’s choice of action is optimal given the information gathered (NIAC) 
and the attention allocation is rational (NIAS), then attention is closely linked to the utility 




SSMs, we specify that the utility consumer  derives from choosing brand  at time  is a 
function of the attention allocated to that brand and an unobserved utility shock : 
 = ∗ + . (3) 
To summarize, the essays in this dissertation build on SSM, RIT, and research that 
documents the role of eye movements as indicators of attention. The models in the three 
essays of this dissertation share the following premises: (1) consumers allocate attention 
strategically, (2) consumers maximize utility given what they know about the brands, and (3) 
eye movements reflect these processes from moment-to-moment. Hence, consumers choose 
what to focus their attention on, rather than what to be inattentive to. While this could be 
described as rational attention, the models developed in this dissertation do not formally test 
rationality. The goal of this dissertation is to understand how eye movements reflect 
otherwise unobservable attention and utility accumulation processes that take place when 
consumers make a single brand choice from a set of complex alternatives. Whether 
consumers’ moment-to-moment choices of what to fixate their eyes on are rational or not, our 
results show that the resulting allocation of attention reveals how consumers evaluate the 
brands and predicts choice. In chapter 5 we come back to this key idea and discuss how the 
models and results of this dissertation take us one step closer towards a Theory of Rational 
Attention, while acknowledging that many such steps remain.  
In the next section we describe how each chapter focuses on specific model 
components. Then, each chapter presents in detail the developed model, the data on which it 
is calibrated, and the results. 
1.4 Outline 
The attention and brand choice model in Chapter 2 offers initial evidence to support the link 
between changes in attention over the course of the decision process and brand utility at the 




contribute to the accumulation of utility and brand choice. The model specifies the effects of 
information density on four types of consumer-and-brand specific attention, and tests 
competing mechanisms through which brand loyalty manifests itself in choice and attention. 
The results show that (1) certain types of attention (e.g. attention for integration) are better 
able to reflect brand utilities, (2) brand loyalty manifests itself via attention, and that (3) the 
link between attention and brand utility is stable across different information density displays. 
To keep the model tractable, we normalize decision duration by splitting it in four quarters 
and investigating changes in attention over these intervals. 
Chapter 3 looks into the link between attention, brand choice, and moment of choice. 
The model specifies both brand and search utilities that change from moment to moment as 
more eye movements are observed. The model predicts both brand choice and the moment of 
choice, and the results show that the accuracy of these predictions is above chance even after 
only 30% of the decision time. This provides evidence that already early in the process eye 
movements predict both what will be chosen and when this choice is expressed. The chapter 
provides insights into consumer heterogeneity in decision thresholds and implicitly decision 
duration, and test different drivers of brand choice and moment of choice. 
While in Chapters 2 and 3 eye movements reflect attention that is linked to overall 
brand utilities, Chapter 4 takes a different approach. The model used in this chapter 
decomposes brand utilities into two components that capture the importance of the attributes 
that describe the brands and the subjective value that the consumer attaches to the attribute 
levels corresponding to each of the brands on display. The results show that eye movements 
reflect not only how the consumer evaluates the brands, but also why some brands are 
preferred by identifying which attributes are considered more important over time.  
There are six main novelties across the three empirical essays. First, the model in 




models both brand and search utilities. Consumers compare these two types of utilities in 
order to determine when to express their choice and compare brand utilities in order to 
determine what brand to choose. When choosing a brand offers more utility than continuing 
to inspect the information on display, the consumer ends the decision process and expresses 
brand choice.  
Second, predictions of brand choice and choice timing are made for new consumers. 
Different from SSM and RIT models, this approach does not require any prior preferences 
measurements (e.g. ratings or choices). Of course, if such prior measurements are already 
available, they can easily be included as prior information both when calibrating the model 
and when making predictions for new participants, as explained in section 3.4.4. 
Third, the model can easily be adapted to extract brand utilities, attribute importance 
weights, and subjective attribute values, all consumer specific. These utility components are 
inferred from the allocation of attention between brands, attributes, or brand-and-attributes, 
which are reflected in eye movements. 
Fourth, the model can accommodate choice sets of any size, unlike the aDDM which 
so far can be applied only to at most three alternatives. Because utility is a function of 
attention and not of attribute levels, the model does not suffer from the usual criticism of the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives property of logit models (Matějka and McKay 2015). 
When choice sets increase, consumers are more likely to ignore some brands, even more if 
they have very similar attribute levels. As a result, these brands receive little, if any, attention 
and as a result have low utilities and choice probabilities that do not impact the choice 
probabilities of the other brands in the set.  
Fifth, the model predicts what and when consumers choose, before they implement 
the choice. It does so from moment-to-moment and updates the predictions as more data 




Sixth, the model is calibrated on a combination of eye movements and brand choice 
data, but predictions in chapters 3 and 4 are based on eye movements only. Currently, eye 
movements are not routinely collected by online platforms. However, recent developments 
that make it easier and more affordable to collect eye tracking data suggest that this could 
change in the future. For example, eye movements can be tracked using the camera of a 
laptop/PC/smartphone (Lopez et al. 2017) and many of these devices are fitted with infrared 
emitters and camera4 that can improve tracking accuracy. Until such solutions are fully 
developed and adapted for eye tracking, other types of data (e.g. browsing) that reflect 
consumer interest and attention could be used. Chapter 5 discusses this in more detail as well 
as the ethical concerns that arise from being able to infer consumer preferences and attitudes.
                                                            
4 For example: iPhone X and later, iPad Pro models with A12X Bionic Chip (https://support.apple.com/en-
us/HT208108); laptops that support facial recognition (Windows Hello); smartphones that use iris scans 




Chapter 2  
Eye Movements, Attention, and Utility Accumulation during Brand Choice 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the idea that eye movements provide a unique window into 
fundamental but not directly observable processes of preference formation and utility 
accumulation during brand choice in information-rich environments. Because attention in 
such environments is a scarce resource, it enables us to test a number of predictions derived 
from rational inattention theory (RIT) (Maćkowiak, Matějka, and Wiederholt 2018; Matějka 
and McKay 2015). 
Consumers make complex choices in information-rich environments, such as when 
choosing between different housing options, holiday destinations, household appliances, or 
smartphones. Even when all information is simultaneously available at a single location, such 
as a comparison website, consumers’ limited attentional capacity prevents them from 
carefully devoting full attention to each of the choice options (Lohse and Johnson 1996; Shi 
et al. 2013; Willemsen, Böckenholt, and Johnson 2011). Early on, Simon (1971, pp. 40-41) 
expressed the challenge that consumers in an information-rich world face as follows: “… the 
wealth of information means a dearth of something else: a scarcity of whatever it is that 
information consumes. What information consumes is rather obvious: it consumes the 
attention of its recipients. Hence a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention and a 
need to allocate that attention efficiently among the overabundance of information sources 
that might consume it.” Based on this notion of the scarcity and costliness of attention, RIT 
posits that it is in the consumers’ best interest to process information that they find useful and 
ignore or pay less attention to choice alternatives that seem less worth the effort. This implies 
that there should be a positive association between the attention that consumers devote to the 




for such a positive association (Atalay, Bodur, and Rasolofoarison 2012; Chandon et al. 
2009; Krajbich et al. 2012; Pieters and Warlop 1999). There is also evidence that consumers’ 
attention during choice tasks, as measured by eye movements, reflects key cognitive 
processes that consumers engage in prior to expressing their choice (Al-Moteri et al. 2017; 
Arieli, Ben-Ami, and Rubinstein 2011; Glaholt and Reingold 2011; Lohse and Johnson 
1996). Moreover, accounting for the attention that consumers devote to specific attributes 
during repeated conjoint choice tasks has been shown to improve preference measurements 
(Meißner et al. 2016; Yang et al. 2015).  
Yet, what is still largely unknown is how eye movements, attention, and the utility of 
brands during choice are linked. Specifically, two key questions are (1) how trajectories of 
attention to each of the brands during the choice task contribute to the accumulation of utility 
and final choice, and (2) which fundamental attention processes contribute to the 
accumulation of utility and brand choice. Answering these questions is one step towards 
understanding the fundamental and possibly neurological links between attention, utility, and 
choice (Manohar and Husain 2013), and towards the more realistic, descriptive consumer 
choice theories that have been called for (Busemeyer and Johnson 2004; Caplin and Dean 
2015; Krajbich et al. 2010; Stüttgen, Boatwright, and Monroe 2012; Willemsen et al. 2011).  
This chapter follows up on this. It tests the hypothesis derived from RIT that attention 
during a complex choice task, the utility for each of the choice options, and final choice are 
closely aligned. We use eye-tracking and choice data from a study with a representative 
sample of 342 regular consumers who made a complex choice for one of five brands of 
smartphones on a realistic comparison website. We estimate a new, generalized Sequential 
Sampling Model (referred to as gSSM) (Forstmann, Ratcliff, and Wagenmakers 2016; Otter 
et al. 2008) to describe the relationship between consumers’ eye movements during the 




that over and above the total sum of attention for each brand, the temporal trajectories of 
attention during the choice task contribute to brand utility. Moreover, we find that over and 
above trajectories of the quantity of attention (reflected in eye fixations), trajectories of 
integration attention (reflected in within-brand saccades), contribute to brand utility and 
choice.  
In addition, we use model estimates to infer the accumulation of brand utility during 
the task and find that attention already marks the final brand choice well before it is 
implemented. In fact, the model correctly inferred brand choice of 56% of consumers 
halfway before choice was expressed. Model performance rose to 77% one quarter before 
choice implementation, with a final hit rate of 85%. This reveals a much earlier attention bias 
effect for the chosen brand than what has been reported before. We also find that attention 
trajectories, rather than mere inertia or habits, account for state dependence effects in brand 
choice. Finally, the information-density of the decision-environment influences the level of 
attention that consumers devote to making a decision, but not the trajectories of attention, nor 
the association between attention and brand choice. Taken together, these findings support 
the fundamental link between eye movements, attention and utility accumulation during 
brand choice.   
The next section presents our model and hypotheses. Then we describe our data, the 
econometric specification of the model, and the estimation results. The final section offers 
implications of the findings for consumer choice theory and for practice. 
 
2.2 Theory 
Consumers move their eyes when making a choice between multiple alternatives on a visual 
display, such as a comparison website. These eye movements comprise fixations and 




directed to a specific location in space to acquire information from it. Because visual acuity 
rapidly drops-off with increasing distance from the center of the gaze, people need to move 
their eyes in order to acquire information from different locations in the visual display (van 
der Lans et al. 2008b). During such saccades, the gaze is rapidly redirected (20-50 msec.), 
while vision is actively suppressed to prevent blurring (Hutton 2008). 
We propose a descriptive model of the relationship between eye movements that 
consumers make during a choice task and the accumulation of brand utilities. It is a 
generalized Sequential Sampling Model (gSSM) (Forstmann et al. 2016; Otter et al. 2008). It 
specifies that observable, overt eye movements that consumers use to sample information 
from a visual display with choice options reflect unobservable, covert attention processes that 
contribute to the accumulation of utility for the choice options. Thus, trajectories of covert 
attention ( ) connect overt eye movements ( ) to the accumulation of brand utilities ( ). In 
this way, the model and research are part of a broader effort to describe choice behavior and 
preference formation when the determinant processes are intrinsically unobservable (Caplin 
and Dean 2015). We first present the basic model and in a next section describe the 
econometric, restricted, model that we estimate. Specifically: 
 = + , (1) 
 = + . (2) 
There are two crucial links, namely between overt eye movements and covert 
attention in eq. 1, and between covert attention and utility in eq. 2. Eq. 1 specifies that  
types of observable eye movements ( , described later) of consumer  to brand  at time  
during a choice task are a function of the covert attention of key interest ( ) and various 
sources of unobserved heterogeneity ( ). Eq. 2 specifies two sources of utility ( ) of 
brand  for consumer  at time  during a choice task, namely the weighted covert attention to 




components reflect the notion that the information signals that consumers obtain about the 
utility of brands during search come with error (Maćkowiak et al. 2018). Model features are 
next. 
2.2.1 Eye Movements and Attention 
Eye movements of consumers during decision-making tasks are overt measures of the covert 
attention processes that take place during these tasks (Glaholt and Reingold 2011; Orquin and 
Loose 2013). Yet, eye movements are fallible indicators of the attentional processes of key 
interest for three reasons. First, covert attention and overt eye movements can be dissociated 
at a specific point in time, for instance to maintain a smooth flow of information processing. 
Then, like a rubber band, consumers’ attention can already move to a location in space where 
it expects certain information before the eyes move, and the eyes can already move due to a 
salient event in the visual periphery before attention does (Hutton 2008). Second, the neural 
systems in the visual brain that direct the eye to locations in space proceed with some 
fixation-location error. In that case, eye saccades miss the intended exact x-y location in 
space, which may require corrective eye movements (Hutton 2008; Reichle and Drieghe 
2015). Third, the recording of eye movements by eye-trackers proceeds with error. For 
common commercial eye-trackers such measurement error is small at .5 degrees of visual 
angle or less. Yet, that error is non-ignorable and varies between people and stimuli (van der 
Lans, Wedel, and Pieters 2011). 
The model and experiment account for measurement error in eye movements in two 
ways. First, we aggregate overt eye-movement measures into larger areas-of-interest than 
their exact x-y location in space and into larger time bins than single fixations, in line with 
prior research (Pieters and Warlop 1999). For instance, Meißner et al. (2016) aggregated eye 
movements across a display of coffee machines into six features of three brands and into two 




consumers make for each of the brands in the choice set into covert attention ( , in eq. 1) and 
measurement error ( ). Shi et al. (2013) decomposed patterns of overt saccades that 
consumers made for the choice set as a whole into covert attentional strategies and 
measurement error. Our model builds on this by examining fixations and saccades for each 
brand in the choice set. 
2.2.2 Quantity and Type of Attention 
An eye fixation indicates whether or not attention has been devoted to a particular area-of-
interest in a visual display, such as a brand. The number of eye fixations reflects the quantity 
of attention for the brand, which has been shown to predict overall liking of the brand, 
consideration, and choice (Chandon et al. 2009). 
Eye saccades indicate specific types of attention to brands (Arieli et al. 2011; Lohse 
and Johnson 1996; Pieters and Warlop 1999; Shi et al. 2013). We propose that these specific 
types of attention contains additional information about the utility of brands, over and above 
the information contained in the mere quantity of attention. Figure 2.1 presents this idea. It 
displays a hypothetical pattern of eye movements across a visual display with three brands (A 
to C) each with two features (1 and 2). Three fundamental types of eye saccades are (a) 
between different features of the same brand, labelled “within-brand saccades”, (b) between 
the same feature of two different brands, labeled “between-brand saccades”, and (c) between 
different features of different brands, labelled “other saccades.” In Figure 2.1, the saccade 
between fixations 11 and 12 is within brand C, the saccade between fixations 1 and 2 is 



















Within-brand saccades reflect attention to integrate information about a single brand 
into an overall judgment or evaluation, while between-brand saccades reflect attention to 
compare information across brands in order to learn about their performance. Such attention 
for, respectively, integration or comparison has been likened to foraging for value or foraging 
for information (Manohar and Husain 2013), value construction or value encoding 
(Willemsen et al. 2011), and holistic or component information processing (Arieli et al. 
2011).  
Importantly, the same quantity of attention, reflected in eye fixations, can be due to 
qualitatively different attention processes, as reflected in eye saccades. Figure 2.1 illustrates 
this. Saccades are assigned to the brand they originate from, where the decision to move the 
eye is made (Hutton 2008). Each of the three brands in Figure 2.1 receives four eye fixations. 
If only the quantity of attention would contribute to utility, the three brands would have the 
same choice likelihood. Yet, whereas brand A and B receive, respectively, 4 and 2 between-




saccades which reflect attention for integration. If the attention type contributes to utility, 
choice probabilities of brands depend on the importance weight of the attention types. 
Specifically, attention for comparison aims to assess the performance of brands vis-à-vis each 
other (Arieli et al. 2011; Willemsen et al. 2011). In contrast, attention for information 
integration aims to assess whether the performance of brands on various features outweighs 
their costs and relative weaknesses (Manohar and Husain 2013). The “other” attention type 
most likely fulfills attentional “bookkeeping” functions such as searching the display for new 
information, and shifting between different attentional strategies (Shi et al. 2013) that are less 
central to the accumulation of utility. The model in eqs. 1 and 2 allows both attention quantity 
and type to contribute to brand utility, as indicated by superscript . 
2.2.3 Utility Accumulation and Choice 
The model in eqs. 1 and 2 lets covert attention  be brand-specific, as indicated by 
subscript , and time-varying during the choice task, as indicated by the subscript . This is 
supported by evidence that the eventually chosen option receives progressively more 
attention towards the end of a choice task (Fiedler and Glöckner 2012; Glaholt and Reingold 
2011; Meißner et al. 2016; Willemsen et al. 2011). For instance, Atalay et al. (2012) found 
that the frequency of fixations on the finally chosen brand of vitamins and food-replacement 
bars rose in the final five seconds before choice. This is consistent with evidence that 
consumers transit through different stages when making a decision and that attention during 
these stages has different functions (Gidlöf et al. 2013; Shi et al. 2013; Stüttgen et al. 2012; 
Willemsen et al. 2011). Russo and Leclerc (1994) identified three stages in a study on choice 
for supermarket products such as peanut butter. In an early, orientation stage, consumers use 
eye movements to inspect products and learn about their content. In the following evaluation 
stage, consumers use eye movements to form an overall judgement or evaluation of specific 




information for brand evaluation was not missed. This suggests that later attention to evaluate 
carries more weight than earlier attention to inspect (Willemsen et al. 2011). 
2.2.4 Predictions and Contribution 
The gSSM specifies the relationship between eye movements of consumers on brands during 
a choice task and the accumulation of utility of the brands. It posits covert trajectories of the 
quantity and type of attention as the link between overt eye movements and the accumulation 
of utility of the brands. Consistent with other SSMs (Krajbich et al. 2010) and RIT (Caplin 
and Dean 2015; Matějka and McKay 2015), it specifies that attention to brands in a visual 
display is biased towards the brand that is eventually chosen, rather than being uniformly 
distributed across brands. It extends prior work in three important ways, and makes novel 
predictions.   
First, the model identifies covert attention and measurement error from overt eye 
movements. This improves on earlier work which rests on the assumption that eye 
movements are error-free attention measures (Atalay et al. 2012; Chandon et al. 2009; 
Krajbich et al. 2010; Meißner et al. 2016; Pieters and Warlop 1999; Reutskaja et al. 2011). As 
covert attention should be a less noisy indicator of utility than overt eye movements are, we 
predict the former to contribute more to brand utility (Hypothesis 1). 
Second, the model identifies attention quantity, reflected in eye fixations, and 
attention types, reflected in eye saccades, and allows both to contribute to brand utility. This 
extends earlier work which rests on the assumption that eye fixations contain the key or all 
information about brand utility (Atalay et al. 2012; Chandon et al. 2009; Krajbich et al. 
2010). Identifying the contribution of various types of attention to brand utility has been 
identified as an important area for new choice theories and research (Krajbich et al. 2010; 
Meißner et al. 2016, p. 16), but is still largely unexplored (an exception is Shi et al. (2013)). 




utility (Hypothesis 2a). And more specifically, we predict that attention for information 
integration contributes more to brand utility than attention for comparison, and other attention 
do (Hypothesis 2b).  
Third, the model specifies that attention trajectories and their contribution to brand 
utility systematically vary across the time course of the choice task. The term  in eq. 2 
is a generalized form of the drift rate in SSM (Krajbich et al. 2010), which is the mean rate of 
change over time of the value of choosing an option or not. Our formulation extends prior 
work which rests on the assumption that the attention share of brands in the choice set is 
constant over time (Chandon et al. 2009; Pieters and Warlop 1999) or that it changes over 
time but that its contribution to brand utility is constant (Atalay et al. 2012; Krajbich et al. 
2012; Meißner et al. 2016). If attention and its contribution to utility were time-invariant, 
differences between brands in accumulated (summed) attention at the end of the choice task 
would fully capture their utility differences. Instead, our theory predicts that the trajectories 
of attention to the brands during the choice task capture the accumulation of brand utility. 
More specifically, we predict that later attention contributes more to brand utility than earlier 
attention does (Hypothesis 3a). This is in line with neural evidence (Shimojo et al. 2003) that 
the accumulation of information about the utilities of choice options is reflected in an 
increased attention bias towards the finally chosen brand. H2a, H2b and H3a imply that both 
the later quantity and type of attention contribute more to brand utility than earlier attention 
does, and that in particular attention for information integration does so (Hypothesis 3b).  
Finally, RIT also suggests that stickiness in choices is due to inattention to alternative 
choice options rather than being due to choice inertia or habitual choice (Steiner et al. 2017). 
Then, current brand ownership should affect choice and attention trajectories but, conditional 
on those, should have no direct effect on choice. Specifically, we test if stickiness in choices 





2.3.1 Background and Sample 
Our study simulates a typical on-line product comparison situation in which consumers 
evaluate a set of smartphones, from now on called devices, and choose one. Participants were 
presented with a side-by-side comparison of five devices, on 24-inch TFT computer 
monitors, as is common on many wireless carrier, retailer, and reviewer websites. The choice 
set consisted of the Apple iPhone 5 (brand A), Samsung Galaxy Note II (brand B), Nokia 
Lumia 920 (brand C), HTC One (brand D), Motorola Droid Razr Maxx HD (brand E). These 
were the most common devices in on-line product reviews and the most recent versions of 
each brand at the time of data collection (Spring 2013). Study participants were instructed to 
review the presented information about the devices and chose the device that they would be 
most likely to purchase. 
Tobii Insight, a dedicated eye-tracking and market research firm, conducted sampling 
and data collection for the study (https://www.tobiipro.com/insight/). It drew a stratified 
sample of consumers who had indicated to be in the market for a new smartphone, from 
large, locally representative participant pools, from three locations in the continental US 
(Washington DC, Cincinnati, and San Diego). Data collection took place in dedicated 
research areas in shopping centers in each of the three locations.  
The sample comprises 342 participants. Stratification ensured representation of four 
user groups: users of the two leading brands (30% brand A, and 24% brand B), other brand 
users (25%), and current non-device users (21%) were represented in the final sample. In the 
sample, 47% was female, and 30% was between 18-29 years, 39% between 30 and 49 years, 
20% between 50 and 65, and 11% was over 65 years. Seventy-two percent of the sample (246 
of 342) currently owned a smartphone of one of the five brands in the display, respectively 




indicated a 71% likelihood (0 to 100% scale) of purchasing a new smartphone in the next 
nine months. Participants received $50 to cover transportation costs of commuting to one of 
the data collection facilities and volunteering their time.  
2.3.2 Design and Stimuli 
To account for the possibility that the links between eye movements, attention, and brand 
utility depend on the information density in the choice task, we experimentally manipulated 
that in three levels (low, medium, and high). Information density or “complexity” was 
manipulated, between-participants, by varying the number of features presented to the 
participants on the computer screens (18 in low, 29 in medium, and 39 in high). Note that the 
low information density condition here is still denser than common in choice research (e.g., 3 
brands and 6 features: Meißner et al. (2016); 4 brands and 12 attributes: Shi et al. (2013); 7 
brands and 7 attributes: Lohse and Johnson (1996)). Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the conditions (respective ns are 113 in low, 118 in medium, and 111 in high). Devices 
were shown in the columns and features in the rows, with the device name/model, colors, and 
the price category always displayed at the top of the page, as is common. Figure 2.2 provides 
examples from the low and high information conditions. 
2.3.3 Eye Movements and Brand Choice 
Eye-movement recording was done with Tobii 60XL infra-red eye-trackers integrated in 24 
inch TFT computer monitors (screen resolution: 1920 x 1200 pixels), using sampling rate of 
60hz, with a typical accuracy of 0.5 degrees of visual angle. Participants were free to move 















Eye fixations were determined from the raw eye-movement recordings using default 
factory settings. Eye movements were aggregated for each participant in two ways. Fixation 
locations were aggregated into areas-of-interest covering each a feature for a brand in the 
visual display. The sequence of eye fixations until choice was aggregated into four time bins 
for each participant, labelled Quarters 1 to 4, respectively, 0-25%, 26-50%, 51-75%, and 76-
100% of eye fixations. These periods cover common stages of information exploration (Q1), 




Leclerc 1994; Willemsen et al. 2011).  
With 342 participants, 5 brands, 4 time periods, and 4 eye-movement measures, the 
dataset contains 27,360 observations. On average, participants made 236 eye fixations (SD = 
200) before making their choice. Information condition influenced fixation frequencies until 
choice was made (F(2, 333) = 7.56, p < .001): participants in the low information condition 
fixated less (M = 185, SD = 122) than participants in the medium (M = 239, SD = 185) and 
high condition (M = 285, SD = 259), who did not differ from each other. Of the 342 
participants in the sample, 129 chose the brand they currently owned (“loyals”), 117 switched 
brands (“switchers”), and 96 did not own a device in the category yet (n = 71) or owned 
another brand than on display (n = 25) (“others”). Also, these customer segments differed in 
fixation frequency (F(2, 333) = 7.47, p < .001): loyals fixated less (M = 188, SD = 168) than 
switchers (M = 259, SD = 181) and other customers did (M = 274, SD = 246), who did not 
differ from each other. The interaction between information condition and customer segment 
was not significant (F(4, 333) = 1.36, p = .24). Choice shares were 26%, 29%, 8%, 21%, and 
16% for, respectively, brands A to E. There were no differences in state dependence between 
brands (χ (4) = 2.16, p = .71), and information condition did not affect the brand being 
chosen (χ (8) = 6.33, p = .61).  
 
2.4 Model Specification 
The theoretical model in eqs. 1 and 2 specifies a link between eye movements, trajectories of 
covert attention, and the accumulation of utility of the choice options during a choice task. It 
(1) infers latent attention trajectories from observed eye-movement measures, and (2) 
quantifies the link between the attention trajectories and the accumulation of brand utilities as 




2.4.1 Attention Trajectories 
We use a reduced form of eq. 1 to identify attention trajectories. Specifically, we decompose 
the eye-movement measures of consumers to each of the brands during the choice task into 
(1) three components of the attention trajectories and (2) unobserved heterogeneities. We 
further decompose each attention trajectory component into (1) the consumer-brand-specific 
part of prime interest, and (2) the consumer-specific part which is constant across brands. We 
use a general latent trajectory specification for this (Muthén 1997; Muthén et al. 2011):  
 = + + + + , (3) 
 = + + . (4) 
In eqs. 3 and 4 superscript  indexes eye-movement measures, respectively brand 
fixations, within-brand saccades, between-brand saccades, and other saccades. Subscript  
indexes time periods,  indexes brands, and  indexes consumers. The number of fixations 
and saccades are natural-log transformed (after adding 1 to accommodate zero frequencies: = ( + 1)) to normalize their distribution (Pieters and Wedel 2004; Rosbergen, 
Pieters, and Wedel 1997). Then, = 1, … , 4, = 1, … , 4, = 1, … , 342, = 1, … , 5. 
In eq. 3,  and  denote, respectively, linear change (coded as 0, 1, 2, 3 for the 4 
time periods) and quadratic change (0, 1, 4, 9), as deviations from the initial level ( ) of 
the attention trajectory, and  denotes the three attention trajectory components. Thus, eq. 3 
specifies that the trajectory of each of the eye-movement measures is the weighted sum of 
three components of an attention trajectory, and time-varying unobserved heterogeneity for 
consumers ( ), and brands and consumers ( ). The three attention trajectory components 
are the initial level after the first period ( ), a linear change component ( ) and a 
quadratic change component ( ). Then eq. 4 decomposes each of the attention trajectory 




consumer-specific attention, from now on called brand-specific ( ), for each of the four 
eye-movement measures. 
2.4.2 Accumulation of Utility 
We use a reduced form of eq. 2 to specify the contribution that the three components of the 
brand-specific attention trajectories have to the utility of the brands, while accounting for 
consumer prior states and market-level preferences:  
 = + + + . (5) 
In eq. 5,  is the overall utility of brand  for consumer . The first two terms 
capture the effect of consumers’ prior states and knowledge (Matějka and McKay 2015) 
independent of attention trajectories. The term  captures intrinsic market-level preferences 
for the brands in the choice set, using brand fixed-effects ( = 0, for identification). The 
term  captures state dependence effects (Dubé et al. 2008), where  indicates if 
consumer  currently owns brand  ( = 1 if consumer  owns brand j, and 0 otherwise), 
and   reflects the size of the state dependence effect. These terms effectively control for 
market conditions and prior states that may influence brand utility independent of attention, 
and that might confound inferences of the contribution of attention to utility if left 
unaccounted for. The term  captures the contribution of the attention trajectories to 
brand utility. It allows different types of attention, as expressed in the superscript , to 
contribute to brand utility and allows their contribution to be time-varying, as expressed in 
the subscript . 
The random components  are assumed to be type I extreme value distributed, 
which gives a conditional logit formulation of brand choice (McFadden 1973). Specifically: 
 ( = | , ) =  ( )∑ ( ), (6) 
with ( = ) the probability that consumer  chooses brand . From eqs. 5 and 6 we can 




 = + + . (7) 
In eq. 7, the weight =  transforms the contribution ( ) of the  (0 to 
2) attention trajectories components to brand choice into brand utilities brand ( ) in each 
period , while controlling for prior consumer states and knowledge. We use these estimated 
utilities to examine how brand choice probabilities change during a single brand choice.  
2.4.3 Determinants of Attention Trajectories 
The formulation in eq. 5 lets consumer prior states and market-level preferences have direct 
effects on utility. Our model accommodates these and additional effects also on the attention 
trajectories in eq. 5. This expresses that attention trajectories are determined exogenously by 
stimulus and endogenously by person characteristics (Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer 2013; 
Chandon et al. 2009; Pieters and Warlop 1999). Specifically: 
 = + + , (8) 
 = + + . (9) 
Eq. 8 quantifies the extent to which consumer-specific attention trajectories are 
influenced by the information condition in the experiment ( ; coded -1 = low, 0 = medium, 
and 1 = high) and current product ownership ( = 1 if consumer  owns a brand in the 
product category, and 0 otherwise), and consumer-specific heterogeneity ( ). Eq. 9 
quantifies how much brand-specific attention trajectories are influenced by market-level 
brand preferences ( ), current brand ownership ( ), and brand-specific heterogeneity 
( ). Allowing market-level brand preferences and current brand ownership to influence 
both attention and choice reduces the possibility that estimated links between attention and 
choice are spurious. This is interesting of its own by documenting possible state dependence 
and status quo effects (Dubé et al. 2008) on attention and choice for complex products. Our 
research is the first to link attention in a brand choice context to previous brand choice, and 




Heterogeneities in attention trajectories ( and ) and eye-movement measures (  
and ) are assumed normally distributed with mean zero and uncorrelated between the 
brand and consumer-levels. Components of the attention trajectories ( ) for all eye-
movement measures ( ) are allowed to correlate at the brand ( ~ (0, )) and consumer-
level ( ~ (0, )). Eye-movement measures are allowed to correlate at each time period: ~ (0, ), ~ (0, ), with a block-diagonal structure on  and  at each time point 
(details in Appendix A).  
2.4.4 Model Estimation 
The joint likelihood of the model is: 
 ℒ( , | ) = ∏ ( = ∗| , ) ∏ ( | , ) ( | , , ) , (10) 
where BC is the vector of observed brand choices, Y contains the eye-movement measures, ≡ [ , , , , , , ] denotes all the parameters of the model: choice weights ( , ), 
brand and consumer specific attention trajectories ( ), overall attention trajectories ( ), 
brand and consumer specific effects (γ), and variances of the unobserved heterogeneities in 
eye-movement measures (Σ) and attention trajectories (Ψ) (details in Appendix A). The 
model is estimated in R using the RStan package (Carpenter et al. 2017; R Core Team 2018). 
We assess convergence using the Gelman-Rubin diagnostic – potential scale reduction factor 
(Gelman et al. 2013) and evaluate model fit based on the log marginal density (LMD) 
computed using the Gelfand and Dey method for the attention part (Gelfand and Dey 1994; 
Koop, Poirier, and Tobias 2007) and the Newton and Raftery method for the choice part 
(Rossi, Allenby, and McCulloch 2005), and the hit rate for brand choice (percentage correctly 
predicted choices). Models with LMDs closer to zero and with higher hit rates are preferable. 
One-tailed Bayesian p-values are reported for parameter estimates, indicating the percentage 






2.5.1 Attention Trajectories 
Table 2.1 has descriptive information about eye movements during the choice task for the 
three conditions, and for the chosen and non-chosen brands. To facilitate interpretation, it 
presents the shares of the three types of brand eye-saccades (within-brand, between-brand, 
and other) rather than their raw frequencies. We confirmed that all three components of the 
attention trajectories are required to describe the eye-movement patterns, and that consumer-
level and brand-level factors influence the attention trajectories by comparing the fit of the 
full model against three alternatives. A model with all three attention trajectory components 
and effects of current brand and product ownership, and information condition               
(LMD = -22,121) outperformed models with, respectively, only (1) the three attention 
trajectories (LMD = -24,005), (2) the initial level and linear component (LMD = -26,716), 
and (3) the initial level (LMD = -32,728). Table 2.2 provides estimates of the attention 
trajectories for the full model.   
Consumer-level Effects. By construction (normalization in time bins), consumer-level 
trajectories of the quantity of attention are constant across the choice task, and can only differ 
in their overall level. As reported in the Data section (2.3.3), the three information density 
conditions influenced the total quantity of attention that consumers allocated during the 
choice task (  = .19, SD = .06, p < .001, Table 2.2 top). Importantly, there were no 
differences between information conditions in integration, comparison, or other attention 
during the choice task (  = 1,  = 2). Product ownership did not significantly influence the 
consumer-level attention trajectories (all ps ≥ .14). Thus, attention trajectories of consumers 
varied in their level (  = 0) but not in their shape (  = 1,  = 2) across information conditions 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Components of Attention Trajectories 
Initial Level 
(  = 0) 
Linear Change 
(  = 1) 
Quadratic Change 
(  = 2) 
M SD p-value M SD p-value M SD p-value 
Consumer-level ( ) 
Brand eye fixations (  = 1) 
   Intercept ( ) 
   Information density ( ) 
   Product ownership ( ) 























































Within-brand saccades (  = 2) 
   Intercept ( ) 
   Information density ( ) 
   Product ownership ( ) 
   Heterogeneity ( ) 
Between-brand saccades (  = 3) 
   Intercept ( ) 
   Information density ( ) 
   Product ownership ( ) 
   Heterogeneity ( ) 
Other saccades (  = 4) 
   Intercept ( ) 
   Information density ( ) 
   Product ownership ( ) 








































































































































Brand-level ( ) 
Brand eye fixations (  = 1) 
   Brand ownership ( ) 
   Heterogeneity ( ) 
Within-brand saccades (  = 2) 
   Brand ownership ( ) 
   Heterogeneity ( ) 
Between-brand saccades (  = 3) 
   Brand ownership ( ) 
   Heterogeneity ( ) 
Other saccades (  = 4) 
   Brand ownership ( ) 












































































































Note – M = Mean estimate; SD = Standard deviation; p-value = one-tailed Bayesian significance level. All eye-
movement measures transformed natural log +1 prior to analysis. Information density: -1 = low, 0 = medium, 1 
= high. Product -, and brand ownership: 1 = yes, 0 = no. Effects of market-level preferences (brand fixed-





Brand-level Effects. As hypothesized, current brand ownership influenced attention 
trajectories. The initial level of the quantity of attention to the currently owned brand was 
significantly higher than to the other brands (.19, SD = .06, p < .001, Table 2.2). This was 
mostly due to a higher level of integration attention to the currently owned brand (.20, SD = 
.07, p = .003) rather than to elevated levels of comparison (.06, SD = .04, p = .07) or other 
attention (.07, SD = .05, p = .07). Also, the currently owned brand attracted a higher attention 
quantity towards the end of the task (quadratic change .04, SD = .02, p = .04).  
2.5.2 Contribution of Attention Trajectories to Brand Choice 
The proposed gSSM specifies that the accumulation of brand utilities is a function of the 
time-varying weights ( ) of time-varying, consumer- and brand-specific attention ( ). 
Theory Tests and Model Selection. We compared our proposed model against five 
competing models. Table 2.3 summarizes the key assumptions of each model, indicates how 
their specification differs from the full model, and presents model fit results. We examine 
these two sources of utility, and start with the contribution of attention. 
Model 1 has an LMD of -481 and a hit rate of 44%. This model assumes that attention 
during the choice task does not provide information about brand utility. Model 2 assumes that 
overt eye movements have a time-invariant contribution to brand utility, similar to previous 
research on attention and choice (Glaholt, Wu, and Reingold 2009; Krajbich et al. 2010; 
Pieters and Warlop 1999). Model 2 (LMD of -301 and hit rate of 68%) improves substantially 
over model 1, which provides initial support for our reasoning and RIT.  
Models 3 and 4 specify that the trajectories of attention contain information about 
brand utilities. Model 3 assumes that only the trajectories of attention quantity, and model 4 
that only those of the specific attention types contribute to brand utility. These models have 
similar fit (LMD of -170 and -175 respectively, and hit rate of 83%), both improving 




Table 2.3 Model selection 














Attention does not reflect 
brand utility. 
= 0, for = 1, … , 4; and = 0, … , 2 -481 (5) 44% 
M2 M1  
+ sum of eye 
fixations 
 
Sum of overt eye movements 
across all periods reflects 
brand utility. 
= ∑ ,  





M3 M1  
+ trajectories of 
attention quantity 
Contribution of attention 
quantity to utility is time-
varying. Utility is invariant 
to type of attention. 
 
= 0, for = 2, … , 4;  
and = 0, … , 2 -170 (8) 83% 
M4 M1  
+ trajectories of 
attention type 
Contribution of attention 
type to utility is time-
varying. Utility is invariant 
to quantity of attention. 
 
= 0, for = 1;  
and  = 0, … , 2 -175 (14) 83% 
M5 M1  




and type  
Increased attention during 
final stages of the choice 
task does not carry extra 
weight on brand utilities. 






Trajectories of attention 
quantity and type contribute 
to brand utilities throughout 
the choice task. 
 






Note: LMD is Log Marginal Density. Hit rate is the percent of correctly inferred brand choices. Null model without 
predictors has LMD -550 and hit rate 20% (1 out of 5).  = 1, …, 4 indexes eye-movement measures, respectively 
brand fixations, within-brand saccades, between-brand saccades, and other saccades; t = 1, …, 4 indexes time 




eye movements, and for the moment-to-moment changes in attention that take place during 
choice, which supports H1. 
Model 5 assumes that trajectories of attention quantity and type contribute to brand 
utility, but that the contribution increases linearly over time, without a boost towards the end. 
It is a restricted version of the full model without the quadratic change component of the 
attention trajectories. It has an LMD of -267 and a hit rate of 69%, both much worse than the 
full model, and models 2 and 3 which contained the quadratic change component.  
The full model outperforms all restricted models (LMD of -164 and hit rate of 85%). 
These results have two key implications. First, the findings support that the contribution of 
attention to utility is time-varying, expressing that early and later attention contribute 
differently to utility accumulation, which supports H3a. Second, the findings imply that both 
the trajectories of quantity and types of attention contribute to the accumulation of utility 
rather than only the trajectories of attention quantity or types, which supports H2a. Further 
hypothesis tests follow5. 
Contribution of Attention Quantity and Types. Table 2.4 gives parameter estimates of 
the full model, and of models 1 and 3 for comparison. Model 1 assumes that attention does 
not contribute to brand choice, and model 3 that only the trajectory of quantity of attention 
does. The contribution of attention to brand choice varies strongly across the time course of 
the choice task, as hypothesized. Specifically, the quantity of attention devoted to the brands 
(eye fixations) contributes stronger to brand choice in later than in earlier stages of the choice 
                                                            
5 As robustness check, we tested whether the results of the proposed model are invariant to the experimental 
conditions and to the total decision time of participants. We added interaction terms between each of the twelve 
attention trajectory components, and respectively, the information density condition and the total eye fixation 
frequency for each consumer after grand mean-centering. The follow-up models each have 12 additional 
parameters but did not improve in fit over the proposed model.  
We also calculated the hit rate for a model that predicts brand choice based on the brand fixed effects and brand 
ownership effects of the full model but restricts the contribution of attention to utility to zero. The hit rate of this 





task. The 95% CI of the quadratic change in attention quantity [12.75; 37.42] does not 
overlap those of the initial level [-.18; 4.17] or linear effect [2.35; 9.97]. The estimate of the 
quadratic change of attention for integration (22.24, p < .001) is also larger than the estimates 
of the initial level (2.89, p = .02) and linear change (7.70, p < .001), although the 95% CIs 
overlap. Taken together this is further evidence that later attention quantity contributes 
stronger to brand choice than earlier attention does, in support of H3a.  
Over and above the quantity of attention that brands receive, the contribution of 
attention for integration is statistically significant as well for the initial level (2.89, p = .02), 
linear (7.70, p < .001) and quadratic change (22.24, p <.001). Yet, only the initial level of 
attention for comparison is significant (3.16, p = .01), and none of the components of the 
trajectory of other attention are (p > .14). This supports H3b.  
A comparison of the three models in Table 2.4 shows that brand ownership 
contributes to predicting brand choice when attention is not accounted for (model 1), 
reflecting a state dependence effect. Importantly, prior ownership does not contribute 
significantly anymore once attention to the brands is accounted for (model 3, p =.09; full 
model, p = .18), and the CIs with model 1 do not overlap. Moreover, Table 2.2 shows that 
brand ownership led to increased attention quantity (eye fixations) and attention for 
integration (within-brand saccades) for the owned brand. This reveals that the state 
dependence effect here is captured by the attention trajectories, rather than by mere choice 
inertia or habit formation. This supports H4.  
A comparison of model 3 with the full model reveals that the contribution of the 
trajectory of attention quantity to brand choice drops when trajectories of attention types are 
added. Then, the contribution of the linear change in attention quantity more than halves from 
14.13 (p < .001) in model 3 to 6.22 (p < .001), with the respective 95% CIs not overlapping. 
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model 4 to 25.22 (p < .001) in the full model, with not overlapping 95% CIs. These results 
provide evidence that attention types, in particular attention for integration, contribute to 
brand choice over and above the mere attention quantity, and that eye saccades carry 
information about utility accumulation over and above fixations, supporting H2a and H2b. 
2.5.3 Attention Trajectories towards Brand Choice 
The analyses so far demonstrate that the contribution of attention to brand choice increased 
over time ( ), but not whether attention to the chosen brand across the four time bins 
increased ( ). We estimated a slightly adapted version of the model in eqs. 3 and 4 to 
examine this. Specifically, eye-movement frequencies were converted into eye-movement 
shares and used as response variables ( ) to facilitate comparison of heterogeneous 
consumers and eye-movement measures. Trajectories of attention shares were estimated by 
adding  to eq. 9, with the rest remaining unchanged. Here,  (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
indicates whether or not consumer  chooses brand , and  captures differences between 
chosen and non-chosen brands in the attention share trajectories. Table 2.5 and Figure 2.3 
document the attention trajectories for the chosen and non-chosen brands during choice.  
There is evidence of a “double attention bias” towards the ultimately chosen brand: 
(1) it progressively attracts more of the total attention quantity during the choice task, and (2) 
a progressively larger share of its attention is allocated to information integration. First, with 
five brands in the choice set, 20% would be the “fair share” of attention quantity for the 
chosen brand which is close to the intercept of the initial level (.19, p < .001, Table 2.5, 
column 1). Yet, the chosen brand already attracts 8 percentage points more attention quantity 
after the first quarter of the task (.08, p < .001). The attention bias towards the ultimately 
chosen brand accelerates when choice implementation nears (quadratic change .04, p < .001). 
In the last quarter the chosen brand reaps an estimated 44% of the attention quantity, which is 




remaining 56%. Inspection of the raw data in Table 2.1 (final two columns) further illustrates 
this. Figure 2.3 plots the model-estimated shares of attention quantity for the chosen brand 
(thick line in left plot) and the non-chosen brands (thick line in right plot). Attention bias 
towards the ultimately chosen brand is not restricted to the final quarter but reveals itself 
early on and across the whole trajectory. This attention bias cannot be explained by multiple 
brands completely being ignored towards the end of the choice task, such that the chosen 
brand becomes the sole “attention survivor.” Even in the last quarter, 60% of consumers still 
attended all five brands, 77% attended at least four, and 88% attended at least three.  
Second, with three specific types of attention, 33% would be the fair share of attention 
for each type. This is the intercept of the initial level of attention for information integration 
(.33, p < .001). Yet, even after the first quarter the ultimately chosen brand already attracts 9 
percentage points extra integration attention (.09, p < .001). This bias in integration attention 
for the ultimately chosen brand rises over time. The net effect of the linear (-.01, p = .39) and 
quadratic change (.03, p < .001) is positive. Figure 2.3 documents the resulting 18 percentage 
points increase in model-estimated share of integration attention for the chosen brand, from 
42% in the first quarter to 60% in the last quarter. The shares of comparison and other 
attention for the chosen brand similarly drop over time. In sharp contrast, shares of the three 
attention types for the non-chosen brands remain essentially stable (intercepts of linear and 
quadratic change are not different from zero; Table 2.5). To illustrate, the share of integration 
attention for the non-chosen brand is 33% in the first quarter and 27% in the final quarter.  
Taken together this supports the predictions from the proposed gSSM that both 
attention and its contribution to brand utility are time-varying. This is the first evidence that 
during choice the eventually chosen brand gains more of the total attention, that more of this 
attention is for information integration, and that the contribution of such attention to brand 








































































































































































































































































































































Components of Attention Trajectories 
Initial Level 
(  = 0) 
Linear Change 
(  = 1) 
Quadratic Change 
(  = 2) 
M SD p-value M SD p-value M SD p-value 
Attention Quantity 
   Intercept 
   Brand chosen 
   Brand owned 
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   Brand owned 





































Note: M = Mean estimate; SD = Standard deviation; p-value is one-tailed Bayesian significance level. Attention 
shares are examined. Integration, comparison, and other attention shares are relative to each other. Attention 
quantity shares are relative to other brands. Brand chosen: 1 = yes, 0 = no. Brand owned: 1 = yes, 0 = no. 
Effects of brand fixed-effects (brand-level), and of information density and product ownership (consumer-level) 
not shown to save space. 
 
2.5.4 Model-based Inferences 
The model allows us to infer the trajectories of utility and from these the choice probability 
trajectory of the chosen brand for each consumer using backward induction (eq. 7). That is, 
for the start of the choice task and for each of the four time periods during the choice task, we 
identify the brand most likely to be eventually chosen for each consumer, and compare this 
with the actually chosen brand. Choice probabilities at the start of the task (Q0), when no 
attention has been allocated yet, are based on model 1, and the rest on the full model. The 
accuracy of inferring final brand choice from the model estimates is termed “inference 




(Q1 to Q4) and before the start (Q0), there are 32 patterns of inference accuracy. Table 2.6 
(column “all”) and Figure 2.4 (thick line) summarize the results for all participants. The 
bottom part of Table 2.6 summarizes inference accuracy for each time period separately. 
Inference accuracy is already 56% after two quarters, reaching a high 77% after three 
quarters, and the final 85% at the end of the choice task. The thick line in Figure 2.4 shows 
these sharp increases in inference accuracy for the sample as a whole. 
Expression and Accumulation of Utility. The specific accuracy patterns provide 
deeper insights. For a high 33% of the sample final brand choice could be accurately inferred 
in all four quarters during the choice task (patterns 31 and 32 in Table 2.6). These consumers 
where from start to end on-track to choose their preferred brand, attended to it most during 
the choice task and chose it. For a further 19% of the sample, brand choice could be 
accurately inferred in the final three quarters (patterns 29 and 30). These consumers quickly 
learned and “knew early” their preferred brand, attended to it most from there on and chose it. 
A further 21% of the sample “formed their final preference later” so that their final brand 
choice could be accurately inferred in the final two quarters (patterns 25 to 28). Thus, for a 
high 73% of the sample, final brand choice could be inferred at least in the final two quarters 
of the choice task. And for a low 9% of the sample (n = 32, patterns 17 and 18), final choice 
could be inferred only in the final quarter. These consumers apparently formed their 
preference for the finally chosen brand late in the task. 
For another 4% of the sample (n = 13, patterns 9 to 16), final choice could be 
accurately inferred in the third but not the final quarter. These few consumers most likely 
engage in verification of other brands during the last quarter before implementing the final 
choice that they had made earlier (Russo and Leclerc 1994; Stüttgen et al. 2012).  
State Dependence Effects. The stratified sample of various brand owners and non-
product owners also permits exploring state dependence effects on choice for complex 
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Table 2.6 Attention – choice link over time 
Pattern 
Inference Accuracy of 














(n = 342) 
Loyal 
(n = 129) 
Switch 
(n = 117) 
Other 

































































































































































































































































































































 Accuracy (%) after:       
 Quarter 0  44 100 0 24 
 Quarter 1  39 51 36 28 
 Quarter 2  56 68 53 44 
 Quarter 3  77 84 73 73 
 Quarter 4  85 93 79 80 
Note: Choice inferences at Q0 based on model 1. Loyal consumers choose the brand they currently 
own, hence 100% inference accuracy at Q0. Consumers who switch chose another than the currently 
owned brand, hence, 0% inference accuracy at Q0. Other consumers choose the highest choice share 
brand, which is 24% for brand 2. Bolded hit rates indicate significant difference (p < .05) from 
previous quarter for same segment. In all quarters, inference accuracy for loyals is higher than for 
switchers and others, which do not differ from each other, except after Q0, when inference accuracy 
for others is better. 
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Figure 2.4 Choice probability trajectory for the chosen brand  
 
 
products. Note that choice probability of the loyal segment is 53% before starting the task and 
then drops in the first quarter to 44%. This drop is due to the initial attention that these 
consumers allocate to other brands than the brand they own and eventually choose again. 
Choice probability for the loyal segment increases to 55% after the first two quarters and 
eventually reaches 86%. Choice probability patterns for the other customer segments are 
similar but shifted down. 
 
2.6 Discussion 
This chapter set out to answer two key questions: (1) how do trajectories of attention to each 
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and (2) which fundamental attention processes contribute to the accumulation of utility and 
brand choice. It was motivated by the RIT idea that, because attention is scarce, it is in 
consumers’ best interest to bias their limited attention in favor of strong candidates and pay 
less attention to weak candidates in a choice task. Yet, strong and weak candidates are not 
always immediately evident to consumers and gradually emerge in particular in complex 
choice tasks. Attention trajectories document this accumulation of utility.  
We proposed a generalized Sequential Sampling Model (gSSM) to answer these 
questions. It extends earlier models and research in three important ways. First, it 
decomposes overt eye-movement measures into covert attention and measurement error. This 
provides unbiased and dis-attenuated estimates of the link between eye movements, attention, 
and expected brand utility. Second, it separates the quantity of attention, as reflected in eye 
fixations, from the types of attention, as reflected in saccades between successive eye 
fixations. It identifies three types of attention, respectively, integration, comparison, and 
other. This provides insight into higher-order processes that may contribute to brand utility, 
and which cannot be readily identified otherwise. Third, it decomposes attention trajectories 
into key components: their initial level, and linear and quadratic change. This makes it 
possible to monitor when attentional preferences for brands surface during the choice task, 
and to quantify the contribution that the earlier and later stages have to utility and final 
choice. We estimated the gSSM on data from a large-scale eye-tracking experiment, with a 
national, stratified sample of 342 consumers. The results provide answers to both key 
questions, and empirical support for our hypotheses. 
First, we found that covert attention was more intimately linked to brand choice than 
overt eye fixations were, in support of our hypotheses. Thus, prior research that has treated 




underestimated the link between attention and utility, and may have missed links where these 
exist. 
Second, the trajectory of attention quantity contributed more to brand choice than the 
accumulated final sum of attention did. This supports the idea that the contribution of 
attention to utility is time-varying, and that later attention contributes more to utility than 
earlier attention. 
Third, the trajectories of attention types contributed to brand choice over and above 
the trajectory of attention quantity. This supports the idea that eye saccades provide insight 
into utility accumulation over and above the sheer frequency of eye fixations. It also 
highlights the importance of controlling for attention type when quantifying the contribution 
of attention quantity, and that a failure to do so might overestimate the contribution of the 
latter.   
Fourth, final brand choice revealed itself in attention trajectories early on. So it is not 
the case that attention only became biased towards the preferred brand just before expressing 
the final choice. In fact, the finally chosen brand already gained 8 percentage points more 
overall attention than its fair share after the first quarter of the task, and ended up with 24 
percentage points more in the last quarter (44% of the total attention). 
Fifth, in particular attention for information integration contributed significantly to 
brand choice, and in particular later during the choice task. This marks the importance of eye 
saccades within-brands which consumers deploy to form an overall evaluation of the merits 
and costs of a particular brand when faced with a complex choice, such as when choosing a 
smartphone. Thus, the finally chosen brand progressively gained more attention overall 
during the choice task, and an increasingly larger share of this attention was allocated to 




half of the choice task, the final choice of 56% of the consumers already revealed itself in 
their attention patterns. 
Sixth, state dependence effects, when consumers chose the new device of the brand 
they already owned, were fully captured by attentional trajectories to the brand, rather than 
being habitual or automatic. It was not the case that all loyal consumers only attended to the 
finally chosen brand; in fact they tended to allocate their early attention to other brands. Also, 
while information density influenced the duration of the choice task, it did not influence the 
attention trajectories nor the contribution of the attention trajectories to brand choice. This is 
suggestive of the fundamental nature of the link between trajectories of attention, the 
accumulation of utility, and final choice. 
2.6.1 Implications and Future Directions 
Our findings demonstrate the usefulness of the gSSM to examine (in)attention and its 
implications for choice. In support of the central tenet of RIT, consumers indeed did not 
allocate their attention proportionally across the brands, but instead biased their attention 
toward the brand they eventually chose, which has been documented before. Yet, a surprising 
result of our experiment is how early during the choice task the eventually chosen brand 
already attracted more than its fair share of attention. Thus, preferential allocation of attention 
was an emergent property that started much earlier than documented before. Prior research 
has reported a so-called “gaze cascade” where the finally chosen brand attracts a 
disproportionate amount of attention just before choice implementation. For instance, 
Shimojo et al. (2003) observed increased attention to the chosen alternative in the final 
second before choice. Shi et al. (2013) observed a similar effect in the final three fixations, 
which is about one second. Atalay et al. (2012) reported a gaze cascade effect in the final five 
seconds of choice for vitamins and food-replacement bars. If such an attention bias for the 




managerial and policy relevance. Our results are the first to document a much earlier 
attentional bias towards the ultimately chosen brand; revealing a “preferential attention 
trajectory” from the outset of brand choice in an information-rich environment. This opens up 
opportunities for novel theories and research about preference formation during choice tasks, 
and potentially managerial intervention if undesirable choice options appear to gain early 
traction.  
The findings do not imply that consumers were completely path-dependent and 
universally chose the brand that initially garnered most attention. In fact, the findings reveal 
clear individual differences between consumers in how early the final winner revealed itself. 
Thus, 33% of consumers expressed preferential attention towards their final choice from the 
first quarter of the task onwards. Yet, 19% of consumers did so only after the first quarter, 
another 20% only after the second quarter, and 6% only after the third quarter. This reveals 
substantial variation in the accumulation of utility for the chosen brand.  
An interesting avenue for further research and interventions is to assess the effects of 
intra-task changes in the information structure and content of the choice options. Such 
changes can occur exogenously, when a new brand or offer pop-up during the choice task that 
consumers are engaged in, or endogenously as a consequence of the attention trajectories 
themselves. For instance, contingent on the brand currently garnering preferential attention, 
new information about that brand or about competing brands might accelerate or decelerate 
utility accumulation. In a first stage, the gSSM could be trained on eye-movement and final 
choice data of participants to derive attention trajectories and brand utility weights. In a 
second stage, the model could then be used to predict final choice from the attentional 
trajectories of (other) participants before they implement their choice. We implement this 
approach in Chapter 3 in the context of consumer choice. The results help to understand and 




making (Pärnamets et al. 2015). In a recent review, Al-Moteri et al. (2017, p. 63) conclude 
that “…the investigation of eye-movement behavior in deliberate (analytical) decision-
making modes does not appear to be a priority in eye-tracking studies in the medical field. 
This is an important area for future research.” The proposed model and inference approach 
can inform such research and applications. 
The present findings are the first, to our knowledge, to document the tight link 
between the accumulation of brand utility and trajectories of specific types of attention, in 
particular attention for information integration, over and above the mere quantity of attention. 
This extends RIT and prior SSMs which have emphasized the quantity of attention as the 
dominant or sole driver of utility. Yet, the same attention quantity to brands, as reflected in 
eye fixations, can be the result of qualitatively different specific types of attention, which 
may contribute differently to utility accumulation. Shi et al. (2013) examined the relationship 
between choice and the total duration that consumers were in a state of specific attention. 
Here, we quantify the contribution that the whole trajectory of different attention types for 
each brand has to utility, and over and above the trajectory of attention quantity, which is 
new. Our findings also suggest that choice models need to account for stickiness due to 
inattention to correctly model the impact of prior choice on current choices, because the 
processes accounting for state dependence (inattention, inertia, habit formation) have 
different managerial and public policy implications.  
Our work has important limitations which point to future theory development and 
research. First, the findings support the idea that over and above the sheer amount of attention 
quantity, attention for information integration contributed to brand choice, but are contingent 
on the specific decision studied. Although the findings are broadly consistent with work that 
used information display boards to examine choice between gambles (Willemsen et al. 2011) 




complex choice with a small choice and large feature set, and consumers who were in the 
market for the target product. When the choice set is large and the feature set is small, or 
when consumers are not yet in the market for a (new) purchase attention trajectories and their 
contribution to final choice might be different (Lohse and Johnson 1996; Shi et al. 2013). 
Future research with our model can test the role of choice and feature set sizes, and other 
contextual factors on the contribution that the various attention types have on choice.  
Second, in an effort to keep the modeling tractable, to account for measurement error, 
and based on theory about stages in decision making, the eye-movement data were 
normalized into four time bins for each consumer. This is consistent with prior research that 
has used one up to four time bins (Meißner et al. 2016; Pieters and Warlop 1999; Willemsen 
et al. 2011), but limits the amount of detail about attention trajectories and utility 
accumulation. It also precludes modeling the time that consumers take to make a choice, 
which is an important caveat. Follow-up research which jointly models brand choice and 
individual decision time is particularly called for (Cavanagh et al. 2014). This is the focus of 
the model we develop in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.  
Third, our model is agnostic about the causal processes linking attention and utility at 
each point in time, as other models are (Manohar and Husain 2013; Reutskaja et al. 2011). 
Thus, we cannot claim that attention causes utility, only that they are empirically strongly 
associated. The observed systematic links between trajectories of attention, utility and choice, 
informed by theory, do suggest such a causal link, but our data and model do not permit 
strong causal inferences. It is reasonable to assume that attention and utility are part of a 
positive feedback loop (Shimojo et al. 2003), with utility driving attention (consumers search 
for value; Yang et al. (2015)), and attention driving utility (via changes in the utility weights; 
Bordalo et al. (2013)), with reasonable time-out mechanisms. Whereas both causal directions 




moment-to-moment bidirectional effects between attention and utility, which is an important 
direction for future research.   
Linking work on attention and choice to the literature on sequential search for 
information and choice would prove very useful in establishing such structural and causal 
links. Especially work on repeated search decisions leading to a (single) purchase decision 
would be relevant. There is initial work to formalize costly search for information before 
obtaining the rewards from a choice between multiple products (Ke, Shen, and Villas-Boas 
2016) or a choice of a single product with multiple features (Branco, Sun, and Villas-Boas 
2016). This type of work relies on various simplifying assumptions and as the number of 
attributes and options rise, estimating such models becomes intractable. Integrating our 
descriptive attention-and-choice model with search-and-choice theories is challenging but a 
potentially fruitful area for cross-disciplinary work, novel theories and empirical findings. 
Such future work will add to the current effort to identify fundamental links between eye 




Chapter 3  
How Attention Reveals Why Consumers Choose What When 
3.1 Introduction  
Consumers use online environments to make choices, such as selecting health insurance or 
making a purchase for a durable good. This facilitates access to detailed information that 
consumers could inspect in order to identify the choice alternative that provides the best 
utility match. Yet, consumers (1) acquire only some information about a limited set of 
alternatives. Even more, by the time they make a brand choice, consumers (2) will have 
repeatedly inspected information about the brand that they eventually choose and (3) will 
have done so increasingly towards the end of the decision process. These three characteristics 
of how consumers inspect brands before choice have been documented with observational 
data that covers weeks of online search (Bronnenberg et al. 2016) and in controlled studies 
that facilitate information acquisition by presenting brands side-by-side (Meißner et al. 2016; 
Shi et al. 2013; Yang et al. 2015).  
Models in the bounded rationality literature (Simon 1955) found that information 
acquisition and processing costs motivate consumers to inspect only parts of the available 
information while leaving others unexplored. While this justifies the first of the three 
characteristics of how consumers inspect brands before choice, the explanation for the other 
two remains unknown. Namely, it is not clear why consumers are more likely to repeatedly 
inspect information about the brand that they eventually choose and why they do so 
increasingly towards the end of the decision process. These cannot be explained by 
information processing costs as there is no compelling reason why consumers would be more 
likely to forget information about the brand that they eventually choose closer to the moment 




Building on rational inattention theory (RIT) (Caplin and Dean 2015; Steiner et al. 
2017) and sequential sampling models (SSM) (Krajbich et al. 2010; Ratcliff and Smith 2004), 
we propose that consumers decide from moment-to-moment (1) what brand to inspect and (2) 
for how long in order to reduce uncertainty about the utilities of the brands on display. This 
does not exclude the impact of information processing costs, but suggest that consumers are 
more likely to verify information for brands that are worth the effort. Therefore, differences 
in attention to brands are closely linked to brand utilities and choice probabilities. The 
sequential nature of eye movements that consumers use to inspect the brands offers the 
opportunity to predict both brand choice and its timing from moment to moment, as the 
consumer progresses through the task.  
In this chapter we develop a model that provides insights into how consumers decide 
(1) what brand to choose and (2) the moment when to express their choice, and (3) how these 
decisions are linked to the sequential eye movements that precede them. The model specifies 
that consumers use eye movements to inspect the brands on display until choosing one of 
them justifies foregoing the net benefits of additional information. The model is calibrated on 
eye-tracking and choice data from a study (N = 214) on single choice between four digital 
cameras for which information is displayed side-by-side. We use eye movements that 
consumers make during the task, as manifest indicators of information acquisition and 
attentional processes (Just and Carpenter 1980; Shi et al. 2013), to gain insights into rapid 
and partly automatic moment-to-moment decision-making processes (Lohse and Johnson 
1996; Russo and Leclerc 1994; Wedel et al. 2008). We use the results of the proposed model 
to test the empirical support for implications of SSM and RIT. The rest of the chapter is 
organized as follows. In the next section we present the model and explain how it relates to 
existing theories. Then, we describe the study, the econometric specification of our model, 




3.2 Eye movements, Utility Accumulation, and Brand Choice 
We propose an attention and utility accumulation model to formalize the link between eye 
movements and brand choice during a single consumer decision. Our approach focuses on 
choice from a set of  brands for which information is displayed side-by-side, such as on 
comparison websites. In this setting, consumers inspect the brands by moving their eyes to 
different areas of the display. During this visual inspection process, the eyes move rapidly 
from one location of the display to another. Eye-fixations are brief moments (200-400 msec.) 
when the consumer acquires information from a specific location that the eye is fixated on 
(Rayner 1998). In what follows, we index brands with  ( = 1, … , ) and moments during 
the decision process with  ( = 1, … , ), where  is the number of brands on display and  
is the moment when brand choice is expressed. One moment corresponds to a sequence of 
two or more consecutive fixations on the same brand. For example, if a consumer uses four 
consecutive eye-fixations to inspect brand 1, these correspond to a moment  when  = 1 is 
inspected using  = 4 eye-fixations (section 3.3.3 provides a more detailed description). 
Consumers are strategic about what brand they inspect and for how long they do so 
from moment-to-moment before choice. Specifically, they inspect in more detail brands that 
appear promising and pay minimal or even no attention to those that are not worth the effort. 
This implies that sequences of eye-fixations are closely linked to the moment-to-moment 
accumulation of utility that takes place until the final brand choice is observed. The model 
has four components: eye movements (eq. 1), brand utility (eq. 2), search utility (eq. 3), and 
moment-to-moment utility comparison (eq. 4). Figure 3.1 offers a visual representation of the 
model and the four components. In Table 3.1 we summarize the model components and 
assumptions, their implications, and the empirical evidence needed to support them. We now 
provide a concise description of the decision process for a consumer  and in the next section 
discuss how the model components and their determinants are related to RIT and SSM. 
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Figure 3.1 Eye movements, utility accumulation, and brand choice 
 
 
Note: = ( , ) indicates that at moment  consumer  uses  eye fixations to examine brand ; = 1, … , ; = ( , … , ) is the sequence in which consumer  inspects the brands on display up to 
moment ; = 1, … , ;  is the uncertainty experienced by consumer  at moment ; ∗ is the brand with 
maximum utility among the  brands on display;  is the moment of choice for consumer ;  is the action 






At each moment  ( = 1, … , ) during a choice task, the consumer uses eye-fixations 
to inspect the brands on display. We use = ( , ) to indicate the brand ( ) 
inspected by the consumer  at time  using  eye-fixations. Let = ( , … , ) be the 
time-sequence in which the consumer examines the brands on display up to moment . For 
example, if at = 3 the consumer has two fixations on brand 4 ( = (4, 2)) and before that 
had three fixations on brand 3 ( = (3, 3)) and four on brand 1 ( = (1, 4)), then =( , , ) = ((4, 2), (3, 3), (1, 4)). 
The consumer uses the information acquired up to moment  to calculate two types of 
utility: (1) brand utility and (2) search utility derived from inspecting the brands longer. Then, 
the consumer compares these utilities and takes one of two possible actions: (1) end the 
decision process by choosing the brand that provides the largest utility ( = ∗, where max = ∗ ) and (2) continue to inspect the brands ( = 0). The consumer expresses 
brand choice when the utility of choosing a brand is larger than that of continuing the search.  
Eye movements: = ( , ) +  (1) 
Brand utility:  = ( = | ) (2) 
Search utility: = ( = 0| , ) (3) 
Utility comparison: 
 = ∗,  max ≥   max = ∗0,  max ≤  (4) 
Where: = ( , ) indicates the brand  examined by consumer  at moment  
using  eye-fixations; = 1, … , ;  is the information acquisition strategy that 
consumer  uses at moment  (described in section 3.2.1);  is an unobserved random error 
(described in section 3.2.1);  is the action consumer  takes at moment ; = ( , … , ) 




the brand with maximum utility among the  brands on display; = 1, … ,  where  is the 
moment of choice for consumer . Subscript  indicates values at moment  while superscript 
 indicates a vector of length  that contains all values up to and including moment . For 
example, = ( , … , ) is the sequence of actions of consumer  up to and including . 
3.2.1 Eye Movements 
Costly information acquisition motivates consumers to be strategic in how they inspect the 
brands and what information they attend to (Steiner et al. 2017; Yang et al. 2015). After an 
initial orientation stage during which the brands are only briefly looked at, consumers inspect 
in more detail those brands that appear promising (Russo and Leclerc 1994). Hence, the 
decision of what brand and for how long to inspect depends on the current evaluation of the 
brands and the information previously acquired (Stüttgen et al. 2012; Willemsen et al. 2011; 
Yang et al. 2015). To the extent that (1) consumers inspect the brands they are more likely to 
choose and (2) consumers prefer different brands, there is brand and consumer heterogeneity 
in eye-movement sequences. 
Eq. 1 formalizes three important aspects of the link between eye movements and 
utility. First, the model specifies that consumers decide which brand ( ) and for how long 
( ) to inspect based on what they previously fixated on ( ) and the corresponding 
accumulation of utility ( ). This is consistent with evidence that consumers revisit brands 
that they eventually choose (Bronnenberg et al. 2016; Krajbich et al. 2010), and suggests that 
the amount and timing of attention reflect how the consumer evaluates the brands. This 
behavior has been documented even when consumers are expected to use a strategy that 
renders revisits improbable, such as a satisficing strategy (Stüttgen et al. 2012). Second, the 
link between eye movements and utility is consumer and time specific ( ). This accounts for 
evidence that consumers use various decision strategies that lead to different amounts and 




between such strategies during the process (Shi et al. 2013). Third, the model accounts for 
unobserved error ( ) in the mapping between what consumers intend to focus on and the 
exact location of their eye-fixations, which can be due to salience (Hutton 2008; van der Lans 
et al. 2008b) and corrective eye movements (Reichle and Drieghe 2015). 
3.2.2 Utility Accumulation 
Rational Inattention Theory asserts that “limits on attention impact choice” (Caplin and Dean 
2015, p. 2183). Recently, analytical models of optimal information-processing behavior have 
been proposed (Matějka and McKay 2015; Steiner et al. 2017) that as far as we know have 
not been tested empirically. We build on these theoretical developments and offer a model 
that is calibrated on eye movements and brand choice data. In this section we describe how 
the two types of utility (brand and search) are related to the attention reflected by eye-
movement sequences.    
Brand utility. The amount of attention that the consumer allocates to each of the 
brands is reflected in the total number of eye-fixations they receive, which is linked to choice 
probabilities and preference (Glaholt et al. 2009; Krajbich et al. 2010; Pieters and Warlop 
1999). When the consumer finds a brand interesting enough to inspect in more detail and use 
in comparisons with other brands, the number of fixations on this brand increases over time. 
This reflects a larger amount of attention on the brand ( ̅ ) relative to the other brands on 
display. While over time consumers can inspect two brands for about the same time, at a 
specific moment  their eyes can only fixate on one of the brands. The moments when 
consumers inspect a brand reflect how their interest in each of the brands grows or diminishes 
as they come across new information or as they become more certain of the brand utilities. 
More specifically, brands that have recently been fixated on are more likely to be considered 
as compared to brands that have not been inspected in a while, even if the consumer 




closely linked both to the extent that the brand has been under focus ( ̅ ) and to the 
moments when this took place ( ̿ ).  
Search Utility. Consumers balance the costs and benefits of examining the brands 
longer when they decide whether to choose one of the brands at current time  or to postpone 
the choice for a later moment >  (Krajbich et al. 2010; Meißner et al. 2016; Yang et al. 
2015). Before acquiring any information about the brands, consumers are uncertain about 
which of the brands offers the best utility match. By examining the brands on display, 
consumers reduce uncertainty about the brand utilities and are better able to make a choice. 
As the brands are inspected in more detail, the utility of continuing the search reduces unless 
consumers acquire information that makes them less confident about their final choice. This 
implies that consumers derive more utility for search when they are uncertain (high ) 
which of the brands is a better match than when they are confident about which of the brands 
is best (low ). This is consistent with evidence that consumers spend more time in the 
decision process when there are two or more good alternatives than when one of them 
dominates the others (Krajbich et al. 2010; Meißner et al. 2016)  
3.2.3 Utility Comparison 
The consumer ends the decision process when the utility of one of the brands ( ∗ ) is larger 
than that of additional search ( ). Therefore,  is a decision threshold that one of the 
brands needs to reach in order for choice to be expressed. Our model accounts for three 
determinants of the moment of choice: (1) the utility that the consumer derives by ending the 
search and choosing the best brand, (2) uncertainty, and (3) time costs, as we explain in more 
detail in section 3.4 (Econometric Specification). 
3.2.4 Contribution 
Standard rational choice models make the assumption that consumers have all information 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































acquire all available information, which impacts their brand choice. This has motivated the 
development of new theories and models, such as rational inattention theory (RIT) (Matějka 
and McKay 2015; Steiner et al. 2017) and sequential sampling models (SSM) (Krajbich et al. 
2010; Ratcliff and Smith 2004), that explain choice while accounting for limited information 
acquisition and processing. The model developed in this chapter builds on these theories. It 
jointly models the two outcomes of the decision process (the chosen brand and the moment of 
choice) and contributes to the literature in three important ways. 
First, the model predicts what consumers are going to choose from moment-to-
moment as they inspect the brands before expressing their choice. We do this by using 
differences in the amount and timing of attention that each brand receives to infer how (1) 
consumers evaluate the brands at every moment before choice is observed and how (2) these 
evaluations change as consumers continue to inspect the brands. This differs from previous 
models that provide insight into how consumers evaluate the brands only after brand choice is 
observed, but that cannot be used to predict choice during the process. Such models  focus on 
differences between brands over predefined time intervals relative to the observed moment of 
choice: four equal time bins (previous chapter), the two halves of the decision process 
(Meißner et al. 2016), or the final few seconds before choice (Atalay et al. 2012; Shimojo et 
al. 2003).  
Second, the model jointly models the final brand choice and the moment when it is 
expressed, which has been indicated as an important research area (Cavanagh et al. 2014; 
Krajbich, Oud, and Fehr 2014). The model predicts both the eventually chosen brand and the 
moment of choice for new consumers and updates these predictions from moment-to-moment 
as more eye-fixations are observed. This is not possible using previous methods as they 
require prior preference measurements (Krajbich et al. 2010; Reutskaja et al. 2011), 




sequence of eye movements (Atalay et al. 2012; Shimojo et al. 2003). While our empirical 
application makes use of data from a controlled eye tracking experiment, the model is more 
widely applicable, as we explain in the general discussion section.  
Third, the model investigates how consumers balance the costs and benefits of 
inspecting the brands longer and quantifies their effects on decision time. This has important 
implications for understanding consumer variation in decision time and extends previous 
SSMs, such as the aDDM, which assume a consumer-invariant threshold fixed prior to the 
decision task (Ashby et al. 2016; Krajbich et al. 2010). Understanding how consumers adjust 
the decision threshold from moment-to-moment during preference-based choice provides an 
important extension of previous applications of SSM in perceptual decision making 
(Cavanagh et al. 2014; Forstmann et al. 2016). 
3.2.5 Model Comparison 
We test the proposed model by comparing it against two groups of competing models (Table 
3.2). The first group contains models M1 and M2 that have different assumptions about the 
link between eye movements and brand utility. The second group contains three models (M3, 
M4, and M5) that specify different determinants of the moment when brand choice is 
expressed. Comparing our model (M6) against these specifications test assumptions about the 
link between eye movements and brand choice, and sources of variation in decision time. 
M1 specifies that the mapping from brand utilities to eye-fixations occurs without 
error ( = 0, eq. 1), which is a common assumption in previous work (Cavanagh et al. 
2014; Krajbich et al. 2010; Pieters and Warlop 1999; Reutskaja et al. 2011). Chapter 2 reports 
initial evidence against this assumption. Furthermore, this chapter investigates the impact of 









































































































































































































































































































Similar to our proposed model, M2 accounts for imperfect mapping between what 
utility and eye-fixations ( , eq. 1). However, M2 assumes that the moments when the 
consumer examines each brand does not reflect brand utilities over and above the amount of 
attention. This is a core assumption of analytical models of RIT (Matějka and McKay 2015; 
Steiner et al. 2017).  
M3 specifies that consumers inspect the brands as long as continuing the search 
provides them with non-negative utility. This assumption is consistent with applications of 
the aDDM in which consumers use a fixed decision threshold set before the start of the 
process. If M3 provides a better fit than the proposed model, then the decision to continue the 
search is not influenced by consumers’ uncertainty ( ) or by the brand utility consumers 
would derive by expressing choice ( = 0  > 0 and = ∗  < 0, where max = ∗ , eq. 4). 
M4 relaxes M3 by specifying that the extent to which the consumer is uncertain about 
which brand offers more utility ( ) influences search utility. This is in line with previous 
applications that have found longer decision durations when choice alternatives provide very 
similar utility (Krajbich et al. 2010; Krajbich and Rangel 2011). Same as M3, M4 assumes 
consumers’ decision to continue inspecting the brands is not influenced by the utility of the 
best brand on the display. 
Different from M3 and M4, M5 assumes that consumers compare the utility they can 
derive by choosing the best brand against the utility of continuing the search. However, M5 
specifies that the decision to continue the search is not influenced by uncertainty. This 
implies that consumers do not benefit from additional information that can help them 
differentiate between the brands as long as choosing any of them provides sufficient utility. 
While this assumption is typical for DDM, it is not always supported by applications that 




two or more good alternatives than when one of the brands dominates the others (Cavanagh 
et al. 2014; Krajbich et al. 2010; Reutskaja et al. 2011). 
Empirical support for our model would imply that (1) both the amount of attention 
and the moments when the brands attracted it reflect brand utilities, (2) it is necessary to 
account for unobserved error in the mapping between utility and eye-fixations, (3) consumers 
express brand choice when brand utility reaches a time and consumer specific decision 
threshold, and (4) uncertainty motivates consumers to inspect the brands longer and postpone 
brand choice.  
 
3.3 Data 
3.3.1 Participants and Design 
Students at a large public university (N = 214) participated in a study on consumers’ choice 
for a digital camera. The experiment lasted approximately ten minutes and it was part of a 
one-hour session with other unrelated studies. Participants received the following instruction: 
“You have decided to purchase a digital camera today. Your price range is €300-400 and you 
are buying the digital camera online. Afterwards you will carefully examine your 
expectations and the experiences with the camera.” The experiment had a between-subjects 
design and participants were randomly assigned to one of the following five conditions: (1) 
avoiding regret about the outcomes (40 participants), (2) avoiding regret about the process 
(41 participants), (3) avoiding disappointment (43 participants), (4) following the brain 
(rational, cognitive) (41 participants), and (5) following the heart (affective, emotional) (49 
participants). These conditions mimic different decision goals that are expected to influence 
how participants inspect the brands (Bettman et al. 1998; Shi et al. 2013). After reading 
specific instructions depending on the condition they were assigned to, participants were 




participants received feedback about their choice (on screen) and answered a questionnaire 
about their expectations and experience with the camera and the choice. The last slide had a 
message to thank the participants for their cooperation. All participants were paid 7$ for 
participating in the one-hour session. Responses to the post-choice questionnaire are not used 
in the current study, and the goal manipulation had minimal effects on attention and choice 
and is not further considered. 
 
Figure 3.2 Stimulus and example of gaze plot for one participant 
 
 
3.3.2 Eye-tracking Procedure 
Participants were informed that their eye movements were going to be recorded while they 
made a choice between four digital cameras. The experimental room was a cubicle containing 




seated in front of the screen such that the center of the screen was on the same level as their 
eyes. The distance between the eyes and the screen was 60 centimeters and all tracking was 
binocular at a frame-rate of 50Hz. Participants saw the instructions and stimuli slides 
projected on the screen and could move to the next slide by pressing the space bar. After 
deciding which brand to choose, participants could indicate their choice by fixating on the 
chosen brand and pressing the space bar to record their choice. Slide projectors, eye 
recordings, and brand choice recordings were computer controlled. 
3.3.3 Grouping Fixations into Moments 
A fixation is defined as a relatively stable eye-in-head position within some threshold of 
dispersion (usually ~2°) and with a velocity of 15-100 degrees per second (Duffy, Morris, 
and Rayner 1988). This study uses number of fixations on specific relevant areas of the 
stimulus display, similar to other research on eye movements (Pieters and Warlop 1999). 
Eye-tracking data offer a detailed account of the areas attended to during the choice 
process. However, a single fixation is not enough to process detailed textual or numerical 
product details (Glaholt, Wu, and Reingold 2010; Stüttgen et al. 2012; Yang et al. 2015). Eye 
fixations are grouped into more meaningful measures of brand focus named moments, similar 
to previously work (Meißner et al. 2016). One moment corresponds to a sequence of two or 
more consecutive fixations on a brand, separated by at most one fixation on a different brand. 
For example, the fixations in the sequence ‘b1 b1 b1 b4 b1 b4 b3’ correspond to two 
moments. During the first moment ( = (1, 4)) the consumer uses four eye-fixations to 
inspect brand 1 and during the second moment ( = (4, 2)) two fixations are used to inspect 
brand 4. Let  be the number of fixations on brand  at moment : 
 = ,  ℎ      0, ℎ  (5) 




cumulated by brand . There are  such sequences, one for each brand on display, and they 
indicate the timing and amount of attention allocated to each of the brands thus far. 
Brand choice shares are 42% (brand 1), 12% (brand 2), 7% (brand 3), and 39% (brand 4) 
(Figure 3.3). Participants in our study express their final choice, on average, after 21 brand 
visits regardless of the brand that they eventually choose (F-test = 1.48, p-value = .221) 
(Figure 3.4). While the chosen brand receives more than 25% of fixations (M = 35%, p-value 
<.001) and visits (M = 32%, p-value <.001), all of the brands on display are inspected at least 
once by 91% of the participants. 
 
Figure 3.3 Number of participants who choose one of the brands 
 
 





3.4 Econometric Specification 
3.4.1 Eye Movements 
We account for consumer specific decision strategies and brand evaluations that impact the 
number, frequency, and pattern of fixations (Bettman et al. 1998; Shi et al. 2013; Stüttgen et 
al. 2012) by decomposing the observed eye-fixations into a consumer-specific level of 
attention ( ̅ ), brand-specific deviations ( ̅ ) from this average, and measurement error, 
similar to the approach in Chapter 2: 
 = ̅ + ̅ +  (6) 
where  is unobserved heterogeneity and = ln ( + 1) is the log transformed 
cumulated number of fixations. We use this log normal transformation to normalize the 
distribution of fixations (Pieters and Wedel 2004). 
The model accounts for consumer-level differences in attention due to the decision 
goal conditions that participants are assigned to (explained in section 3.3.1) and due to 
unobserved heterogeneity as well as brand-level differences in attention due to the order in 
which the brands are display and due to unobserved heterogeneity: 
 ̅ = + +  (7) 
 ̅ = ( + )  (8) 
Where:  is a -row vector that contains the overall coefficients that capture changes in 
attention over time,  are deviations from  for consumers assigned to condition  (for 
identification, = 0 for = 5), ~ (0, Σ ) is consumer unobserved heterogeneity; Σ  
is a diagonal matrix;  is a  vector that contains time scores corresponding to time ; =( − 1)  for = 1, … , ;  are the effects specific to the  brand on display (for 
identification, = 0 for = 4), ~ (0, Σ ) is brand specific unobserved heterogeneity; 




3.4.2 Utility Accumulation 
The model operationalizes the timing of attention to a brand ( ̿ ) using two measures: (1) 
the time that has passed since the previous moment when the consumer fixated on the brand 
( ) and (2) a dummy variable that indicates if the brand is fixated on at time  ( ( )). 
Therefore, the utility of brand  at time  is reflected in the amount of attention ( ̅ ) the 
consumer has acquired thus far and the two measures that reflect its timing: 
 = + ̅ + + ( ) +  (9) 
Where:  are brand dummies that account for market level preferences for brand ,  is 
the time that has passed since the previous fixation on brand b, and ( ) is an indicator 
function that takes the value 1 if the consumer inspects brand b at time t and zero otherwise; 
and  is an unobserved utility shock. 
Assuming that  is type I extreme value distributed, the probability of choosing 
brand  as a function of the known part of brand utility  ( = + ) is:  
 = ( )∑  (10) 
As discussed in section 1.3.1, there are different types of uncertainty that the 
consumer can experience during brand choice. In this chapter, we include an entropy measure 
that captures type IV uncertainty (about which of the brands in the set is best). In Chapter 5 
we discuss alternative measures for this type of uncertainty and for the other three types. The 
extent to which consumer  is uncertain at time  is operationalized as: 
 ( | ) = − ∑ log  (11) 
Where  varies between 0 (when one brand has a choice probability of 1) and ln  (when 
the brands have equal choice probabilities).  
We specify the utility consumer  derives at time  from continuing the search ( ) 
as a function of an overall threshold ( ), uncertainty ( ), and the time spent thus far ( ):  




Where  is an unobserved utility shock. 
3.4.3 Moment-to-moment Utility Comparison 
Assuming that the random utility term in equations 9 and 12 (  and ) is type I extreme 
value distributed, the probability of observing action = 0, at time  is: 
 Pr( = 0| , , ) = ( )( )  ∑ ( )  (13) 
Where  accounts for correlations between brand choice probabilities (Wooldridge 2010).  
If the consumer decides to end the search, then the probability of choosing brand ∗ is: 
 Pr( = ∗| ≠ 0, , , ) = ∗∑  (14) 
3.4.4 Model Estimation and Out-of-sample Predictive Performance 
We use = ( , ) to indicate the eye-fixations and choice data for participant . The 
likelihood for participant  who expresses brand choice after  brand visits is: 
 ℒ ( ) = ℒ Θ ℒ Φ = Θ ∏ ( |Φ) (15) 
Where Θ is the collection of parameters that capture the link between eye movements and 
attention (eqs. 6-8) and Φ is the collection of parameters that describe the link between 
attention and choice (eqs. 9-14). 
The model is estimated in R using RStan (R Core Team 2018; Stan Development 
Team 2018) using non-informative priors and multiple chains with dispersed starting values. 
Convergence is assessed using potential scale reduction (Gelman and Rubin 1992). The 
supplementary material (available on GitHub) includes all the code and data necessary to 
reproduce the results included in this chapter. 
We compare model performance based on predictive accuracy calculated using K-fold 
cross-validation (Vehtari, Gelman, and Gabry 2017). The dataset is partitioned into = 11 
subsets , for = 1, … , . Then, the model is fit on a training dataset  which contains 




predictions for participants in subset . This approach mimics reality: a company has data 
about customers purchasing products which is used as input to determine market popularity 
and to calibrate the parameters of the model. Subsequently, this information is used to 
forecast what other customers will choose and when. Specifically, the model estimates Θ and Φ using observed data . Then, for participants in  it predicts the sequence of eye-
fixations , the timing of choice , and the final brand choice .  
The prediction performance for eye-fixations data ( ) is assesed using the density of 
the normal distribution. The log predictive density for the sequence of eye-fixations of 
participant  in subset  is: 
 log ( | ( )) = ln Θ p(Θ|D( )) Θ (16) 
Which is approximated by the expected log predictive density over  simulation draws from 
the posterior distribution ( | ( )): 
 = log( ∑ ( |Θ , )) (17) 
The expected log predictive density for model  over all participants = 1, … ,  is:  
 = ∑  (18) 
We compare the predictive performance of two models by calculating the difference 
in expected log predicted density ( − ) and standard error of this difference: 
 − = ∗ ( − ) (19) 
The model predicts the timing of choice  and the final brand choice  for each 
participant from moment-to-moment, as more eye movements are observed. Hence, for 
participant  the model makes  predictions. The predictions made at moment  use the eye 
movements observed for that participant so far ( ) and the estimated parameters based on 




eye movements . Then, we use this to simulate search and brand utilities at future 
moments:  and  where ≤  and calculate the probability that the participant 
continues inspecting the brand for all moments  where ≤ . The predicted timing of 
choice  is calculated by integrating over these probabilities. While in theory the integral 
should be taken over an infinite time horizon it is unlikely that participants continue to 
inspect the brands indefinitely. We found that using a time horizon two times longer than the 
maximum decision time observed in the study ensures the probability of continuing the 
process converges to zero. Hence, the moment of choice is predicted as: 
 = + (1 − ̂ )  (20) 
Given the predicted moment of choice  and the brand utilities at that moment, the 
model predicts the brand that the participant is going to choose based on the corresponding 
brand choice probabilities. The predictive performance for brand choice ( ) predictions 
( ) for model  is based on the brand choice hit rate. This is calculated as the average 
predicted choice probability of the chosen brand ( ∗) at the predicted moment of choice ( ): 
 = ∑ ̂ ∗=1  (21) 
The predictive performance for moment of choice ( ) predictions ( ) for model 
 is calculated as one minus mean absolute percent error: 
 = 1 − ∑ | |=1  (22) 
 
3.5 Results 
Model free evidence shows that participants allocate a larger share of fixations on the brand 
that they eventually choose compared to participants who choose a different brand (Figure 
3.5). For example, brand 1 has a 49% fixation share for participants who choose it but only 




brand between participants who choose the brand and those who do not increases from 
moment-to-moment until choice is expressed. This suggests that there is heterogeneity in 
attention at the participant-level and at the brand-level. Similar to chapter 2, there is empirical 
support in the eye-movement data for heterogeneity in attention both between participants 
and brands. Appendix C presents the results of comparisons between the model specified in 
equations 6-8 and alternative models that restrict brand or participant-specific attention to 
zero. These results (Appendix C) support the idea that consumers strategically inspect the 
brands (model component 1 in Table 3.1). Table 3.3 presents estimates for the amount of 
heterogeneity at the participant and brand levels. The results show more heterogeneity at the 
brand-level as compared to participant-level heterogeneity. There are differences both in the 
initial attention to the brands (eq. 8,  = .46, CI = [.44; .49]) and in how brands are 
inspected from moment-to-moment (eq. 8,  = .74, CI = [.69; .79] and  = .32, CI = 
[.29; .36]). If participants were to inspect all the brands in a similar way, for example by 
processing the information by brand or by attribute, then it would not be possible to infer any 
differences in utilities before observing choice.  
3.5.1 Model Comparison 
As described in section 3.2.6, the proposed model (M6) is compared against two groups of 
competing models. We compare these models in terms of predictive performance first at the 
moment of choice, when all the eye movements are observed, (Table 3.2) and in section 3.5.4 
present moment-to-moment predictive performance. We discuss implications for the link 
between attention and utility accumulation, and for determinants of choice timing.  
First, we compare the proposed model against M1 and M2. Because these models use 
different specifications for the determinants of what brand to choose, we expect to see 
differences in predictive performance both for brand choice and moment of choice. Even if 




Table 3.3 Estimated heterogeneity in information acquisition 







































































































Heterogeneity  .28 .002 <.001 .27 .28 
Note: M = Mean; SD = Standard deviation; 2.5% and 97.5% = percentiles of the posterior 
distribution; p-value = Bayesian one-tailed p-value. Participant and brand specific effects are not 
shown to save space. 
 





the search utility is compared against different brand utility values (due to different 
specifications of brand utility). M1 specifies that the mapping from brand utilities to eye-
fixations occurs without error ( = 0, eq. 1), thus using the observed number of eye-
fixations to specify brand utility. While M2 accounts for imperfect mapping between what 
utility and eye-fixations ( , eq. 1), it assumes that the moments when the consumer inspects 
the brands do not reflect brand utilities over and above the amount of attention. This 
competing model restricts  and  in equation 9 to zero. These differences in the 
specification of brand utility lead to different predictions for the moment of choice.  
M1 and M2 differ in how they account for the link between eye movements and 
attention. By comparing these models, we find that it is important to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity in eye movements and extract the brand and participant specific attention 
measures ( ̅ ) as opposed to using the observed number of fixations. While the brand choice 
hit rate at the moment of choice is better for M1 (57.2% vs 54.5%) the prediction accuracy 
for the moment of choice is much lower (53.5% for M1 vs 72.7% for M2). The difference in 
predictive performance between M1 and M2 suggests it is important to account for error in 
the mapping between utility and eye movements (  in eq. 1), especially if we want to 
understand what determines the moment when choice is expressed.  
Comparing the brand choice hit rate at the moment of choice, we see that the 
proposed model has a hit rate of 59.6% which is larger than that of M1 (57.2%) and M2 
(54.5%). Different from the proposed model, M2 assumes that brand utilities are not 
influenced by the timing of attention. The difference in brand choice hit rate at  between 
M2 (54.5%) and the proposed model (59.6%) shows that it is important to account for when 
the consumer focuses on a brand, in addition to the amount of attention on the brand. This is 
consistent with previous studies that find increasing number of fixations on the chosen brand 




The second group of models (M3-M5) makes different assumptions about the 
determinants of when to express brand choice. These models all use the same specification 
for brand utility, so the minor differences (± .1 pp) in brand choice hit rate at the moment of 
choice are due to sampling variation in the MCMC chain. Therefore, we focus on interpreting 
results for the accuracy of moment of choice predictions. M3 (62.3%) has a lower 
performance as compared to M4 (67.6%), M5 (73.3%), and the proposed model (73.4%) at 
the moment of choice. Similar to M3, M4 also assumes that consumers compare the search 
utility against a fixed decision threshold, but allows consumer uncertainty to influence search 
utility and the moment when brand choice is expressed. By comparing M4 against M3 we 
find that accounting for consumer uncertainty improves moment of choice predictions by 
about 5pp. However, the improvement in moment of choice predicts disappears for models 
that specify that consumers compare search and brand utilities. Specifically, the predictive 
performance of the proposed model (73.4%) is very similar to that of M5 (73.3%), which 
restricts the contribution of consumer uncertainty to zero.  
By comparing the proposed model against M3 and M4, the results show strong 
support for participants comparing search and brand utilities from moment-to-moment, as 
opposed to comparing search utility against a fixed threshold from moment-to-moment and 
brand utilities against each other only at the moment of choice. If the model were to 
outperform M5, then this would have been evidence that consumers take into account not 
only the maximum brand utility they receive by ending the task, but also how uncertain they 
are about which brand is best. However, the results do not support this.  
These results demonstrate that to understand how decisions are made, one needs to 
account for (1) how much consumers have inspected each brand, (2) when they have done so, 




3.5.2 Utility Accumulation 
Determinants of What Brand to Choose. Both the amount of attention and the moments when 
brands are inspected impact brand utilities. Specifically, brands that receive more attention 
are more likely to be chosen (2.02, p-value <.001). This supports the assumption that 
consumers allocate more attention to promising brands (Table 3.1: Eye movements). The 
time since the last visit on the brand has a negative effect on brand utility -.30 (p-value 
<.001). This implies that brands that have recently been fixated on have a larger choice 
probability. The results do not support a positive effect of current visit on brand utility (.41, 
p-value = .06). The estimated brand intercepts are in line with observed brand choice shares 
and fixations frequencies, as brands 2 and 3 are chosen by fewer participants than brands 1 
and 4. While brands 1 and 4 have similar choice shares, brand 1 receives more fixations. The 
positive intercept for brand 4 (1.60, p-value <.001) reflects this. Overall, the results are 
consistent with Chapter 2 and show that those brands that the participant inspects in more 
detail accumulate more evidence, especially if this takes place over repeated visits closer to 
the moment of choice.  
Determinants of When to Express Brand Choice. The overall threshold (  = 8.06, p-
value < .001) is the level of brand utility required to stop the process after the first visit. The 
decision threshold decreases due to costs of time (  = -.15, p-value < .001). On average, 
search utility decreases by one unit of utility every seven brand visits. The estimated cost of 
time corresponds to a reduction of 3.15 units of utility in the decision threshold for the 
average duration of a decision in our sample (21 brand visits). If the decision to express brand 
choice were influenced by consumer uncertainty, then  would be positive. However, the 








Table 3.4 Attention reflects why consumers choose what when 
  M SD p-value 2.5% 97.5% 
Determinants of What brand to Choose       
     Brand intercepts 
          Brand 2 
  Brand 3 
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Determinants of When to Express brand Choice       
     Overall threshold 
     Uncertainty 



















Note. M = Mean; SD = Standard deviation; 2.5% and 97.5% = percentiles of the posterior distribution; p-value = 
Bayesian one-tailed p-value. Brand 1 is the reference brand. 
 
3.5.3 Sequential Predictions for Brand Choice and Moment of Choice 
The model predicts what brand consumers are going to choose and the moment when they 
express their choice. Both predictions are out-of-sample and from moment-to-moment. As 
more eye-fixations are added to the  sequence, the model updates the attention measures 
(amount and timing of attention). These are used to simulate brand and search utilities at 
future visits ( < ) and predict the consumer’s actions, as described in section 3.4.4. We 
present the accuracy of these predictions summarized by decision decile. 
The brand choice hit rate reaches 59.6% at the end of the process. A naïve model that 
predicts brand choice based on observed brand choice shares in the calibration sample has a 
hit rate of 34.39%. Starting with the third decile our model is already above this hit rate 
baseline. In the beginning of the decision process the model underestimates how much time 
consumers need and predicts that they stop earlier than they actually do. However, brand 
choice and choice timing predictions become more accurate over time (Figures 3.6 and 3.7). 
This evidence supports the assumptions we make about the components 2, 3, and 4 of the 
model (Table 3.1), namely that moment to moment search and brand utilities predict what 




Figure 3.6 Comparison of out-of-sample prediction accuracy for models with different 
determinants of what brand to choose 
 
Note: Naïve model predictions for brand choice are based on observed brand choice shares in the calibration 
sample. Naïve model predictions for moment of choice are based on the distribution of decision times in the 
calibration sample. 
 
Figure 3.7 Comparison of out-of-sample prediction accuracy for models with different 
determinants of when to express brand choice 
 
Note: Naïve model predictions for brand choice are based on observed brand choice shares in the calibration 






The findings of this chapter provide insights into fundamental decision processes that 
describe how consumers determine (1) what brand to choose and (2) when to express their 
choice, and (3) how these two decisions are closely linked to the sequential eye movements 
that consumer use to inspect the brands. While it builds on previous results for the overall 
link between brand choice and eye movements (Glaholt et al. 2009; Krajbich et al. 2010; 
Pieters and Warlop 1999), to the best of our knowledge, the proposed model is the first to 
jointly investigate the drivers of both brand choice and choice timing when consumers make 
a single preference-based choice between multiple complex alternatives.  
Table 3.1 summarizes the components of the model developed in this chapter and the 
assumptions that it is based on. For each of these assumptions we formulate implications and 
indicate the empirical evidence that is needed to support them. To support all the 
characteristics and assumptions of our model we would need 11 pieces of evidence, which 
consist of (1) estimated values for parameters of interest and (2) measures of out-of-sample 
prediction performance for brand choice and moment of choice. We find empirical support 
for nine of the 11 required pieces of evidence. The results indicate that the timing, amount, 
and sequence in which consumers focus on the brands reflect utility accumulation throughout 
the decision process. This supports the main proposition of our model – that differences in 
attention between the brands build up over time as the consumer evaluates their utilities based 
on sequentially acquired information. We now summarize the main results and in the next 
section discuss their implications.  
As in chapter 2, we find (1) empirical support for heterogeneity in attention and (2) 
that consumers attend more to the brand they are more likely to choose. Even though all 
participants were presented with the same information, they inspected the brands in different 




more on the brand they eventually choose. Model free evidence and estimation results show 
that this happens regardless of the brand consumers eventually choose. This supports the idea 
that utilities build up over time and are updated in light of newly acquired information about 
the brands. These results are important because brand-heterogeneity in attention makes it 
possible to infer brand utilities from moment to moment in the absence of any other prior 
preference measurements.  
Importantly, and novel, the proposed model predicts when consumers are going to 
express their choice, in addition to what brand they choose. This is evidence of a fundamental 
link between moment-to-moment eye movements and unobservable processes of attention 
and utility accumulation that result in brand choice.  
Second, accounting for unobserved sources of heterogeneity in eye movements 
improves predictions, in particular moment of choice predictions. This implies that observed 
fixations do not accurately reflect brand utility, despite making reasonable predictions of 
what brand consumers are going to choose. More specifically, the accuracy of brand choice 
predictions based on the observed number of fixations are surprisingly similar to those of the 
proposed model. This means that models that use the number of fixations, as it is common in 
the literature, can still provide insights into which brand consumers like best. However, they 
make poor predictions (M1) of the moment when consumers express their choice. 
Third, the results suggest that consumers compare brand utilities against a time-
varying decision threshold. Hence, it is important for brands to attract consumers’ attention 
early on as this can terminate search faster before competing brands steal the spotlight and 
sway consumers’ choice. 
Fourth, both the moment of choice and brand choice can be predicted early on and 
more importantly, without having any information about the participant (e.g. prior choices, 




over time as the consumer inspects the brands.  
3.6.1 Implications and Future Work 
This research extends prior work that has primarily focused only on what brand consumers 
choose, but that has not explored determinants of when consumers express brand choice. This 
applies both to empirical applications (Atalay et al. 2012; Glaholt et al. 2009; Meißner et al. 
2016; Pieters and Warlop 1999) and analytical developments of RIT (Matějka and McKay 
2015; Steiner et al. 2017) which so far have not been tested empirically. While previous 
SSMs such as the aDDM (Krajbich et al. 2010) use decision duration to explain the 
computational processes that take place during choice, it is not immediately obvious if and 
how they can be adapted to typical consumer choices. More specifically, applications of the 
aDDM use multiple repeated choices between at most three single-attribute brands while 
consumers very often make single choice between multiple multi-attribute brands for which 
no prior preference measurements are available. 
 Developments in the RIT literature thus far focus primarily on analytical models that 
formalize how decision makers choose what information to acquire and the impact of this 
choice on the outcome of the decision process (Matějka and McKay 2015; Steiner et al. 
2017). Such models are based on the assumptions that consumers optimally choose what 
information to acquire. However, it is unclear to what extent optimal information acquisition, 
which implies the exclusive use of top-down directed attention, can take place in realistic 
decision settings. For example, online retailers use advertising, product recommendations, 
and changes in webpage layout to attract consumers’ attention and to influence what 
information they are exposed to, with the final goal of influencing their purchase behavior. 
Therefore, it is probably more realistic to accommodate for a mix of bottom-up and top-down 
directed attention. Our model offers this possibility by extracting brand- and participant- 




optimal information acquisition by also accounting for unobserved random error in the 
mapping from utility to eye movements (  eq. 1).  
The results of this study suggest three directions for future research. First, it would be 
interesting to investigate if eye movements data can be used to improve preference 
measurement in situations when repeated choices cannot be observed or when there is reason 
to believe that observed choices are not an accurate reflection of consumers’ true preferences. 
For example, in situations when consumers have an incentive to be dishonest or feel 
pressured to give a certain answer (e.g. attitudes towards substance use, unhealthy lifestyle 
choices, political preferences). Standard choice models assume that consumer preferences are 
revealed by their final stated choice and require multiple observed choices in order to 
estimate consumer heterogeneity in preferences. Therefore, they are not well suited in these 
situations. The model developed in this chapter offers a starting point because it uses brand 
and consumer specific attention to infer utilities before the final choice is observed.  
Second, the introduction indicates that the proposed model can be adapted to use other 
types of data that capture repeated consumer interactions or touchpoints. This is useful for 
decisions that are taken over a longer time and in multiple sessions, when eye-tracking 
participants is no longer an option. Examples of other types of consumer level data that can 
be used with the proposed model are: browsing history and geolocation data. Both types of 
data are easily accessible to companies who use cookies to collect consumer browsing 
behavior or mobile apps that track GPS coordinates in real time. We argue this would make 
the application of our model relevant also for physical stores, not only for online retailers. 
Third, Chapter 2 discussed how the proposed model can be trained on eye-movement 
and choice data of participants and then be used to predict choice for new participants. The 
model in this chapter implements and tests this idea. This is one step further towards 




intervene and try to influence what consumers choose or when they express choice, or both. 
For example, if the participant appears to favor a brand, then an intervention could influence 
him or her to express choice faster to prevent the discovery of competing brands. But if the 
consumer favors a competitor’s brand than an intervention could facilitate the discovery of 
other brands with the goal of changing the final brand choice. Such interventions, while 
obviously beneficial for companies, raise multiple ethical concerns. These ethical concerns 
are even more important if the choices are in the health domain, involve under-age decision 
makers, or have consequences for political elections. Therefore, as methods and models are 
developed to influence choice, it is necessary to also focus on limiting or restricting their use. 
We come back to this point in chapter 5. 
Several topics for discussion remain. Though our model controls for brand effects on 
attention, the better option would have been to just randomize the order of the brands. The 
goal manipulations used in our study did not impact attention or choice which limits what our 
results can say about the role of decision goals on attention and choice, or both. Both 
limitations of our study can be addressed by future research that uses incentive aligned 
studies and randomizes the order in which brands are presented on the display.  
 Second, our results focus on choices from a preset choice set. While this is a frequent 
choice situation, the choice set is commonly also endogenously determined. Studies that 
account also for the decision to include a brand in the final choice set might find that this also 
reflect consumer preferences and are expected to have an even better brand choice hit rate.  
 Current models of information acquisition and choice are well suited to measure 
preferences post-choice. However, to understand how preferences are constructed within a 
single choice, a new approach is needed. This chapter offers such an approach and thus 
provides insights into how consumers arrive at their choice and the opportunity to make 
moment-to-moment predictions for when consumers choose what. 
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Chapter 4  
Attention, Attribute Importance, and Brand Choice  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the idea that eye movements reflect both what brand consumers are 
going to choose, and why this brand is preferred over other alternatives in the set. We 
develop a model that infers attribute importance from how consumers allocate their attention 
over time to the information on display before expressing brand choice. This builds on 
theoretical perspectives of rational inattention theory (RIT) (Caplin and Dean 2015; Steiner et 
al. 2017) and multialternative decision field theory (MDFT) (Roe et al. 2001), and 
generalizes the models developed in chapters 2 and 3. While analytical RIT models focus on 
the overall link between attention to a brand and its utility, the model developed in this 
chapter adapts RIT theoretical assumptions to choice between brands described by multiple 
attributes. The models proposed in Chapters 2 and 3 extract attention measures that are linked 
to overall brand utilities. In this chapter, we take a different approach and decompose brand 
utilities into two components that capture the importance of the attributes that describe the 
brands and the subjective value that the consumer attaches to the attribute levels 
corresponding to each of the brands on display. This implies that eye movements reflect not 
only how the consumer evaluates the brands, but also why some brands are preferred.  
Consumers frequently make online purchases for one brand from a set of competing 
alternatives. Shopping websites facilitate search for a brand that matches their preferences 
among thousands of competing alternatives, each of them described by multiple features (i.e. 
attributes). For example, Amazon users can use filters to view only brands that meet certain 
criteria (e.g. price range) and are presented with information about brands in a format that 




brands that they inspect by moving their eyes to areas of the display corresponding to specific 
attributes. 
 
Figure 4.1 “Compare with recently viewed items” section at amazon.com  
 
Note: retrieved June 20196. 
 
While consumers could inspect all the brands and attributes on the screen, it is in their 
interest to focus on information that is most relevant for their choice (Caplin and Dean 2015). 
This has three implications. First, preferred brands are examined more, as already supported 
by the results of chapters 2 and 3, and previous research that examines eye movements during 







brand choice (Chandon et al. 2009; Glaholt et al. 2009; Pieters and Warlop 1999). Second, 
consumers allocate more attention to important attributes in order to identify the brand that 
performs best on specific dimensions. For example, a price sensitive consumer is expected to 
focus more on price and less on other brand attributes as compared to what would be 
expected if all attributes were equally important. Third, the moments when attributes are 
attended to provide additional information about how important they are for the consumer. 
Because inspecting the brands takes time and effort, consumers are expected to focus on the 
most important attributes already early in the process (Russo and Rosen 1975; Wedell and 
Senter 1997). Then, they can examine additional attributes that are not as important and 
closer to the moment of choice, consumers can go back and briefly check important 
information as part of a verification stage (Russo and Leclerc 1994). These three implications 
suggest that attribute importance weights vary over time and are closely related to the 
moment-to-moment eye movements that consumers make during a single brand choice. This 
offers the possibility to extract time-specific attribute importance weights from moment-to-
moment eye movements during a task. 
Traditional methods for assessing attribute importance include: (1) asking consumers 
for direct ratings of importance, (2) using conjoint measurement techniques, or (3) open-
ended elicitation (Jaccard, Brinberg, and Ackerman 1986). Even though these methods aim to 
measure the same construct, namely attribute importance, they can produce contrasting 
results (Heeler, Okechuku, and Reid 1979). Choice-based conjoint (CBC) studies use 
repeated choices in the same product category to estimate consumer specific subjective 
values (partworths) of different attribute levels (Green and Srinivasan 1990). Then, the 
importance of each attribute is calculated as a ratio between the range of estimated partworths 
for that attribute relative to the sum of the partworth ranges for all attributes (Green and 




importance increases as a function of the number of attributes and attribute levels that 
describe the brands. To the extent that consumers do not examine all the information on 
display, augmenting choice with eye-fixation data lowers the necessary number of repeated 
choices per participant in conjoint studies (e.g. from 16 to 12 choices per participant (Yang et 
al. 2015)). Nevertheless, multiple choices within the same category are required in conjoint 
studies and the attribute importance measures that are derived are agnostic to the moments 
when the consumer has inspected them. However, consumers are more likely to inspect 
important attributes at earlier moments during choice (Payne, Bettman, and Luce 1996; 
Simonson, Huber, and Payne 1988). Therefore, the importance of an attribute is reflected by 
the moments when the attribute is attended to, in addition to the amount of attention it 
receives. Asking consumers for direct ratings of importance and open-ended elicitation 
methods also suffer from similar limitations (Bottomley, Doyle, and Green 2000; Zhu and 
Anderson 1991). The model developed in this chapter addresses these limitations and 
contributes in three important ways.  
First, the model extracts consumer-specific attribute importance weights based on 
attention allocation during a single brand choice. Building on previous research (Bettman et 
al. 1998; Payne 1976; Pieters and Wedel 2007), the proposed model assumes that attribute 
importance weights are influenced by specific decision goals that consumers have. This 
implies that differences in attention between attributes are primarily motivated by top-down 
attention processes. The results of this chapter extend (1) prior work that has used 
information display boards to examine the relationship between information acquisition and 
importance weights (Wedell and Senter 1997), and (2) recent developments in economics that 
examine the role of importance weights in choice, but assume these weights are extrinsically 
determined by how much the attribute level stands out, i.e. is salient, as compared to the other 




weights were choice set specific, as these models in economics assume (Bordalo et al. 2013, 
2016), as opposed to consumer-and-time specific as in the model we propose, then two 
consumers making a choice from the same set would use the same importance weights. The 
results included in this chapter provide evidence against such simplifying assumptions and 
support our theory. Namely, that attribute importance weights are (1) consumer specific, (2) 
influenced by the decision goal of the consumer, and (3) vary over time. 
Second, the model decomposes brand utility in two components: attribute importance 
and consumer’s subjective values for the features of the brand. We do this for single brand 
choices and thereby extend previous theories and methods that require consumers to make 
repeated choices within the same category in order to estimate consumer-specific preferences. 
The results reveal that decision goals influence not only what attributes are attended, but also 
conditional on attending to an attribute, what brands are inspected and for how long. This 
extends MDFT models in two ways. First, MDFT models assume attention influences only 
the selection of which attribute is attended to at a specific time, but not how the brands are 
evaluated within that attribute (Roe et al. 2001). Second, empirical applications of MDFT 
make two simplifying assumptions (Diederich 2003; Dror, Basola, and Busemeyer 1999): (1) 
participants derive the same values from the different attribute levels, and (2) these values are 
equal to the corresponding attribute levels, which requires all attribute levels to be numeric. 
The model developed in this chapter infers participant specific values for different attribute 
levels from sequences of eye movements and can be calibrated for any type of attribute 
information (e.g. textual, numeric, pictorial).  
Third, attribute importance and subjective values of brand-and-attribute combinations 
are extracted from moment-to-moment eye movements, and the model can accommodate any 
number of brands and attributes. This offers the possibility to make brand choice predictions 




above chance (25%, one in four brands) and even above standard logit models. Specifically, 
the proposed model has an average brand choice hit rate of 63%, 26 percentage points larger 
than that of a logit model that accounts for observed brand choice shares (37%), and 8 
percentage points larger than that of a logit model that includes information about the type of 
brand that the consumers aims to choose (55%). In addition, the results of this chapter 
establish the extent to which attention-based attribute importance weights differ from 
importance weights typically estimated in a choice model (M5 versus M3, sections 4.2.3 and 
4.4.4). The results show that brand choice can be predicted even for new consumers in new 
categories. Of course, these predictions are also possible for existing customers, and we 
explain in section 4.2.2 how the model can include available information about consumers, 
brands, and attributes.  
We calibrate our model on eye-tracking data collected in a study (N = 334) on single 
choice between four multi-attribute brands. The next section offers a brief description of the 
eye-tracking and choice study and introduces the proposed model. Then, we describe in detail 
the study design and eye-movement measures (section 4.3), and the results of the proposed 
model (section 4.4). The chapter ends with a discussion of the implications and limitations of 
the proposed approach. 
 
4.2 Model and Related Literature 
Before describing the model and the related literature, this section introduces the eye-tracking 
and choice study. Participants were instructed to (1) choose the most environmentally 
friendly brand (eco-goal, = 1) or (2) choose the brand that performs the best 
(performance-goal, = 0) from a set of four brands. Decision time was externally 
controlled: (1) 15 seconds (high time-pressure, = 1) or (2) 30 seconds (low time-




assignment to conditions. After being reminded of the decision goal and available time to 
inspect the brands, participants were presented with an attribute-by-brands matrix that 
contained information on several attributes for four brands. Participants made single choices 
in four product categories, while their eye movements were recorded. For each participant ( ) 
and choice task ( ), the decision time is split in three intervals ( ). This facilitates 
comparisons between participants with in different time-pressure conditions, as each time 
interval corresponds to one third (5s for participants in the low time-pressure conditions and 
10s for participants in the high time-pressure condition) of their respective decision time. One 
observation corresponds to the number of eye-fixations on brand  and attribute  for 
participant , choice task , and interval . Two measures are derived: (1) per attribute, the 
share of eye-fixations as percent of the total number of fixations ( ) and (2) per brand 
and attribute, the share of eye-fixations on the brand as percent of the number of fixations on 
the attribute ( ).  
In order to draw general inferences about the effects of decision goals and time-
pressure on attention towards different types of information on display, attributes are grouped 
in three categories (Roe et al. 2001). Specifically, the three ( = 3) types of attributes are: (1) 
eco-attributes ( = 1) that provide information needed to select the most environmentally-
friendly brand, (2) performance-attributes ( = 2) that provide information needed to select 
the brand that performs the best, and (3) other-attributes ( = 3) that provide additional 
information not directly relevant to either of the two decision goals. For example, in the third 
choice task  between four TV brands, eco-attributes are energy class, on-mode power 
consumption, and electricity consumption for a year; performance attributes are image 
motion rate, image quality, resolution, and audio power; and other-attributes are brand name, 
screen size, and dimensions. The names of all attributes and their classification into attribute 




4.2.1 Brand Utility 
This chapter develops a model to describe consumer choice from a set of  brands for which 
information about  attributes is displayed at the same time, in an attribute-by-brands matrix. 
Consumers use their eyes to inspect the information on display and are strategic in their 
choice of what brands and attributes to inspect from moment-to-moment. Building on RIT 
(Caplin and Dean 2015) and multialternative decision field theory (MDFT) (Roe et al. 2001), 
consumers allocate more attention to promising brands and important attributes. 
The utility that a participant  derives from choosing brand  described by  attributes 
accumulates over time as the participant inspects the information on display. Specifically, 
brand utility is influenced by (1) the importance of the attributes ( ) and (2) the subjective 
value ( ) that consumer  assigns to the features of brand . Consider a participant aiming 
to choose the most environmentally friendly TVs from a set of four brands. The participant 
forms a subjective value for each of these brands that reflects the extent to which their 
features match the eco-goal of the consumer. For example, TV brands with lower energy 
consumption offer more value to this specific participant. Because a larger weight is placed 
on eco-attributes such as energy class and consumption (captured by  ( = 1 ( )), the 
participant is better able to discriminate between the brands on this particular attribute, even 
for small differences between their respective subjective values ( ). As the participant 
examines the information on display, the utility of the brands changes. The utility of brand  
at time  for participant  is: 
 = ∑ ∗ + , (1) 
where  is the importance of attribute  for participant  at time ;  is the subjective 
value of brand  on attribute  for participant  at time ; and  is an unobserved random 
utility shock. All model parameters are choice task specific but to simplify notation, subscript 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Assuming that  is extreme value type I distributed, and = ∑ ∗ , 
the probability that participant  chooses brand  at time  is: 
 = ( )∑ . (2) 
Because consumers allocate more resources to information that is more important for 
their decision task or goal (MacKenzie 1986; Pieters and Wedel 2007; Wedell and Senter 
1997), important attributes receive a larger share of attention ( ̅ ) as compared to what 
would be considered a fair share. Assuming similar levels on information complexity 
between the attributes on the screen, if all attributes were equally important to the participant 
then the fair-share is given by the number of attributes of a specific type divided by the total 
number of attributes (  in Table 4.1). The ratio between the attention share and this fair share 
captures the relative advantage or disadvantage of an attribute type ( = ̅ / ). The share 
of attention on an attribute is reflected by the share of fixations on that attribute: 
 = + , (3) 
where  is the share of fixations on attribute  as percent of the total number of fixations 
for participant  at time ; ̅  is the share of attention on attribute  for participant  at time ; 
and  is unobserved heterogeneity. 
 In the absence of additional information about participant  or attribute  that could 
influence the share of attention on attribute  for participant  at time , the model specifies: 
 ̅ = ̅ + , (4) 
where ̅  is overall attention share on attribute  at time ;  is unobserved heterogeneity 
for participant  and attribute  at time ; ~ (0, );  is participant-level variance in 
attention shares for attribute  at time . 
Building on RIT (Caplin and Dean 2015; Matějka and McKay 2015), the model in 




which implies that these brands receive more than their fair share of attention (1⁄ ). 
Specifically, the subjective value of brand  on attribute  for participant  at time  is a ratio 
between its share of attention and the expected share if all brands were equally preferred 
( = ̅ / ). The share of attention for participant , attribute , and brand  is 
reflected by the share of fixations on that brand and attribute relative to the total number of 
fixations on the attribute: 
 = ̅ + , (5) 
where  is the share of fixations on brand  and attribute  relative to the total number of 
fixations on attribute  for participant  at time ; ̅  is the subjective value of brand  and 
attribute  of participant  at time ;  is unobserved heterogeneity.  
If no other information is available about participant , brand , or attribute  that 
could influence the share of attention at time , then: 
 = + , (6) 
where ̅  is overall attention share on brand  and attribute  at time ;  is unobserved 
heterogeneity for consumer , brand , and attribute  at time ; ~ (0, );  is 
participant-level variance in attention shares for brand  and attribute  at time . 
The example in Table 4.2 illustrates the idea of the proposed model for one of the 
participants in the sample who chose brand C from the set of four TVs. The attribute fixation 
shares ( ) at the end of the decision process ( = 3) are: 45%, 25%, and 29% on eco-, 
performance-, and other attributes respectively. Comparing these shares to the expected 30%, 
40%, and 30% (based on the number of attributes of each type), indicates that: (1) the 
participant focused more on attributes that offer information about how eco-friendly the 
brands are ( %% = 1.5), (2) to the detriment of performance attributes that are inspected less 




brand (brand C) receives a similar number of fixations as compared to the other brands on 
eco-attributes, but a larger share on the other two attribute types. This suggests that the 
participant did not choose brand C based only on the information about its eco-attributes and 
formed an overall evaluation of the brand. The total number of fixations per brand could 
correctly predict brand C is likely to be chosen, but the attribute shares indicate why this 
brand was chosen over the other options on display.  
 
Table 4.2 Fixations frequencies and shares for brands and attributes during choice 
(Participant 5, eco-goal and low time-pressure condition, brand C is chosen, TVs) 
































(10%) 31 29% 
Fixations on 
brand 16 19 53 18   
Note: numbers in brackets are shares of fixations for the attribute and brand combination relative to the total 
number of fixations on the attribute ( ). 
 
4.2.2 Effects of Decision Goals and Time Pressure on Attention 
Equations 1-6 specify a general link between eye movements, attention, and brand utility that 
is agnostic to participant and brand characteristics. When data about such characteristics are 
available, the model can easily be adapted as we explain in this section. 
In line with previous research on the impact of motivation and time pressure on eye 
movements during choice (Pieters and Warlop 1999), the model accounts for differences due 
to decision goals and time pressure:  




where  is the importance of attribute  at time  for participants in the performance-goal 
and low time-pressure condition;  is the deviation from  for participants in the eco-
goal and low time pressure condition;  is the deviation from  for participants in the 
performance-goal and high time pressure condition; and  is the deviation from the sum of 
, , and  for participants in the eco-goal and time-pressure condition.  
 = + + , (8) 
where  and  are dummy variables equal to 1 if  larger than or equal to 1 and 2 
respectively;  is the effect in the first time interval,  is the deviation from  in the 
second interval;  is the deviation from the sum of  and  in the final interval. 
Participants in the eco-goal condition ( = 1) are expected to have larger 
attention shares ( > 0) for eco-attributes than participants in the performance-goal 
condition ( = 0). Because participants under high time pressure are more likely to filter 
information, the share of attention to attributes that are most relevant to the decision goal is 
likely to increase. For example, participants in the eco-goal and high time-pressure condition 
should allocate a larger attention share on eco-attributes ( > 0) while participants in the 
performance-goal and high-time pressure condition should have a larger attention share on 
performance-attributes ( > 0).  
 The specification in equation 7 incorporates results of previous research, which pre-
dates the current formalization in RIT, that finds consumers skip more information when they 
are under time pressure and that the type of skipped information is non-random (Pieters and 
Warlop 1999). These previous results describe the link between the total number of fixations 
and consumer-specific characteristics (task motivation and time-pressure). The proposed 




specific characteristics on covert attention shares by accounting for measurement error in 
eye-fixations (  in eq. 3) and (2) it models these effects over time as specified in eq. 8. 
Between-consumer variation in decision goals and time pressure influence not only 
the attribute attention shares, but also the brand and attribute attention shares. For example, 
participants in the eco-goal condition ( = 1) are expected to attend more to eco-
attributes of the eco-friendly brand(s). These participants are more likely to discriminate 
more between the brands on the eco-attribute dimension than participants in the performance-
goal condition. For the latter, differences between brands on the eco-attribute are not as 
relevant and hence not worth the effort to separate the brands on this dimension. High time 
pressure ( = 1) should also influence differences between goal conditions (Bettman et al. 
1998; Pieters and Warlop 1999) as participants who have less time to thoroughly inspect the 
brands benefit if they quickly identify the best brand on the most important attribute. 
Therefore: 
 ̅ = + + + , (9) 
where  is the average attention share for brand  and attribute  at time  for participants 
in the performance-goal and low time-pressure condition;  is the deviation from  
for participants in the eco-goal and low time pressure condition;  is the deviation from 
 for participants who are in the performance-goal and high time pressure condition; and 
 is the deviation from the sum of , , and  for participants in the eco-goal 
and time-pressure condition.  
 = + + , (10) 
where  and  are dummy variables equal to 1 if  larger than or equal to 1 and 2 




the second interval;  is the deviation from the sum of  and  in the final 
interval. 
4.2.3 Brand Choice Predictions and Model Estimation 
If the decision goal of the participant is known, then predicting brand choice should be 
relatively easy. However, in a real-life choice setting decision goals are rarely known to the 
researcher. To test the extent to which eye movements reflect fundamental attention and 
utility accumulation processes, the proposed brand choice model (eq. 1-6, when the decision 
goal of the participant is unknown) is compared against five competing specifications. The 
six models differ in the amount and type of information they extract from eye movements 
(Table 4.3). The equations that describe the competing models are detailed in Appendix E. 
 













attribute Choice task 
      1 2 3 4 
M0 x      39% 31% 37% 42% 
M1 x x     51% 44% 59% 66% 
           
M2 x  x  x  74% 58% 76% 73% 
M3 x  x   x 75% 58% 73% 73% 
           
M4     x  41% 30% 41% 40% 
M5    x  x 67% 49% 70% 67% 
 
The first two models incorporate standard choice models specification. M0 is a logit 
model that specifies utility as: = + . The underlying assumption is that the 
observed component of brand utilities is the same for all participants ( ), and that 
differences in brand choice between participants are due to unobserved utility shocks ( ). 




the observed utility component ( + ) in the same way, but that their choices 
differ due to idiosyncratic utility shocks ( ). M0 and M1 do not include time-specific 
information, therefore these models do not update their brand choice predictions over time. 
Because M1 includes brand and decision-goal intercepts, it is expected to have a better hit 
rate than M0.  
The next two models combine characteristics of the logit model (accounting for brand 
fixed intercepts) with measures extracted from eye movements. M2 specifies that brand 
utility is: = + + , which combines the assumption of M4 + M0. The fourth 
model, M3, specifies brand utility as: = + + . By comparing M3 against 
M5 we test the extent to which attention-based importance weights ( ) are similar to 
choice-based attribute weights ( ). Parameters , , and  are estimated conditional on 
observed brand choice. M2 and M3 can make moment-to-moment predictions because  
and  are time-specific and estimated based on observed eye movements up to time . 
The remaining two models predict brand choice using only attribute importance and 
subjective values extracted from eye movements. M4 is a naïve model that specifies brand 
utility as a function of subjective brand values ( ) only: = + . M5 is the 
proposed model (eq. 1-6). Because M4 and M5 extract the utility components (  and ) from 
eye movements only, the choice probabilities can be calculated from moment-to-moment, 
before observing brand choice for any of the participants. By comparing M4 and M5 we test 
if the allocation of attention between the attributes provides additional insights into brand 
utilities in addition to the brand attention. 
By comparing M5 and M0 we test the extent to which attention and utility are closely 
linked. M1 is akin to a segmentation approach because it estimates brand preferences within 
two separate groups of participants (eco-goal and performance goal). Subscript  is not 




Attention shares (eq. 3-6), effects of decision goals and time pressure on attention (eq. 
7-10), and competing brand choice specifications (M0-M3) are estimated using MCMC 
techniques in R (R Core Team 2018; Stan Development Team 2018), using non-informative 
priors, and multiple chains with dispersed starting values. Convergence is assessed using 
potential scale reduction (Gelman and Rubin 1992).  
To summarize, the model developed in this chapter extract participant and time-
specific attribute importance weights ( ) and subjective values of brand features ( ) 
from eye-moments that participants make during choice. This is different from the standard 
approach which estimates attribute importance weights from brand choices that consumers 
make from sets in which attribute levels are systematically manipulated (e.g. conjoint 
design). The model uses differences in the amount and timing of eye movements between the 
brands and attributes to assess the effects of (1) time pressure and (2) decision goals on 
participants’ preferences for attributes and brands.  
 
4.3 Data 
4.3.1 Participants and Design 
Students at a large public university (N = 443) participated in a study on consumer 
preferences. They were informed that they would make choices between brands in four 
different product categories (light bulbs, travel mugs, TVs, and combi-fridges), on a 
simulated website, and that they would be given information about four brands. The data 
were collected in two waves: January-February 2016 and November 2016, in order to 
increase the number of participants. To motivate participants to make choices that align with 
their preferences, they were told that there would be a lottery after all participants complete 
the study. The prize of the lottery was one of the products that the winner chose during the 




the lab. There were two lottery draws and two winners, one for each of the two data 
collection waves. 
The experiment had a 2 (time-pressure) x 2 (decision goal) x 2 (brand order) between-
subjects design and participants were randomly assigned to one of eight possible conditions. 
Time pressure conditions are high (“only 15 seconds”) and low (“30 seconds”). Goal 
conditions are eco (“Choose the option that is most friendly to the environment”) and 
performance (“Choose the option that has the highest performance”). Order conditions 
reverse the order of the brands on the display (ABCD and DCBA) to control for location 
effects on eye movements (Atalay et al. 2012). Participants were informed that for each of the 
choices they make, they would see three screens: (1) the description of the choice task, (2) the 
website with product information, and (3) the four brand names. Then, to help them 
familiarize with the task, participants had a practice round to choose one out of four brands of 
toothbrushes. Before every choice task, participants were reminded of the decision-goal and 
time-pressure condition they are in. The study ended with questions about how they have 
made the choices (e.g. what information they found important) and if they wanted to 
participate in the lottery. Those who indicated that they wanted to participate in the lottery 
wrote their email address and participant number on a lottery ticket which they placed in a 
“lottery” box on the research assistant’s desk.  
4.3.2 Eye-tracking Procedure 
Participants were informed that their eye movements were going to be recorded. The 
experimental room had three cubicles each containing a Tobii TX300 eye-tracker arranged on 
a table and a chair in front of it. Participants were seated in front of the screen such that the 
centre of the screen was on the same level as their eyes. The distance between the eyes and 
the screen was approximately 60 centimetres. Then, the research assistant performed the 




participant would start the study. All stimulus slides were projected on the screen and 
participants could see the next slide by making one click. The slides containing brand 
information were presented for a fixed amount of time (15s and 30s) and did not allow the 
participant to move to the next slide by clicking. 
4.3.3 Eye-movement Measures 
Tobii T60XL eye-trackers have a display resolution of 1920 x 1200 pixels and a sampling 
rate of 60Hz (Tobii AB 2015). Raw eye-movement data exported from Tobii Studio were 
grouped into eye-fixations using the Binocular-Individual Threshold algorithm (van der Lans 
et al. 2011). Then, we checked the percent of eye movements classified as fixations for all 
participant and task combinations (van der Lans and Wedel 2017) and retained N = 334 
participants with at least 80% of their eye movements classified as eye-fixations for each of 
the four tasks (n = 295) or who have an average of at least 80% over all four choice tasks and 
a minimum of 70% in one of them (n = 39). There are N = 334 participants, C = 4 choice 
tasks, T = 3 intervals, J = 3 attribute-types (j = 1 (Eco), j = 2 (Performance) and j = 3 
(Other)), and B = 4 brands. Hence, the total number of observations is 48,096. Table 4.4 
presents raw data summaries grouped by goal and time pressure condition type.  
 









Sum of fixation 
durations (s) 
M SD M SD M SD 
1 Low Eco 96 200.8  121.2  126.4  14.9  25.4  1.7  
2 Low Performance 79 199.6  119.2  127.4  14.8  25.4  1.8  
3 High Eco 87 195.2  103.5  66.3  8.5  12.9  0.7  
4 High Performance 72 191.2  93.6  67.9  6.3  13.0  0.7  
Note: the difference between the sum of fixations durations and the time available to inspect the brands is due to 






In this section we first present model-free evidence based on: (1) observed differences in eye 
movements across participants, brand, attributes, and time, and (2) differences in brand 
choice between participants. Then, the estimated effects of decision goals and time-pressure 
on attention during choice between TV brands are discussed in 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 respectively. 
To save space, the estimated effects for the other three product categories are included in 
Appendix F. In section 4.4.4 we describe the results of brand choice predictions for the six 
model specifications introduced in section 4.2.3.  
4.4.1 Model-free Evidence 
Figure 4.2 shows the average fixation shares for the three attribute types in each choice task, 
by decision-goal and time-pressure condition. It appears that there are only very small 
differences due to time-pressure. Fixation shares by attribute type differ between tasks 
because the number of attributes of a type varies between the product categories (Table 4.1). 
 
Figure 4.2 Minor differences in shares of fixations by attribute type between participants in 





Participants in the eco-goal condition allocate a larger share of fixations to eco-
attributes. For three of the four choices (light bulb, TV, and combi-fridge) this difference is 
easily noticeable, while for the remaining choice task (travel mug) this difference is much 
smaller (Figure 4.3). The larger share of fixations on eco-attributes for participants in the eco-
goal condition reduces the share of fixations on performance-attributes, while the share of 
fixations on other attributes is similar between participants in the two decision goal 
conditions.  
 
Figure 4.3 Overall, participants allocate larger fixations shares to the attribute type that is 
aligned with their decision goal  
 
 
Participants in the eco-goal start by allocating a larger share of fixations on eco-
attributes as compared to the fair-share (Figure 4.4, light bulb, TV, combi fridge tasks). In the 
second interval, these participants switch their focus to performance-attributes. In the final 
moments before expressing brand choice participants (both eco-goal and performance-goal 




(light bulb and TV), participants in the performance-goal start by having a larger fixation 
share on eco-attributes, as compared to the fair-share. This could be explained by the fact that 
eco-attributes include pictorial information (EU energy efficiency labels), which usually 
attracts more attention due to visual salience effects (Pieters and Wedel 2004; van der Lans et 
al. 2008b). Three of the product categories (light bulb, TV, combi fridge) include these 
labels, in line with EU regulations.  
 
Figure 4.4 From moment-to-moment, participants allocate more fixations to the attribute 
type that is most relevant for their decision goal  
 
Note: shares are calculated using the number of fixations within each time interval.  
 
We now present evidence for differences in fixation shares between brands. Brands 
that are normatively the best option have larger fixations shares on all attribute types (Figure 




with best performance for participants in the performance-goal group. Brand C (light bulb) is 
normatively the best option for participants in the performance-goal group. This brand 
receives a larger fixation share for each of the attributes for participants in the performance-
goal group as compared to participants in the eco-goal group. Similar differences are 
observed also for the other brands and choice tasks. 
 
Figure 4.5 Participants fixate more on the attributes of the brand that matches their goal (*) 
 
Note: * indicates normatively best option: Eco-friendly brand for participants in the eco-goal group and the 
brand with best performance for participants in the performance-goal group. 
 
In addition to fixating more on attributes and brands that match their goal, participants 
also chose the brand that matches the decision-goal condition they were randomly assigned to 




brands that are eco-friendly (85% over all choice tasks). Similarly, participants in the 
performance-goal condition chose the matching brand (70% over all choice tasks).  
 
Figure 4.6 Participants choose the brand that matches their goal 
 
Note: * indicates normatively best option: Eco-friendly brand for participants in the eco-goal group and the 
brand with best performance for participants in the performance-goal group. 
 
4.4.2 Attribute Attention Shares 
We estimate the effects of decision goals and time pressure on attribute attention shares, as 
deviations from the fair share based on the number of attributes grouped within a type (Table 
4.1). Results are consistent with previous studies that examine effects of time pressure and 
task motivation on attention during choice tasks (Pieters and Warlop 1999). We describe the 
results for choice between TV brands (results for the other choice tasks are in Appendix F). 
In line with the model-free evidence in Figure 4.4, participants in the performance-
goal and low time-pressure condition (“Performance-goal” in Table 4.5) allocate initially 
more than the fair share of attention to eco-attributes (.06, p-value < .001). During the second 




of performance-attributes increases (.18, p-value <.001). In the final third, the importance of 
performance-attributes decreases to the initial level (-.19, p-value <.001) while the share of 
other-attributes (.12, p-value <.001) and that of eco-attributes (.07, p-value = .01) increase as 
compared to the second time interval. Participants in the performance-goal and high time-
pressure condition attend more to performance-attributes in the second interval (.15, p-value 
<.001) as compared to participants in the performance-goal and low time-pressure condition.  
 
Table 4.5 Estimation results – attribute importance 
Choice task 3 (TV) 
Period 1 ( ) Period 2 ( ) Period 3 ( ) 
M SD p-value M SD p-value M SD p-value 
Performance-goal ( = 0, eq. 7-8) 
    Eco-attr. 
    Performance-attr. 





























Eco-goal ( = 1, eq. 7-8) 
    Eco-attr. 
    Performance-attr. 





























High time-pressure ( = 2, eq. 7-8) 
    Eco-attr. 
    Performance-attr. 





























Eco-goal x High time-pressure ( = 3, eq. 7-8) 
    Eco-attr. 
    Performance-attr. 




























Note: attr = attributes. Estimates in the “Period 2” column indicate changes in attribute attention shares relative 
to the “Period 1” column. Estimates in the “Period 3” column indicate changes in attribute attention shares 
relative to the “Period 1” and “Period 2” columns. Shares within a condition and time interval sum to 0. The 
values are as compared to the “fair share” based on the number of attributes of each type as compared to the 
total number of attributes. See table 4.1. 
 
Participants in the eco-goal and low time-pressure condition start by allocating a 
larger share of attention to eco-attributes (.20, p-value < .001), taking away from the share of 




goal and low time-pressure condition. The importance of eco-attributes for participants in the 
eco-goal and high time-pressure condition is initially larger than that for participants in the 
eco-goal and low-time pressure condition (.07, p-value = .048).  
 
Figure 4.7 Attribute types aligned with participants’ decision goals receive more attention – 
changes over time in estimated attribute shares 
 
To summarize, participants allocate larger attention shares to attribute types that 
match their decision goal. This happens already in the first interval for participants in the eco-
goal condition (.20, p-value <.001) with an additional increase if they are under high time-
pressure (.07, p-value = .048). This initial advantage diminished over time though. In the 
second interval, participants in the eco-goal condition lower the share on eco-attributes an 
additional 10 percentage points (.10, p-value = .02) as compared to those in the performance-




salient (EU eco-labels). Participants in the performance-goal fixate more on performance-
attribute in the second interval (.18, p-value <.001), with an additional 15 percentage points if 
they are under time-pressure (.15, p-value <.001). We plot the estimated attribute attention 
shares, which capture similar trends to those in fixations shares (Figure 4.7 compared to 
Figure 4.4) 
4.4.3 Brand-and-attribute Attention Shares 
Table 4.6 presents the effects of decision goal and time-pressure conditions on the brand 
attention shares within an attribute type. These are deviations for the fair share of .25 (there 
are four brands). Shares should sum to 0 within a condition, attribute type, and time interval. 
When shares do not sum to zero it is because some participants do not have fixations on any 
of the brands for the respective attribute-type within the time interval (e.g. performance-
attributes for participants in the eco-goal and low time-pressure condition). For example, 
participants in the eco-goal and low time-pressure condition allocate a smaller share of 
attention to performance attributes (-.22, p-value < .001). Based on the raw number of 
fixations, 23% of participants in the eco-goal and low time-pressure condition do not fixate 
on performance-attributes during the first time interval.  
 The eco-attributes of the eco brand in choice task 3 (brand C) attract more attention 
(than the .25 fair share) only from participants in the eco-goal both initially (.11, p-value 
<.001) and in the second interval (.15, p-value <.001). This brand attracts more attention also 
on the other two attributes from participants in the eco-goal. When these participants have 
more time to inspect the brands (low time-pressure), already in the first interval they inspect 
brand C more than the other brands for performance (.17, p-value <.001) and other attributes 
(.17, p-value <.001). Participants who follow an eco-goal but are under high time-pressure 
inspect performance attributes of brand C in the second interval (.13, p-value = .03) and other 




pressure participants focus first on the more relevant attributes in order to identify the brand 
that matches their goal. Then, to the extent that they have time left, they inspect the other 
information available and form an overall evaluation of the brand they are about to choose. 
 Participants in the performance-goal allocate more attention to the matching brand (B) 
in the second interval both for performance attributes (.09, p-value < .001), eco-attributes 
(.15, p-value < .001) and other attributes (.15, p-value < .001). Participants under high time-
pressure start from a lower attention share on performance attribute (-.09, p-value = .01). 
 
Table 4.6 Estimation results – subjective values of brand-and-attribute combinations  
Choice task 3 
(TV) 
Brand Period 1 ( ) Period 2 ( ) Period 3 ( ) 
M SD p-value M SD p-value M SD p-value 



























































































































































































































































































































(table continues from previous page) 
Choice task 3 
(TV) 
Brand Period 1 ( ) Period 2 ( ) Period 3 ( ) 
M SD p-value M SD p-value M SD p-value 





















































































































































































































































































































Note: Shares should sum to 0 within a condition, attribute type, and time interval. When shares do not sum to 
zero it is because some participants do not have fixations on any of the brands for the respective attribute-type 
within the time interval (e.g. performance-attributes for participants in the eco-goal and low time-pressure 
condition). For example, participants in the eco-goal and low time-pressure condition allocate a smaller share of 
attention to performance attributes (-.22, p-value < .001). Based on the raw number of fixations, 23% of 
participants in the eco-goal and low time-pressure condition do not fixate on performance-attributes during the 
first period. Estimates in the “Period 2” column indicate changes in brand-and-attribute attention shares relative 
to the “Period 1” column. Estimates in the “Period 3” column indicate changes in brand-and-attribute attention 
shares relative to the “Period 1” and “Period 2” columns. The values are as compared to the “fair share” of .25. 
 
4.4.4 Brand Choice Predictions 
The proposed model (eq. 1-6) specifies that the accumulation of brand utilities is a function 
of attribute importance weights ( ) and participants’ subjective values of the brand-and-




observed eye movements that participants make during choice. Of the six specifications for 
brand utility and brand choice (introduced in section 4.2.3 and summarized in Table 4.3), four 
of them include time specific information and therefore can be used to predict brand choice 
from moment to moment. The remaining two (M0 and M1) specify brand utility as a function 
of brand and participant information that does not vary over time. We start by presenting the 
brand choice hit rate for the six models, at the moment of choice, so after all eye movements 
are observed (Figure 4.8).  
 
Figure 4.8 Brand choice hit rate at the moment of choice 
 
Note: M0-M3 predict brand choice based on different combinations of attention-based and choice-based 
estimation results (Table 4.3); M4 predicts brand choice based on attention-based subjective values for each 
brand; M5 predicts brand choice based on attention-based attribute importance and subjective values for brand 
and attributes (eq. 1). The black line marks the 25% random hit rate if the four brands on display were equally 
likely to be chosen. 
 
The first group of models (M0 and M1) specify that attention does not provide any 
information about brand utility. This is a core assumption of standard choice models that 




estimated brand specific utility intercepts7. The hit rate of this model is similar to that of the 
naïve M4. For two of the tasks M4 has a better hit rate (2 percentage points for task 1 and 4 
percentage for task 3) while for the other two tasks M0 performs slightly better (1 percentage 
point for task 2 and 2 percentage points for task 4). If the decision-goal of the participant is 
known, then including this information in the model (M1) improves hit rate, though not 
enough to outperform the proposed model (M5). M5 has a larger hit rate for all product 
categories as compared to M1 (respective percentage points increase:16, 5, 11, and 1).  
The difference between M0 and M1 shows that knowing the decision goal of a 
participant offers the opportunity to predict their choice to the extent that they are decision-
goal compliant. However, this is rarely the case in real-life consumer choice. We argue that 
the difference in hit rate between M1 and M5 is evidence for the fundamental link between 
eye movements, attention, and utility accumulation processes.  
M4 and M5 predict brand choice using only information extracted from eye 
movements. These models are completely agnostic to the specific brand information on the 
display. For example, M4 uses the attention allocated to each brand, but the model does not 
know the brand type (eco- or performance-goal matching) or the decision goal of the 
participant. M5 is the model proposed in equations 1-6. By comparing M4 and M5 we see 
that decomposing brand utilities into attribute importance and subjective brand-and-attribute 
value leads to a large improvement in brand choice hit rate (between 19 and 29 percentage 
points over the four choice tasks). Table 4.3 include the hit rate for all the four choice tasks. 
This shows that in the absence of any other information about the brands (e.g. brand type, 
market shares) or the participant (e.g. decision goal), a model that discriminates between 
attribute types is better able to capture brand utilities and to predict brand choice.  
                                                            
7 As an additional check, we estimate a model without brand fixed effects, but with partworths for attribute 




The second group of models combines characteristics of the previous two groups. M2 
combines assumptions of M4 and M0 by specifying that brand utility is a function of brand 
intercepts and brand specific subjective values extracted from eye movements. The link 
between the subjective value of each brand and brand utility is estimated based on the 
observed brand choice. Different from M5, M3 estimates the link between brand-and-
attribute subjective values and brand utility conditional on observed brand choice. The 
difference in hit rate between M5 and M3 is due to: (1) including brand intercepts (M3), and 
(2) estimating attribute importance based on observed choice (M3) vs. extracting attribute 
importance for observed eye movements (M5). M2 and M3 have similar hit rates – the only 
differences are for task 1 (1 percentage point in favor of M3) and task 3 (3 percentage points 
in favor of M3). Based on the hit rate at the moment of choice, after all eye movements are 
observed, it seems that separately extracting brand and attribute specific subjective values is 
not necessary (M2 and M3). Accounting for differences in attention between brands per 
attribute type is more important when we make predictions based only on attention estimates 
(M5 vs M4). However, the conclusion should be more nuanced given the differences in hit 
rate over time (Figure 4.9) which we discuss next. 
While M2 and M3 both improve over M5 it is important to note that the models use 
different amounts of information. Both M2 and M3 use the observed brand choice to estimate 
the link between attention and utility and to predict brand choice. M5 makes brand choice 
predictions using only attention measures extracted from eye movements. 
Four of the six models include time-varying information in the specification of brand 
utility and therefore can make moment-to-moment predictions before brand choice is 
observed. Figure 4.9 presents these results compared to a naive 25% hit rate (there are four 
brands in the set). For all choice tasks the models predict above the 25% threshold already in 




tasks which larger differences in attention shares between participants in the two goal 
conditions (Figures 4.7 and 4.4). The hit rate improves over time for all the four models, with 
larger changes for M5, M2, and M3. M5, the model that predicts brand choice based only on 
attention measures improves over time at a similar rate as M2 and M3. This suggests that 
including brand intercepts and thus accounting for brand choice shares is important in setting 
the start point of the hit rate.  
 
Figure 4.9 Brand choice hit rate over time 
 
 
While M2 and M3 have very close hit rates at the moment of choice, over time these 
differences vary. For example, for TVs, M2 has a hit rate of 76% at the end, 3 percentage 
points larger than that of M3, but during the previous time intervals M3 had a better hit rate: 
5 percentage points at time 2 and 1 percentage point at time 1. This is also the case for task 2: 






This chapter aimed to test whether eye movements reflect both what brand consumers are 
going to choose, and why this brand is preferred. By manipulating decision goals in a 
between-subjects experimental design, we were able to examine (1) how eye-movement 
patterns reflect otherwise unobserved attention processes closely related to by participants’ 
decision goals, and (2) how attribute importance and subjective brand-and-attribute values 
extracted from eye movements are able to capture the utility accumulation processes that take 
place during value-based choice. The proposed model extracts attribute importance and 
subjective brand-and-attribute values from how consumers allocate their attention over time 
between brands and attributes. We now summarize the most important results. Then, we 
discuss the implications that these results have for related theories of attention and choice, 
and end with limitations and opportunities for future research. 
First, we find that attribute importance shares change over time. Initially, participants 
are more likely to focus on the attribute that matches their goal. For participants following the 
eco-goal, these are eco-attributes (e.g. energy consumption), while for participants in the 
performance goal, these are category specific attributes that indicate the quality of the brand 
(e.g. sound and image quality for TVs). Then, they inspect other attributes and towards the 
end of the process go back and focus again on the attributes that match their goal. This 
supports the idea that the contribution of brand attention to utility is time-varying, which we 
first introduced in chapter 2. 
Second, participants quickly discover the brand that matches their decision goal. 
However, they continue to inspect other attributes of this brand and form an overall 
evaluation of its utility match. Even though participants were assigned decision goals that 
could easily be implemented by simply choosing the best brand on the attribute of interest 




Third, attention-based importance weights and subjective brand values capture brand 
utilities as indicated by the results of the brand choice predictions (M5). This happens already 
in the first third of the decision time and then improves as more eye movements are observed. 
By the time all eye movements are observed, the proposed model has an average brand 
choice hit rate of 63%, 8 percentage points larger than that of a logit model that includes 
information about the type of brand that the consumers aim to choose (55%). 
Fourth, the results suggest that including brand utility intercepts and estimating 
attribute importance weights from choice (M3 vs M5) improves brand choice predictions. At 
the moment of choice, this is an improvement of 8 percentage points on average: from 63% 
for M5 to 71% for M3 (one brand from a set of four).  
4.5.1 Implications 
Just as in previous chapters, the model developed in this chapter builds on RIT (Caplin and 
Dean 2015) and SSM (Forstmann et al. 2016). While specific applications of SSM make 
different assumptions about what exactly is accumulated over time (evidence in aDDM 
(Krajbich et al. 2010) or valence in MDFT (Roe et al. 2001)), they make similar assumptions 
about the more general idea that the utilities of the brands on display evolve over time as the 
consumer inspects them. In that sense, the proposed model is similar – we specify that 
utilities evolve over time as the consumer inspects the brands, similar to both aDDM and 
MDFT. Then, building on MDFT the model accounts for attribute importance weights and 
subjective value of brand-and-attribute combinations. The proposed model differs from 
models of MDFT in two important ways. First, we model brand specific utilities instead of 
the relative advantage of each brand as compared to the other options (valence in MDFT 
(Roe et al. 2001)). Second, the model developed in this chapter infers participant-specific 
subjective values for brand-and-attribute combinations from sequences of eye movements. 




and-attribute combinations (Roe et al. 2001), empirical applications make two simplifying 
assumptions (Diederich 2003; Dror et al. 1999). First, that participants derive the same values 
from the different attribute levels. Second, that these values are equal to the corresponding 
attribute levels, which requires all attribute levels to be numeric. 
We find that participants allocate different amounts of attention not only between the 
attributes, but also within an attribute over the different brands. Such differences in attention 
between brands at the level of an attribute challenge an important assumption of MDFT. 
Specifically, that once attention is focused on an attribute, all the brands in the set are 
evaluated on that dimension. The implication of these results is better aligned with the 
general assumption of RIT - that not all brands are evaluated on all attributes (Matějka and 
McKay 2015).  
Decision field theory was originally developed for decision making under uncertainty 
(Busemeyer 1985; Busemeyer and Townsend 1993). Thus far, MDFT models adapted to 
value-based choice have mostly been compared to other decision models (e.g. elimination by 
aspects, weighted additive utility model) based on their ability to capture and explain context 
effects (similarity, attraction, compromise) (Berkowitsch et al. 2014; Roe et al. 2001). The 
results of this chapter indicate that models in this literature could be further adapted, by for 
example using attention-based measures of subjective values for brand-and-attribute 
combinations. This would make the model more generally applicable to choice situations 
since it would eliminate the need for multiple choices within the same brand category. 
Because the proposed estimation algorithm can easily be implemented in open-source 
software (Stan Development Team 2018), the new model would be more accessible to 
decision researchers who want to implement it. The standard MDFT is difficult to estimate, 
as it requires numerical integration techniques (Berkowitsch et al. 2014), since there is no 




The second implication for MDFT is related to attribute importance weights. In our 
model, attribute importance is extracted from observed eye-fixations shares, after accounting 
for measurement error and unobserved sources of heterogeneity at participant level, such as 
different decision strategies (Shi et al. 2013) or reliance on different types of information 
(van der Lans et al. 2008a). In MDFT models, these weights are assumed to change from 
moment to moment stochastically. However, it is not clear what drives this stochastic process 
and how decision goals could be implemented. We speculate that specifying the structure of 
what influences importance weights would improve the model by allowing its parameters to 
be directly impacted by different sources of variation at the participant and/or attribute level. 
The predictive performance of the proposed model (M5) as compared to standard 
models of choice (M0 and M1) suggests that attention-based subjective values of brand-and-
attribute combinations are closely related to the utility accumulation process that takes place 
during choice.  
The results of our model show that it captures a general link between eye movements, 
attention, and brand utility, which implies that it can predict choice for new consumers, in 
new categories, and for whom decision goals are not known. This would contribute to 
previous research that has focused on settings where the utility of the choice alternatives is 
measured from repeated choices or ratings. Our paper extends this by inferring utility from 
sequences of eye movements in settings where no previous choices and no prior information 
about preferences are available at individual level. More specifically, we focus on single 
choices that consumers make for complex brands, as is usually the case in product categories 
for expensive, durable goods (e.g. digital cameras). Unlike more standard methods of 
attribute importance measurement, the model extracts participant, brand, attribute, and time 
specific attribute importance weights and subjective brand values from eye movements that 




The importance weights and subjective values can be influenced both by 
characteristics of the decision context that are outside the control of the consumer (e.g. 
decision time restrictions) and by internal decision goals. The proposed model quantifies the 
effects of these variables on changes in importance weights and subjective values over time. 
This extends previous models that extract time-invariant importance weights from how a 
participant uncovers specific information on an IDB (information display board) while the 
value of the brands/items is equal between participants (Wedell and Senter 1997). 
4.5.2 Limitations 
In the introduction to this chapter, we argue that our proposed method is preferred to 
traditional methods for assessing attribute importance because it does not require multiple 
choices per participant. At the same time, because we calibrate the proposed model on single 
brand choice, it is not possible to directly compare our results with those of other methods 
(e.g. conjoint design). Future research could focus on this and examine if attention-based (the 
model developed in this chapter) and choice-based (conjoint design) attribute importance and 
subjective values of brand-and-attributes are similar. If differences between the two methods 
appear, then it would be interesting to explore what drives them (e.g. are the methods 
measuring different constructs?). 
While attention measures allow us to predict brand choice ahead of time, and the 
results demonstrate a strong link between eye movements and choice, we cannot claim this is 
a causal link from eye movements to brand utilities (or in the other direction). The 
assumption in our model is that attribute importance is reflected in how participants inspect 
the brands and attributes, in line with prior research (Wedell and Senter 1997). However, we 
cannot exclude the possibility that in other decision tasks, when participants are not as 
motivated to follow a certain goal, more salient information might attract attention and 




which some attributes or brands stand out due to the perceptual features of the area on the 
display (color, luminance, edges) (van der Lans et al. 2008b). But it could be also salience 
driven by the extent to which an attribute or brand stands out as compared to the average 
characteristics of the alternatives in the choice set, or the extent to which attributes or brands 
depart from a reference good (Bordalo et al. 2016). Future research could investigate under 
what conditions attribute importance weights are mainly driven by visual salience, decision 
goals, or characteristics of the alternatives in the choice set. 
The fair share of attribute attention used to calculate attribute importance weights is 
based on the number of attributes, and thus assumes that all attributes have similar levels of 
complexity or require the same number of eye-fixations to be inspected. We argue that in the 
study used in this chapter, the complexity was similar between attributes, but when this is not 
the case, the fair share can be calculated based on a different rule (e.g. area on the screen, 
number of words, reading time). This would change the effects of the estimated effects for 
participants in the performance-goal and low time-pressure condition, but not the effects for 






Chapter 5  
Conclusions and Onwards 
5.1 Introduction 
Consumers frequently make brand choices online after inspecting multiple alternatives. 
Hence, by the time consumers purchase a brand, they have made numerous other choices: 
what information to inspect, for which alternatives, for how long, and at what moments. All 
these choices reflect how consumers allocate attention and time resources between the 
different brands and attributes over time. The three empirical essays in this dissertation focus 
on specific aspects of this type of brand choice processes. In this chapter, we start by 
summarizing the results of the studies included in this dissertation (section 5.2). Then, we 
discuss implications of these results for theories of decision making (section 5.3), marketing 
managers (section 5.4), and consumer protection policies (section 5.5). The chapter and 
dissertation conclude with suggestions for next steps towards a theory of rational attention 
(section 5.6). While the results of this dissertation show that attention reveals and predicts 
choice, we do not claim that this is proof of ‘rational attention’. We acknowledge that much 
remains to be done and introduce four propositions for a theory of rational attention that 
provide directions for future research.  
 
5.2 Summary of Main Results 
The models developed in this dissertation are calibrated on eye tracking and brand choice 
data in order to gain insight into the moment-to-moment utility accumulation that occurs 
before choice is expressed. Table 5.1 presents an overview of the studies. The three empirical 
essays investigate the link between attention and utility and the extent to which eye 
movements, as manifest indicators of attention (Just and Carpenter 1980; Liechty, Pieters, 




when they express their choice. At the same time, each of the essays aims to answer specific 
research questions. Chapter 2 focuses on what brand consumers choose, chapter 3 on what 
brand and when consumers choose, and chapter 4 develops a model that examines why 
consumers choose a certain brand. In this section we present the main findings in each of 
these empirical essays (summarized in Table 5.2).  
 
Table 5.1 Overview of studies  
Chapter Participants 
(sample size) 
Product category*  
(#brands on screen) 




2 US consumers  
(N = 342) 
Smartphones 












3 NL Students 
(N = 214) 
Digital cameras  







brand on the 
screen 
4 NL Students 
(N = 334) 
Light bulbs (B = 4) 
Travel mugs (B = 4)  
TVs (B = 4) 











6 and 10) 
Note: *participants make only one choice per product category; **between-subjects design. 
 
5.2.1 Chapter 2 
When information is available at the same time on display, consumers are free to inspect it as 
they see fit (e.g. by brand, by attribute). The pattern in which information is inspected reflects 
underlying cognitive processes that take place during choice (Bettman et al. 1998; Shi et al. 
2013). Because these processes evolve over the course of the decision, using eye movements 
that reflect them offers the possibility to answer two research questions: (1) how trajectories 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































utility and final choice, and (2) which fundamental attention processes contribute to the 
accumulation of utility and brand choice. To answer these questions, we develop a model 
rooted in recent developments in cognitive science and economics (Caplin and Dean 2015; 
Krajbich and Rangel 2011; Reutskaja et al. 2011). It (1) infers the trajectories of four types of 
attention from observed eye-movement measures, and (2) quantifies the link between the 
attention trajectories and brand utilities. 
Prior research on attention and choice (Krajbich et al. 2010; Pieters and Warlop 1999; 
Yang et al. 2015) has often focused on one type of eye movements (i.e. fixations) while 
largely ignoring eye-saccades, which hold the promise of providing information about the 
specific attentional processes that people are engaged in (Rayner 1978; Shi et al. 2013). The 
essay proposes and tests the following assumptions. First, we argue that (1) consumers 
engage in rapid brand comparison and information integration processes, which are reflected 
in, respectively, between-brands saccades and within-brand saccades, and that (2) in 
particular the latter predict choice. Second, the model investigates the extent to which prior 
ownership effects on choice operate via attention. 
The model is calibrated on data collected from consumers (N = 342) who had 
expressed to be in the market for a smartphone, randomly drawn from large, locally 
representative participant pools, from three locations in the continental US. The results show 
that attention for integration (reflected by eye-saccades within the same brand) contributes 
significantly to brand utility, even when attention quantity (reflected in the number of eye-
fixations on the brand) is already accounted for. In addition, we find support for the time-
varying contribution of attention to brand utility. This provides initial evidence for the link 
between attention and brand choice.  
 The results of this chapter show substantial heterogeneity in attention patterns over 




and account for unobserved sources of heterogeneity in attention ( ) and eye movements 
( ). Importantly, when consumers are presented more information, they adapt how much 
attention they invest in the task, but not how this is allocated over time between the brands. 
This is supported by results that show differences in information density impact the amount 
of attention allocated during choice, but not the brand-specific brand trajectories. 
5.2.2 Chapter 3 
Consumers choose not only which brands to inspect and in what sequence, but also for how 
long to inspect the brands before choosing one of them. Models of RIT  abstract from the 
timing of attention within one choice (Steiner et al. 2017). While the aDDM allows the 
amount of time a brand is under focus to influence choice (what and when), it assumes that 
eye-fixations are random with respect to the value of the fixated item (Krajbich et al. 2010). 
We argue that next to the amount of attention allocated to a brand, the moments when the 
brand is under focus reveal how brands accumulate utility until a threshold is reached. The 
proposed model uses moment-to-moment brand attention to predict both what brand 
consumers are going to choose and when they express this choice.  
The model developed in chapter 3 builds on the results of chapter 2. First, it uses eye-
movement measures that combine characteristics of attention quantity and attention for 
integration. Specifically, it consolidates consecutive eye-fixations within the same brand, 
separated by at most one fixation on another brand. Then, the model extracts brand-and-
consumer specific attention from these measures that retain information about the number of 
eye-fixations (attention quantity) and the brand that they belong to (attention for integration). 
It does so while accounting for measurement error and consumer- and brand-heterogeneities 
in attention over time. 
Specific to chapter 3 is the focus on both brand choice and moment of choice. The 




moment in the future based on sequentially observed eye movements up to the moment when 
the prediction is made. This is important because it provides insights into within choice 
dynamics as compared to existing research on dynamic decision making in marketing, which 
primarily focuses on dynamics over repeated choices (for a review of the literature, see 
Kumar and Man Luo 2008). While applications of SSM, such as the aDDM (Krajbich et al. 
2010; Krajbich and Rangel 2011), explicitly focus on computational processes that take place 
during a choice, the basic nature of the tasks and the required prior preference measurement 
limit the applicability of these models to consumer choice from complex brands. 
While the results of chapter 2 suggest that brand choice can be predicted based on 
intermediate attention measures, these predictions can only be made once eye movements up 
to the moment of choice are observed. Hence, the hit rates in chapter 2 are closer to a 
measure of in-sample hit. Chapter 3 addresses this limitation and develops a more general 
method that predicts brand choice and moment of choice based only on eye movements 
observed until the time when predictions are made. As more eye movements are observed, 
the predictions are updated. Competing models are compared based on their prediction 
performance assessed using a K-fold cross validation approach. The results show that brand 
choice and moment of choice can already be predicted above change after only 30% of the 
decision time (seven brand visits given the average decision time of 22 brand visits).  
An important result of Chapter 3 is that during choice, consumers adjust the decision 
threshold that brands need to reach before they are chosen. This provides insights into 
consumer heterogeneity in decision time. More importantly, it is a necessary first step 
towards influencing consumer choice in real time. Specifically, in order to optimize actions 
meant to influence consumer choice, it is necessary to predict not only what brand it more 




5.2.3 Chapter 4 
In chapter 2 brand utilities are a function of different attention types and the link between 
attention and utility is estimated from choice data. In chapter 3 we use a similar approach but 
extend the model to accommodate moment-to-moment predictions of brand choice and 
moment of choice. But still, the link between attention and utility is estimated from the 
observed choices of participants in a calibration sample. Both chapter 2 and 3 specify brand 
utility as a function of attention at the brand level. Chapter 4 extends this and develops a 
model that specifies brand utility as a weighted sum of the consumer’s subjective values for 
the features of each brand. Importantly, both the weights (attribute importance) and the 
subjective values of the brand-and-attribute combinations are extracted from observed eye 
movements. We test the extent to which attention-based attribute importance weights capture 
consumer preferences as compared models that estimates these weights conditional on 
observed choice. The hit rate of the proposed model outperforms that of standard choice 
models that use information about the type of brand participants aim to choose, which in a 
more realistic setting is unlikely to be known before any choice is observed. 
The model developed in chapter 4 extends previous studies that assume heterogeneity 
only in importance weights, but not in the value assigned to the features of the choice 
alternatives (Wedell and Senter 1997) and that measure consumer’s subjective values (1) 
from preference ratings, independent of attention (Krajbich et al. 2012) or (2) from repeated 
choices in a conjoint design (Yang, Toubia, and De Jong 2015). 
Specifically, the proposed model examines how eye movements during choice reflect 
attribute importance weights that (1) are closely linked to consumers’ decision goals and that 





5.3 Implications for Research on Value-based Choice 
The first chapter of the dissertation introduces two literature streams that have focused on 
how “limits on attention impact choice” (RIT) (Caplin and Dean 2015, p. 2183), and on how 
evidence for choice alternatives accumulates during choice (SSM) (Krajbich et al. 2010; 
Ratcliff et al. 2016; Roe et al. 2001). Theories of rational inattention (Caplin and Dean 2015) 
and sequential sampling models (Busemeyer 1985) highlight the important role of attention 
during choice as a selection mechanism and as modulator of fixed brand preferences. The 
three empirical essays of this dissertation build on this theoretical foundation of fundamental 
processes that take place during choice. However, we argue that the role of attention during 
choice is not limited to filtering out information (RIT) or compensating for differences in 
otherwise fixed brand values (aDDM). Therefore, in addition to what brands consumers 
attend to and for how long, the sequence of moments when consumers focus on the brands 
plays an important role as well. This positions attention as a coordinating mechanism through 
which consumers implement their decision goals - an overarching idea for the models 
developed in this dissertation. The results of this dissertation offer new insights into 
fundamental processes of attention and utility accumulation and thus contribute to a new 
perspective of the role of eye movements in consumer choice. Because attention plays such 
an important and complex role during choice, it has important implications for theories of 
decision making, which we discuss in this section. 
 SSM and RIT models explicitly integrate (in)attention as a core component. In other 
literature streams, the role of attention is implied but not explicitly modeled. Some of these 
previous models offer competing explanations for the effects that we find, as well as 
inspiration for measures of uncertainty that could improve the models developed in this 




5.3.1 Uncertainty during Brand Choice 
The model developed in Chapter 3 specifies that uncertainty influences the utility of 
continuing to inspect the brands. Specifically, uncertainty is operationalized using an entropy 
measure that captures the extent to which brands have different choice probabilities. The 
results do not find support for a significant effect of uncertainty on search utility and 
implicitly on decision time. We argue that there is merit in investigating these effects further 
and provide alternative measures for the four types of uncertainty introduced in Chapter 1.  
Type I: Uncertainty about the description of a brand on a specific attribute. A 
measure that captures this type of uncertainty needs to be at the brand and attribute level. One 
study that accounts for this type of uncertainty combines repeated choice data (choice-based 
conjoint (CBC) design) with eye movements that participants made during the tasks (Yang et 
al. 2015). This model specifies that consumers need several fixations on a specific cell in 
order to acquire the brand and attribute information it contains (Yang et al. 2015, p. 170, Eq. 
1). Before any fixations, the probability that the consumer knows the information in the cell 
depends on the number of levels of that attribute (1 , where  is the number of levels for 
attribute ). The results for this specific study show that after only one fixation on a cell, the 
probability that participants acquired the corresponding information about laptop attributes 
(e.g. CPU, price, hard drive) is .87, while after a second fixation the probability is more than 
.99. Even though this model was calibrated using up to 16 choices per participant, the 
parameter that captures the amount of information extracted in one fixation is identified only 
at the aggregate level. However, because participants in CBC studies make repeated choice 
between different combinations of a limited set of attribute levels8, it is possible that from one 
choice to another they learn what levels to expect. This is supported by results that show that 
                                                            





information search decreases as participants progress through the choice tasks (Meißner et al. 
2016; Yang et al. 2015). Hence, such an approach needs to be adapted if differences in 
information acquisition between consumers, attributes, or brands are expected. For instance, 
if consumers have experience with some of the brands or if purchases within the category are 
frequent, then the measure would need to account for memory effects. Similarly, if there are 
differences in complexity between attributes (e.g. rating stars are easier to understand as 
compared to more technical information), these should also be included in the model.   
Type II: Uncertainty about the importance of an attribute can be difficult to 
separately identify from type I uncertainty. Even though learning about attributes and 
learning about preferences are different at a conceptual level, they are equivalent from a 
modelling perspective as long as brand utilities are linear in attributes and preference weights 
(Ching et al. 2013). Due to the mediating role of attention for the effect of advertising on 
attribute importance (MacKenzie 1986), accounting for consumers’ past exposure to 
advertising is one direction that future research can explore. While advertising has been 
shown to influence brand choice, these results are based on market-level measures of 
advertising expenditure (dollar amount, advertising frequency) (Bronnenberg and Dubé 
2017). Hence, they do not account for consumer-level heterogeneity in advertising exposure. 
The implicit assumption that consumers within the same market of geographic area have been 
exposed to the same advertisements becomes increasingly difficult to justify given the recent 
growth in consumer-level targeting. Online platforms have detailed information about what 
advertisements a particular consumer has been exposed to and engaged with. Because these 
platforms have data about exposure but also other actions that consumers have taken to 
reduce uncertainty (e.g. watching product reviews on YouTube), these types of data can be 




preference formation). Then, they could optimize how information is displayed to account for 
the link between past attention to advertising and attribute importance.   
In experimental studies, one idea could be to add a description of the attributes and 
their levels prior to the choice task. This would make sure that participants acquire 
information about the possible attributes levels before seeing the brand combinations on 
display. Then, a smaller proportion of the eye movements during the task would be needed 
for reducing type I uncertainty. However, it is difficult to claim that consumers would not 
already start learning about their preferences, especially if the attributes have different 
numbers of levels. If consumers were to follow a two-step decision process, then they would 
be more likely to process by attribute: first acquire the information, then decide out how 
important that attribute is. However, there is evidence of the contrary – consumers frequently 
switch between processing by brand and processing by attribute (Shi et al. 2013). In addition, 
a two-stage approach implies that it would not be possible to predict brand choice as early as 
we do in the three essays of this dissertation (after 25-35% of the decision time).  
Type III: Uncertainty about the overall utility of a brand. Brand utilities are updated 
from moment to moment as the consumer inspects the information on display. This offers the 
possibility to capture uncertainty as a function of changes in brand utility over time. If these 
changes are frequent, relatively large, and both positive and negative, then this would suggest 
that the consumer is unsure. If the consumer continues to inspect the brand while these 
changes are ongoing, then the expectation of that brand’s utility is probably high enough to 
justify the effort. The trade-off between inspecting brands that appear promising in order to 
resolve uncertainty about their utility and choosing the best alternative thus far is related to 
exploration vs. exploitation in the multi-armed bandit (MAB) literature (Gittins 1979) as well 
as models of sequential search and choice (SSC) (Weitzman 1979). In MAB problems, the 




choice alternatives) and exploitation (making a final choice for one of the alternatives) 
(Meyer and Shi 1995; Powell and Ryzhov 2012). The objective in SSC models is similar: 
maximize the difference between the utility of the chosen brand and the costs of finding it.  
In order to use the general idea of exploration vs. exploitation from the MAB 
literature in the type of decision processes that this thesis focusses on, a measure for the 
benefit of reducing uncertainty about the utility of a brand is needed. The reason is that 
learning about the utility of a brand is the reward that consumers receive from inspecting a 
choice alternative that they do not choose later on. One solution could be to measure the 
reduction in uncertainty and then estimate the benefit. This approach could provide additional 
insights into consumer characteristics that favour exploration vs. exploitation, to the extent 
that it is possible to empirically identify these effects (e.g. motivation, involvement in the 
category, forward looking behaviour, risk aversion). One measure that captures changes in 
probability distributions is the Kullback-Leibler divergence: 
 ( ∥ − ∆) = ∬ ( ) log ( )∆( ∆) ∆. (1) 
Where ( ∥ − ∆) is the Kullback–Leibler divergence between the brand choice 
probability distribution at time  and − ∆; ∆ is the time interval over which the change in 
choice probabilities is calculated (e.g. when ∆ = 1 ( ∥ − 1) captures the change in 
brand choice probabilities from one moment to the next);  is the utility of brand  at time 
 for consumer ,  is the probability that consumer  chooses brand  at time . 
RIT models use a similar measure to capture changes in beliefs, with one important 
difference. RIT models use the expected change in choice probabilities over the remaining 
decision time(Steiner et al. 2017), while the measure in Eq. 1 integrates over past changes. 
These correspond to the expected gain from continuing to inspect the brands and the 




Type IV: Uncertainty about which brand has the highest utility in the set. In Chapter 3 
the Shannon entropy measure captures the extent to which brands have similar choice 
probabilities. Shannon entropy is defined for discrete distributions and hence it does not 
account for the uncertainty around each brand utility (Figure 5.1 C and D). In addition, there 
are two other limitations to consider. First, it uses all brand choice probabilities, which is a 
limitation if consumers aim to differentiate only the chosen brand from the second preferred 
Figure 5.1 Examples of changes in Shannon entropy as a result of changes in brand utilities 
A B 
C D 
Note: Entropy values calculated as in Eq. 11 (Chapter 3) and rounded to one decimal. The minimum entropy is 0 




option. An alternative approach would be to include a measure of the distance between the 
first and second brands. Second, changes in the ranking of the brands do not always lead to 
changes in entropy. If the consumer represented in Figure 5.1B updates the utilities of brands 
C and D to 5 and 3 units respectively, then entropy remains 0.5. However, this change in the 
ranking of the brands would suggest that the consumer is unsure which of them is best. 
Ideally, a measure on uncertainty about which brand has the highest utility is sensitive to such 
changes. 
5.3.2 Sequential Sampling Models (SSM) 
The results of the empirical essays in this dissertation show that using attention, as compared 
to observed eye movements, is better able to capture the moment to moment utility 
accumulation that takes place during choice. Thus far, SSM applications that integrate eye 
movements use raw frequencies or durations of eye movements (Krajbich et al. 2010; 
Krajbich and Rangel 2011; Reutskaja et al. 2011). This comes with limitations. Using 
observed eye movements can lead to an underestimation of the link between attention and 
brand utility (chapter 2), with negative consequences for the accuracy of moment of choice 
predictions (chapter 3). Therefore, we argue in favor of specifying both search and brand 
utilities as functions of consumer, brand, and time specific attention extracted from eye-
movement sequences.  
The models we propose infer consumer’s subjective values from attention and then 
estimate the link to utility (drift rate) conditional on choice. The specification can easily be 
adapted to any number of brands and attributes, which could be useful for extending the 
aDDM to more than the current limited number of options (3 brands with one attribute, or 1 
brand with 2 attributes) (Krajbich et al. 2010; Krajbich and Rangel 2011).  
The results of the dissertation show that consumers use eye movements to inspect 




be chosen. This contradicts assumptions of aDDM that fixations are random with respect to 
the value of the fixated item (Krajbich et al. 2010) and MDFT models that assume attention 
weights are identically and independently distributed over time (e.g. according to a Bernoulli 
process) (Roe et al. 2001).  
5.3.3 Rational Inattention Theory (RIT) 
The models in this dissertation build on RIT. While developments in this stream of literature 
recognize the important role of attention during choice, they argue that attention is essentially 
unobservable, just as preferences (Caplin and Dean 2015). Therefore, the proposed analytical 
models of RIT argue that both preferences and attention (or lack thereof) need to be 
recovered from observed choices (Masatlioglu, Nakajima, and Ozbay 2012). Specifically, 
from state dependent stochastic choice data (SDSC, introduced in section 1.3.2) collected by 
exposing participants repeatedly to decision problems that vary in terms of available actions, 
the value of the correct choice, and the prior probability of each state. In a marketing context, 
this implies that participants would make repeated choices from sets of brands whose 
attributes are systematically manipulated in a within-subjects experimental design, akin to 
choice-based conjoint studies. The models in this dissertation extract attention from eye-
movement data, thus eliminating the need to observe multiple choices per participant. The 
characteristics of the data used to calibrate the proposed models in this dissertation differ 
from those of SDSC data. However, both this dissertation and RIT models are essentially 
interested in understanding the fundamental link between attention, utility, and choice. 
Therefore, the findings of this dissertation have implications for RIT models. 
 First, the results of chapter 2 indicate that (1) the moments when brands are attended 
to provide important information about changes in attention over time, and that (2) 
trajectories of attention, rather than the overall amount of attention, are more closely related 




accounted for, as they reflect not only what brands were under focus, but also for how long, 
and during which moments. Current analytical models of RIT account for what choice 
alternatives are attended to and the amount of attention (Matějka and McKay 2015), but 
assume that the timing of attention is irrelevant and can therefore be abstracted from (Steiner 
et al. 2017).  
Second, the model proposed in chapter 3 accounts for the possible effects of 
uncertainty on the duration of the choice task. Specifically, participants who are not sure 
which of the brands provides most utility benefit from inspecting the brands for a longer time. 
This integrates a core assumption of RIT: that the costs of inspecting the brands is 
proportional to the choice-uncertainty of the decision maker, which is captured by an 
entropy-measure (Steiner et al. 2017). However, the results of the model comparison in 
chapter 3 (Table 3.2, and section 3.5.1) do not support this assumption. We argue that the 
general idea that uncertainty influences decision time and allocation of attention has merit 
and should be pursued in future research, as we discuss in more detail when we introduce the 
propositions for TRA (section 5.6). At the same time, we speculate that the entropy-based 
measure of uncertainty might not be best at capturing the underlying construct.  
In information theory, Shannon entropy is a measure of uncertainty about a random 
variable. In RIT, this entropy measure captures the uncertainty of the decision maker with 
respect to the utility derived from choosing an alternative. In order to reduce uncertainty, the 
DM uses attention to select information that is relevant and filter out information that is not. 
Then, entropy-based costs imply that “the cost of multiple signals spread over many periods 
is identical to the cost of a single signal conveying the same information” (Steiner et al. 2017, 
p. 523). The assumption is that attention works like a filter and the consumer decides which 




is not influenced by how easy or difficult it is to process it, but by the extent to which it 
makes the consumer more confident in selecting a brand. 
5.4 Managerial Implications 
“Knowing what to sell, when to sell, and to whom is essential for a firm to allocate scarce 
marketing resources in an efficient and effective manner” (Kumar and Man Luo 2008, p. 63). 
While eye-tracking data is not yet routinely collected, companies can use other types of data 
that reflect attention and that are easily available such as browsing history, geo-location, or 
purchase history. We argue that the fundamental link between attention and choice is present 
regardless of the manifest attention indicators (eye movements or browsing history). Online 
retailers (e.g. Amazon) and advertising platforms (e.g. Google Ads, Facebook) are already 
capitalizing on the ability to infer interests, attitudes, and purchase probabilities from detailed 
information about their users. Such platforms have access to large amounts of consumer level 
data that cover browsing behavior not only on their own website, but also on other websites 
though cookies. This data is valuable both for attribution models that quantify the 
contribution of every touchpoint prior to a final purchase (Danaher and van Heerde 2018) and 
for recommender systems. 
The first essay focuses on online decisions in information-rich environments. These 
decisions are increasingly common as consumers have easy and fast access to detailed 
information. Websites display information on tens of attributes and consumers are expected 
to change their processing strategy in order to adapt to the amount of information (e.g. 
processing more by attribute). The findings of this essay suggest that consumers only change 
how much time and attention they allocate to the brands on display, but they do not change 
their strategy. This has implications for how online retailers display information about 
complex brands and suggests that they need to make sure the most diagnostic or important 




The second essay focuses even more on the dynamic aspect of decision making. 
Theories on information processing stages and choice argue that consumers make decisions 
by going through a sequence of stages – information search, utility formation, and only later 
on choice. Under this framework, utilities are formed very late in the process, this process is 
unobservable, and preferences can only be inferred based on observed choices. This essay 
provides support for an early start of the utility formation process and for visual attention 
reflecting the moment-to-moment build up to choice. This can be used to improve preference 
measurement in situations when choices cannot be observed or there is reason to believe the 
observed choices are not an accurate reflection of consumers’ true preferences. For example, 
in situations when consumers have an incentive to be dishonest (e.g. choosing an insurance 
plan in line with one’s risky behaviors) or feel pressured to give a certain answer (e.g. 
attitudes towards substance use, unhealthy lifestyle choices, political preferences). 
In order to make good product recommendations, online retailers need to have a 
measure of the utility match between the consumer and the recommendation. While the exact 
rules that power recommender systems are to a large extent unavailable to the public, some 
information is available in reports (Smith and Linden 2017) and patents (Lam et al. 2012). 
These offer information about how different companies implement variants of the two main 
approaches for recommendations: collaborative filtering or content-based filtering 
(Adomavicius and Tuzhilin 2005; Lam et al. 2012), which we discuss in more detail in 
sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 respectively. 
E-commerce is the fastest growing market at the moment and this trend is expected to 
continue. In the US, online sales have a double-digit growth over the past years9 and the 
leading online retailer Amazon has an active customer base of 300 million worldwide10. 
                                                            
9 https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/arts/supplemental-ecommerce.html 
10 https://www.emarketer.com/Chart/US-Amazon-Active-Customers-vs-Prime-Members-2010-2019-




Consumers frequently use similar websites that display information on multiple brands and 
attributes in response to a search query, to help them choose products. The decisions made on 
these sites are often very fast, taken in just a few minutes or seconds (Shi et al. 2013) and 
both the websites and retailers featuring their products have great interest in understanding 
how such decisions are made. This dissertation looks into how consumers make such rapid 
decisions and examines additional factors that can play a role in these processes, such as 
information complexity and brand ownership. While the empirical results in the three essays 
provide insights into fundamental attention and utility accumulation processes, some 
uncertainty remains about the extent to which they can be generalized to other settings as we 
discuss in section 5.4.3. 
5.4.1 Collaborative Filtering 
Collaborative filtering assumes that consumers with similar past purchases have similar 
preferences. Therefore, these algorithms recommend items that the focal user has not yet 
bought but other similar users have. This approach does not require the algorithm to know the 
content of the recommended items or how users evaluate their features, which makes the 
algorithm relatively simple to implement for online retailers with a large customer base and 
assortment. The models we develop in chapter 2 and 3 are also agnostic to the specific 
features of the brands and predict choice from how consumers attend to the brands from 
moment-to-moment. To the extent that the results of our essays extend to browsing data, then 
online retailers who are using collaborative filtering algorithms could benefit from 
augmenting purchase data with information about which brands the consumer has inspected 
thus far, the duration, and the pattern.  
Amazon has been using collaborative filtering since 2003 and the algorithm that they 
developed also forms the basis of recommender systems implemented by other companies 




system if that after the algorithm identifies similar items from which to make a 
recommendation, those items that have already been seen by the focal consumer are removed 
from the set of possible recommendations(Smith and Linden 2017). The underlying 
assumption seems to be that consumers follow an optimal search process by inspecting one 
brand at a time and then moving on to a different brand if the current option is not going to be 
chosen (De los Santos, Hortaçsu, and Wildenbeest 2012; Weitzman 1979). However, given 
the results of this dissertation, the decision to no longer recommend previously seen items is 
surprising. Specifically, we find that consumers frequently revisit the brand that they 
eventually choose even when the information for all of the brands is available at the same 
time on the screen. This pattern is not specific to eye movements and has also been 
documented for browsing data (Bronnenberg et al. 2016).  
We can only speculate on the effects of this particular aspect of the Amazon 
recommender system. To the extent that recommendations for yet-unseen items allow the 
consumer to make a more informed choice after inspecting more diverse alternatives, and 
consumers appreciate the novelty, this could be a good strategy. However, these 
recommendations are based on items frequently bought by the same type of consumer and do 
not include information about the content of the items. Hence, it is not obvious that the 
recommended items facilitate a more informed choice while it is fair to assume that exploring 
new items extends decision time. To the extent that the results of our essays extend to 
browsing data, then online retailers could benefit from predicting (1) the choice likelihood of 
previously seen items and (2) the remaining time until the consumer is expected to make a 
purchase. These predictions would then inform the decision of whether an item that has 




5.4.2 Content-based Filtering  
Content-based filtering uses information about the content of the items to make 
recommendations and is mostly used by music and movie-streaming platforms. For example, 
Netflix uses a combination of content-based and collaborative filtering. On the home page, 
users are recommended movies similar to what they have previously watched on the 
platform. When users enter a search query, the results are based on the actions of others who 
have entered similar queries. Ideally, Netflix users are able to find a movie they like within 
seconds or minutes. Usually these choices are made by inspecting the visual information 
about the available alternatives and users spend very little time on each movie (1.8 seconds) 
(Lamkhede and Das 2019). 
While the results of the models developed in chapters 2 and 3 are relevant for 
collaborative filtering recommender systems, the model proposed in chapter 4 includes 
information about attribute-types across product categories which makes the results of this 
chapter more relevant for content-based recommender systems. An interesting aspect of 
choices on Netflix is that users aim not only to choose a good movie, but also that they 
choose this movie within a short amount of time. Therefore, the company needs to optimize 
the recommendations offered to its users not only for the utility they derive from watching 
the movie (i.e. making sure that Netflix users find a good movie to watch), but also for the 
utility of the search process (i.e. making sure that users don’t spend too much time before 
finding a good movie, but also not too little time as this might lead to an insufficient 
exploration of available options). 
There are several issues that companies such as Amazon and Netflix highlight when 
discussing recommender systems. First, what recommendations to offer to a new user for 
whom only limited information about preferences is available (Lamkhede and Das 2019; 




new users to select a few movie titles that they like. Once users watch content on the Netflix 
platform, more recent consumption moments receive a larger weight when making future 
recommendations. Second, how to include data about when previous purchases have been 
made or when certain brands have been looked at. This is important in the calibration step. 
Third, at what time in the future is it best to make a recommendation? We think that the 
answers to these questions are extremely valuable to companies. At the same time, we argue 
in favour of a balance between a pure optimization or machine learning approach in which a 
specific outcome of interest is maximized (usually sales) and a causal approach that aims to 
uncover fundamental processes that govern how recommendations work. This would allow 
companies to develop tools that maximize the value they offer to consumers over a longer 
time horizon as opposed to the usual short-term focus on maximizing sales. This becomes 
even more important if we consider the recent increased interest in consumer privacy, as we 
discuss in the next section. 
5.4.3 Extensions to Other Types of Display and Product Categories  
Mobile devices. Participants in the studies presented in this dissertation have made choices 
from a computer monitor. Smartphones have a much smaller screen size, which means that 
consumers need to scroll or click to be able to see more details about products. This leads to 
at least two differences between the devices that participants in our studies have used and 
smartphones. First, because scrolling is more effortful and deliberate than eye movements, it 
should also reflect higher levels of utility. Second, when using a smartphone, previously 
inspected information is unlikely to still be available on screen. Therefore, memory decay can 
play a more important role.  
While consumers are increasingly using mobile devices, they are less likely to use 
them for expensive purchases. A study of more than 37K consumers’ clickstream data during 




device to a lesser one, especially when risk (e.g. functional, financial, privacy) is high (De 
Haan et al. 2018). In the first quarter of 2019, the average online order placed from a mobile 
phone was 78USD while from a desktop was 119USD11. When using a mobile device, 
consumers search information not only on the shopping website, but on other apps or 
platforms (e.g. YouTube, Google) as they “are no longer following a linear path from 
awareness to consideration to purchase”12.  
Websites that do not display attribute by brands matrices to enable product 
comparison. Even when there are no attribute-by-brands matrices, consumers are presented 
with multiple items at the same time, displayed either in a list or in a grid display. Therefore, 
consumers still receive information about multiple brands at the same time on the screen, 
albeit in a different format. If they want to know more details about a brand, they can click it 
and are redirected to another page. This would imply that (1) consumers would need to rely 
more on their memory in order to make brand comparisons, and that (2) as compared to the 
participants in our studies, they would be more likely to form overall evaluations of a brand 
earlier in the process, thus more in line with a sequential search approach. A study on search 
and choice for digital cameras (using browsing and choice data) found that consumers 
frequently revisit those brands that they eventually choose (Bronnenberg et al. 2016). This 
suggests that consumers do not rely exclusively on their memory and also do not form overall 
evaluations of a brand to the extent predicted by sequential search and choice models.  
Low involvement product categories. Participants in our studies made choices in six 
different product categories (Table 5.1). While four of the six categories contain complex 
brands (e.g. smartphones), the remaining two are in relatively simple categories (lightbulbs 
and travel mugs). Regardless of the product category, the results show that attention, utilities, 






and brand choice probabilities are closely aligned. This allows our model to predict brand 
choice early on (after 25-35% of the decision time), irrespective of the duration of the task 
(self-controlled and relatively longer in Chapter 2 and 3, experimentally manipulated and 
shorter in Chapter 4). Applications of the aDDM provide additional support for the general 
nature of the link between attention and choice. These models are usually calibrated on 
choice between very simple items (e.g. snacks) for which involvement is expected to be 
lower than for the product categories used in our studies. While decision time is very short 
(2-3 seconds), the link between attention and choice probability remains (Krajbich et al. 
2010).  
Choice-based conjoint (CBC) studies. CBC is often used to measure consumer 
preferences and to segment the market. This method requires participants to make repeated 
choices within the same category between ‘profiles’ – combinations of attribute levels that 
are experimentally manipulated. Depending on the number of attributes and attribute levels, 
the number of choice sets or tasks varies between eight and 20 (Johnson and Orme 1996). 
Then, exploiting heterogeneity in partworth estimates, segments that group consumers with 
relatively homogenous preferences are grouped together (e.g. price sensitive consumers, 
quality oriented, first-time buyers/experimenting). Ideally, the people in these segments are 
different not only in terms of unobservable preferences, but also other variables that are more 
easily accessible to marketeers and that they can use to customize their offers, 
communication strategy, and thus target the right consumer with a matching offer/message. 
In order for segmentation and profiling to provide valuable insights for companies, 
preferences elicited in conjoint tasks should be the same as those that consumers have at the 
point of purchase in a realistic scenario. If that is so, then preferences during the conjoint 




movement data suggest that early vs. later choice tasks reveal different consumer preferences 
(Meißner et al. 2016). 
 
5.5 Implications for Consumer Protection and Policy 
Consumers use various technologies in their everyday life, such as mobile applications, 
internet browsers, social networks, and wearables. In doing so, consumers leave a digital 
footprint - a stream of data that describes their activities. While eye-tracking data is not yet 
easily available, other types of data that reflect attention and consumer interest are. These 
types of data (e.g. browsing history, geo-location, purchase history, product ratings, product 
reviews) are routinely collected online, and in recent years it has become apparent that such 
practices raise important privacy and ethical concerns. Legislation related to these issues has 
been adopted within the EU (General Data Protection Regulation) and is also being drafted 
by other countries outside EU. In this section we discuss: (1) digital footprints as a data 
source that reflects consumer preferences, (2) technological developments that make is easier 
to eye track consumers using their own devices (smartphones, laptops), and (3) legislation 
initiatives that focus on privacy and data protection. 
5.5.1 Digital Footprints 
Often, consumers explicitly share content with other people (e.g. social networks, forums) or 
companies (e.g. when making an online purchase, contacting customer service). Data that 
consumers intentionally submit online is defined as active digital footprint. At the same time, 
consumers also leave a passive digital footprint: their search history (on Google or through 
the product catalogue of an online retailer), the news they read online, the location and time 
when they use a device. Both active and passive digital footprints can reveal consumer 
attitudes, interests, and preferences (Ghose, Ipeirotis, and Li 2018). This brings numerous 




Marketing analysts benefit from the variety and volume of data that consumers 
generate online as this provides very detailed information at individual level. Such data can 
be used to improve measurement of consumer engagement, preferences, and attitudes. Brand 
managers can use these insights to gain a better understanding of the consumer and to adapt 
their communication and branding strategies accordingly. Before companies had access to 
individual consumers’ digital footprints, they used data from panels of households to inform 
their marketing strategy. Even though these panels contain far fewer data points per 
household, they could still be used to increase revenues and optimize targeting campaigns 
(Rossi, McCulloch, and Allenby 1996). Companies’ increasing access to detailed information 
about individual consumers makes it easier to continuously optimize targeting and reach 
specific consumer segments (e.g. the Facebook ad platform facilitates the delivery of targeted 
ads based on very specific characteristics of the consumers). Developments in facial 
recognition technology make it possible to optimize advertising during sport events in real 
time, based on the composition of the audience (e.g. gender, age) and their engagement with 
the content. The company that offers this service, Fancam, describes it as “the ultimate 
crowd-selfie and while engagement is facilitated through cutting edge technology, the real 
driver is tribalism and our need as individuals to say: ‘Look, that’s me.’”13. 
Ad effectiveness is influenced not only by the accuracy of targeting consumers, but 
also by ad transparency and platform trust (Kim, Barasz, and John 2018). This suggests that 
platforms can derive financial benefits if they build trust with their users as being transparent 
about targeting criteria on trusted platforms increases advertising effectiveness. However, 
more research into these topics is needed to determine how privacy concerns, transparency 
about personalized targeting (ads, recommendations), and the effectiveness of marketing 
actions are related. In light of their users’ growing interest in privacy, companies have 
                                                            




implemented different tools that allow users more control over what ads they are exposed to 
and more information about the ads that they receive. Users (e.g. Facebook, YouTube, 
Twitter) can access some minimal information about why they are being shown a certain ad, 
if they choose to click on ‘why this ad’ buttons displayed next to the ad.  
5.5.2 Eye-tracking Solutions and Recent Developments 
The studies in this dissertation use eye tracking data collected in two different settings: 
research areas inside shopping centers (Chapter 2) and in the lab (Chapters 3 and 4). 
Participants in these studies inspected information presented on a display that looks very 
similar to a regular PC monitor. In addition to the screen-based eye trackers used in our 
studies, there are other products such as glasses or VR headsets (Appendix G provides 
examples from one of the leading companies in this market). While there are several methods 
to detect eye movements, the general approach is to use (near) infrared light to illuminate the 
eyes of the user and then a camera to capture how the eyes reflect the light. Many smartphone 
and laptop models have infrared emitters and cameras that are currently used for facial 
recognition or iris scanning. For example, iPhone X and later, iPad Pro models with A12X 
Bionic Chip14; laptops that support facial recognition (Windows Hello); smartphones that use 
iris scans (Samsung Galaxy S8 / Note 8 or later15); Dell XPS laptops have two infrared 
emitters which enable the infrared camera to sense and track motion. Such technological 
developments make it possible to collect eye tracking data using a user’s own device.  
Large companies such as Facebook, Google, Unilever have been using eye tracking 
studies to understand how consumers use their services and react to their advertisements. 
Both Facebook16 and Google17 partnered with Tobii Pro Insight to understand how consumers 
                                                            








allocate their attention to advertising while using multiple devices (TV and mobile). 
Facebook has also been applying for patents that develop eye tracking solutions. For 
example: a patent on automatic eye tracking calibration that takes place while an individual 
uses their device (Lopez et al. 2017), and a second one on how to use a device’s camera to 
monitor emotions and display content accordingly (Naveh 2017). When asked about these 
patents, by the US Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, Facebook 
stated that the company was at that time (June 8, 2018) only exploring how new technology 
and methods can improve their services and was not building technology to identify people 
with eye-tracking cameras18.  
5.5.3 Data Protection: Legislation Initiatives 
The GDPR defines biometric data as “personal data resulting from specific technical 
processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a natural 
persona, which allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural person” (Article 
4(14)) and prohibits processing of biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a 
natural person (Article 9(1)). Iris texture and facial features fall under the definition of 
biometric data and could potentially be collected at the same time that eye movements are 
tracked. While eye movement data would not allow the unique identification of a person, it 
would make it easier to identify a user within a household. Currently, if members of a 
household use a shared device without signing in with their own separate account, the digital 
footprint can be incorrectly assigned to the account that is logged in. Such incorrect 
assignments could be resolved by verifying that the interpupillary distance of the user 
matches the account.  
 Consumers are using facial recognition and fingerprint reading to open their device, 
although the less intrusive alternative of using a password is still available. It seems that the 





convenience of logging in by scanning one’s face or finger offers enough utility to 
compensate for the loss of privacy and potential risks of data breaches. Measuring the value 
of one’s data is a difficult task, in part because of the information asymmetry between the 
companies that collect it and the users that generate it. Therefore, asking users for their 
willingness to pay (WTP) for using a product (i.e. this could be a device, a feature, an online 
platform) or willingness to accept (WTA) to forgot it, two measures commonly used to assess 
welfare (Hanemann 1991) is unlikely to offer a good estimate of the financial value of their 
data. Even though standard economic theory would predict similar WTP and WTA, the two 
differ substantially in the context of online platforms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, or 
LinkedIn. A survey with a US sample of online platform users found that respectively, 33%, 
15%, and 23% of them would not be willing to pay for an account (Sunstein 2019). Those 
participants who were willing to pay for an account offered an average WTP of 26$, 41$, and 
33$ (per month) respectively. The reported WTA were more than double: 75$, 101$, and 
98$. Another study that measured WTA for Facebook with an incentive compatible design 
has found an even larger value of 126$ (Corrigan et al. 2018).  
 Another way of measuring the value of one’s data is to base it on the price that 
advertisers need to pay in order to target a user group. This approach highlights the fact that 
not all data have the same financial value. The budget of advertisers interested in a user with 
certain characteristics has a direct impact on the price that Facebook or other advertising 
platforms can charge for placing an ad in front of that user’s eyes. All else equal, the data of 
users who control household purchases is more valuable (Lambrecht and Tucker 2019). 
Similarly, the value of data could depend on a large number of factors: income, life events 
associated with increased spending (e.g. becoming a parent, getting a divorce, job 
promotions), location of primary residence, health status. Given the sensitive nature of some 




adopted in the EU (General Fata Protection Regulation19) and California (California 
Consumer Privacy Act20). In addition, a legislative initiative (Designing Accounting 
Safeguards to Help Broaden Oversight and Regulations on Data (DASHBOARD) Act) that 
focuses specifically on the financial value of user data has recently been introduced by two 
US senators21. If adopted, this bipartisan legislation would require companies to disclose to 
users an assessment of the value of their data.  
5.6 Next Steps Towards a Theory of Rational Attention 
The first chapter of this dissertation argues that consumers decide what to focus their 
attention on, rather than what to be inattentive to. While this is closer to rational attention, the 
models developed in the three empirical essays of this dissertation build on and refer to RIT. 
We now come back to this idea and propose a theory of rational attention (TRA). TRA 
specifies that attention, rather than inattention or information acquisition, has an important 
role for utility accumulation processes that take place during brand choice. We provide a set 
of propositions (Table 5.3) that capture important aspects of TRA and discuss how these are 
supported by the results of this dissertation and by previous research. However, there are 
many questions that remain unanswered as we indicate in the description of each proposition. 
We argue that investigating these questions are interesting avenues for future research and 
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Table 5.3 Propositions for a theory of rational attention  
1. Attention is a coordinating mechanism through which consumers implement their 
decision goals. 
 
2. Attention is different from other related processes that can also be reflected in eye 
movements (information acquisition and processing) or lack thereof (inattention). 
 
3. Differences in attention between locations on the display reflect preferences for the 
items displayed in those locations. 
 
4. Consumers inspect the information on display if they expect that this allows them to 




Attention is a coordinating mechanism through which consumers implement their 
decision goals. 
 
An important first step towards a theory of rational attention is specifying what 
attention is and explaining how it is different from other processes that take place during 
choice. In this dissertation, attention denotes covert attention, “the taking possession by the 
mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of [...] several simultaneously possible objects” 
(James et al. 1890, p. 404). When consumers inspect brands presented on a visual display, 
their attention is closely related to the eye movements they make during the task (Liechty et 
al. 2003). While eye movements are not error-free indicators of attention (section 2.2.1), they 
are reliable reflections of what consumers are focusing on (Pieters and Wedel 2007; Wedel et 
al. 2008).  
Illustrated by previous research on goal control in advertising (Pieters and Wedel 
2007) and supported by the results of chapter 4, consumers use eye movements to inspect 
areas of a visual display that contain information relevant for their task. These results are 




participants. Hence, it is not clear to what extent more subtle attempts at influencing 
consumers’ decision goals would lead to similar effects on attention. For example, when 
consumers inspect brands in a display their attention can be briefly captured by 
characteristics of the display (e.g. luminance, color, position) (van der Lans et al. 2008b). 
Under what conditions can attention initially captured by bottom-up effects can be used to 
influence the decision goals of the consumer? Then, to the extent that bottom-up effects on 
attention impact attribute importance or subjective brand values, and knowing that that 
consumers focus on different areas of a display which depend on their initial decision goals 
and motivation, how should actions aimed at influencing their goals be adapted? 
 
Proposition 2  
Attention is different from other related processes that can also be reflected in eye 
movements (information acquisition and processing) or lack thereof (inattention). 
 
Eye-fixations are brief moments when the eyes are relatively still (for about 200-400 
msec.) and focused on a specific location in space to acquire information from it. During 
these moments the consumer can acquire information by reading what is presented on the 
display (Rayner 1998). Once the consumer acquires some information, deliberation is needed 
to process it. A distinction is made between information-acquisition and information-
processing due to additional cognitive costs that consumers incur when processing 
information (Payne and Bettman 2004). For example, a consumer who acquires information 
about the annual energy consumption of a dishwasher uses additional resources (cognitive 
effort, time) in order to understand if that is an environmentally friendly option or not. During 
a task, eye movements that consumers make reflect what they focus their attention on 




consumption information is more likely to pay more attention to energy efficiency as 
compare to others who only briefly inspect this attribute. In the absence of eye fixations on a 
specific area of the display it is reasonable to infer that the consumer did not acquire, process, 
or attend to the corresponding information (brand and/or attribute). However, the sheer 
presence of some fixations on a specific area of the display is not a guarantee that the 
consumer acquired, processed, or attended to the corresponding information. This has several 
implications. First, eye movements are a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
information acquisition and processing to occur. Second, information acquisition is a 
precondition for information processing. Third, consumers’ attention to a specific type of 
information does not guarantee that the information is acquired and/or processed. For 
example, a consumer whose attention is focused on the environmental impact of their choice 
is likely to try to acquire relevant information. However, this consumer could fail to find 
and/or understand this information. 
Inattention in rational inattention theory (RIT) is best described by notions of 
information theory in the communication of messages, specifically Broadbent’s (1958) 
selective filter theory (Masatlioglu et al. 2012). The implication is that decision makers filter 
out some information in a way similar to how in a noisy environment one needs to make an 
active choice about what conversation to follow while ignoring other conversations around 
them. RIT models specify that the decision makers restrict attention to one information 
acquisition strategy that they use to make a choice (Steiner et al. 2017). If this is the case, 
then the role of attention is that of “early selection” or a gate that makes sure some 
information is filtered out. If attention were just a gate or filter that would let information 
enter the decision process or not, then inattention would be its complement22. However, the 
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assumption of the eliminative filter is not supported by empirical evidence and “information 
flowing in unattended channels is not switched off but simply weakened or attenuated” 
(LaBerge 1995, p. 24).  
Some important questions remain. First, are there consumer choice tasks where only 
attention, inattention, or information acquisition/processing play the main role while the 
others are less important? We argue that attention is always the most relevant, as it is more 
informative about what consumers are interested in. However, the empirical results of this 
dissertation are based on choice tasks in a specific domain: choice between complex brands 
for which information is displayed at the same time in an attributes-by-brands matrix. Future 
research could investigate the extent to which the effects we find generalize to other decision 
types and domains. For example, it would be interesting to examine situations when 
consumers (1) construct their own choice sets by actively including or excluding brands from 
a larger, awareness set (Shocker et al. 1991) or (2) make choices best described as a mix of 
stimulus- and memory-based (Lynch Jr, Marmorstein, and Weigold 1988). In terms of 
different decision domain, future applications of these models could focus on (1) financial or 
investment decisions (e.g. what information do investors ignore and what do they pay 
attention to? Is the performance of investments decisions explained by what investors paid 
attention to or by what they ignored?), (2) medical decisions, and (3) voting decisions.  
 While RIT models assume that decision makers attend only to information that 
reduces their uncertainty, there are situations when decision makers are in fact actively 
avoiding information that would do so (Gigerenzer and Garcia-Retamero 2017). Such willful 
ignorance impacts not only brand choice (Ehrich and Irwin 2005), but more importantly 
medical choices as well. For example, the choice of taking a genetic test to determine the risk 
of developing cancer (Biesecker et al. 2000) or vaccination choices (Maayan-Metzger, 




Proposition 3  
Differences in attention between locations on the display reflect preferences for the 
items displayed in those locations.  
 
The three empirical essays in this dissertation find that differences in attention between 
brands and between attributes are closely linked to the subjective value that consumers attach 
to those brands and to the importance of the respective attributes. The link between attention 
and utility has been documented in a variety of other settings (Glaholt et al. 2009; Lindsen et 
al. 2010; Pieters and Wedel 2007; van der Lans et al. 2008b). We argue that this is a 
fundamental aspect of attention and therefore expect it to be manifest in other situations. 
Because the models developed in this dissertation are agnostic to the specific information that 
is being attended to, we argue that they can be used to also for choice between non-
comparable brands (Bettman et al. 1998; Shocker et al. 1991). For example, this could be 
applied to model gift choices (Wang and van der Lans 2018) as these are often made among 
items that are in different product categories.  
Another area that would be interesting to explore further is related to the impact that 
changes during the task have on attention and choice. Participants in the studies of this 
dissertation were presented with all the attribute and brand information at the same time. 
However, it is not clear how the effects we find in the three empirical essays would change if 
the moments when participants inspect specific brand and attribute information are not 
completely under their control, but are also influenced externally. This becomes even more 
relevant in the context of actions that online retailers could take to influence the choice of a 
consumer who is in the search and choice process. More specifically, future research could 
examine: (1) how changes in the amount and type of brand-and-attribute information 




(e.g. price discount for that one brand) impact the evaluation of all the brands in the set, and 
(3) what processes capture the link between changes in information and utility accumulation. 
 
Proposition 4  
Consumers inspect the information on display if this allows them to reduce uncertainty 
about their choice. 
 
During brand choice, consumers inspect information about the brands in order to reduce 
uncertainty about their utility match. While this idea is shared by various types of choice 
theories, what each of these theories assumes by “uncertainty reduction” can differ 
considerably, with important implications for how preferences are measured and how 
predictions for brand choice and moment of choice are made (if possible), as discussed in 
sections 1.3.1 and 5.3.1.  
Models developed in the optimal sequential search and choice theoretical framework 
(Weitzman 1979) assume that consumers already know the brand attributes. Therefore, 
consumers engage in a search process in order to reduce type III uncertainty about the overall 
utility of the brand (Kim, Albuquerque, and Bronnenberg 2017). However, it seems rather 
unlikely that consumers know all the brand attributes before they start inspecting the brands. 
This explains why models that account for the moment-to-moment reduction in both 
components of brand uncertainty have found that this leads to more efficient preference 
measurements (Yang et al. 2015).  
Search and choice models (De los Santos et al. 2012; Kim et al. 2017; Weitzman 1979) 
and models of bounded rationality (Gabaix et al. 2006; Yang et al. 2015) both assume that 
uncertainty is at the brand level, but not at the choice set level. Specifically, consumers 




uncertainty about the utilities of two or more brands is eliminated, the consumer is certain of 
their utility differences. Sequential sampling models, such as the aDDM, make a different 
assumption – consumers spend time inspecting the brands because they are unsure about the 
difference in utilities between the brands (Krajbich et al. 2010; Oud et al. 2016). Therefore, 
uncertainty is at the level of the choice set.  
This shows that there are at least two potential explanations for why consumers 
acquire information: (1) to make an informed choice and (2) to be confident that the chosen 
brand is the best from the set of  alternatives. The first explanation implies that consumers 
reduce uncertainty at the brand level, while the second implies that they reduce uncertainty at 
the choice set level. Importantly, consumers who have different motivations to reduce 
uncertainty are expected to inspect the brands differently and to focus on different types of 
attributes. We argue that it is important for model to capture this accurately, especially if 
these models aim to make predictions about when consumers are going to express their 
choice.  
Then, future research could investigate: (1) if the type of uncertainty that consumers 
try to reduce by inspecting brand information differs between consumers, choice contexts, 
type of decisions (e.g. memory-based vs. stimulus based (Lynch Jr et al. 1988), and (2) if and 
how providers of information (e.g. retailers, policy makers, medical practitioners) should 
highlight information that decision makers have not inspected or considered enough. If 
consumers are mostly reducing uncertainty at the choice set level, this implies that from 
moment-to-moment during choice there are two or more brands that are closely competing. 
Then, studies that ask for provisional choices or that interrupt the task a random times to ask 
for choice could offer additional insights into (1) how utility accumulates during choice and 












A. Chapter 2: Model estimation 
Let = , , … , , … , ,  be a vector of length (G ∗ T). Equation 3 
becomes: 
(A1) = + +  
Where X  is of dimensions (G ∗ T) by (K ∗ G), η  is a vector of length (K ∗ G), and e  and e  
are vectors of length (G ∗ T). We assume the unobserved heterogeneities to be normally 
distributed: e ~N(0, Σ ) (consumer-level) and e ~N(0, Σ ) (brand-level). The variance 
covariance matrices at the consumer and brand-level have a similar block diagonal structure. 
We include here the description at the consumer-level: 
(A2) Σ =  Σ … 0⋮ ⋱ ⋮0 … Σ  
Σ  is a block of size G by G that captures the residual variance for observed eye 
movements and the covariances between the different saccade types at time t: 
(A3) Σ = σ 0 0 0000 σσσ σ σσ σσ σ  
We assume normally distributed heterogeneities: r ~N(0, Ψ ) (consumer-level) and r ~N(0, Ψ ) (brand-level). The variance-covariance matrices at the consumer and brand-
level have a similar block diagonal structure. Ψ is of dimensions (G ∗ K) by (G ∗ K) and 
contains one block of size d = 3 corresponding to trajectories of brand fixations (g=1), and a 
second block of size d = 9 corresponding to trajectories of eye-saccades (g in 2, 3, 4).  
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B. Chapter 3: Fixations and brand visits 
Let ,  indicate if the fixation on brand B at time t for individual i is part of a brand visit: 
, = {1 max , + , ;  , + , , ;  , + , > 0  0 ℎ  (B.1) 
Where  
, = {1    ℎ       0 ℎ  (B.2) 
For example, for an individual with the sequence of fixations ‘b1 b1 b1 b4 b1 b4 b3’ there are 
two moments (brand visits): 
Brand Visit Brand 1 Brand 2 Brand 3 Brand 4 
1 4 0 0 0 
2 4 0 0 2 
The results of this paper are based on a dataset of 4487 observations (brand visits) for 
214 individuals. This dataset is constructed from the raw eye tracking data collected in the 
experiment. This raw eye tracking data had 27125 fixations for the 214 individuals in the 
sample. Per individual, the number of fixations varied between 21 and 321, with an average 
of 127. Starting from this dataset, several steps were taken to clean the data and to aggregate 
fixations into brand visits. These steps are: (1) Select fixations on the display area that 
contains brand information, (2) Select fixations with a typical duration ([-2*STD; 2*STD] 
interval, after log transformation), (3) Select fixations that are part of a brand visit, and (4) 
Group fixations into brand visits. After the first two steps, the dataset had 22351 fixations 
that are on the brand information display area and that have a typical duration. The 17.6% of 
the fixations in the raw dataset that were discarded were either on an empty area of the 
monitor, or they were of an unusual length (too short or too long), or both. After the third 
step, the dataset contains 17797 fixations which are part of a brand visit. The 16.8% fixations 
in the raw dataset that were discarded in this step were isolated fixations on one of the brands, 
preceded and followed by fixations on different brands. For example, the fixation on brand 2 




C. Chapter 3: Heterogeneity in attention trajectories – model fit comparisons 
We test the support in our data for heterogeneity in attention at the participant-level and at the 
brand-level by comparing the fit of the proposed model for the link between eye movements 
and attention (eqs. 6-8) against four other competing models based on their ability to predict 
eye-fixation data ( ) out-of-sample (section 3.4.4). A model (IAM1 in Table A.1) that 
restricts all participant- and brand-specific effects and heterogeneities to zero ( , Σ , , 
and Σ  all fixed to zero) has an expected log predictive density ( ) of -19176. After 
including participant ( ) and brand ( ) specific effects the fit ( ) improves to -
14955 (brand and participant heterogeneities Σ  and Σ  remain fixed to zero). We test if 
both participant (Σ ) and brand (Σ ) heterogeneities are supported by the data by comparing 
the proposed model against models that include only one of the two. The proposed model, 
which includes both participant and brand heterogeneities provides the best fit (-1866). The 
model with only brand-level heterogeneity (IAM4: Σ  estimated and Σ  fixed to zero) has a 
fit of -1882 while the model that includes only participant heterogeneity (IAM3: Σ  
estimated and Σ  fixed to zero) has a fit of -14326. The difference between the proposed 
model and the model with brand heterogeneity only is 15.55 (s.e. = 3.59). 
Table A.1 Out-of-sample prediction performance supports brand- and participant-











   Σ  Σ  
IAM1 x     -19176 
IAM2 x x x   -14955 
IAM3 x x x x  -14326 




x x x x x -1866 
Note: ELPD stands for expected log predictive density. ELPD values closer to zero indicate better fit. 
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D. Chapter 4: Stimuli 
Figure D.1 Choice task 1 stimuli (light bulbs) 
 
 





Figure D.3 Choice task 3 stimuli (TVs) 
 
 







E. Chapter 4: Utility specifications for brand choice predictions 
The model specification for M0 is: 
 = +  (D.1) 
Where  is the utility of brand ;  is a type I extreme value distributed utility shock. 
The model specification for M1 is: 
 = + +  (D.2) 
Where  indicated the decision goal of participant  ( = 1 for eco-goal and = 0 for performance-goal);  is the utility of brand  for participants in the 
performance-goal condition;  is change in utility of brand  for participants in the eco-
goal condition; the   is a type I extreme value distributed utility shock. 
The model specification for M2 is: 
 = +  (D.3) 
Where  is the subjective value of brand  as reflected by the share of attention on brand  
( ̅ ) relative to the expected share if attention is equally distributed between the brands 
(25%);  is a type I extreme value distributed utility shock. 
 = ̅ +  (D.4) 
Where  is the observed share of eye-fixations for participant  on brand  at time  as 
percent of the total number of eye-fixations for participant  at time ; ̅  is the attention 
share of participant  on brand  at time ; ̅ ~ ( ̅ , 2 ); ̅  is the overall attention 
share for brand  at time ; and  is the participant-level variance in attention shares for brand  
at time . 
The model specification for M3 is: 




Where  is the utility intercept of brand ;  is the subjective value of brand  on 
attribute  at time ;  is reflected by the share of attention on brand  and attribute  
relative to the fair share of 25%;  is a type I extreme value distributed utility shock. 
 = ̅ +  (D.6) 
Where  is the share of fixations on brand  relative to the total number of fixations on 
the attribute  for consumer  at time ; ̅  is the share of attention on brand  on attribute  
for consumer  at time ; ̅ ~ ( ̅ , ); ̅  is the overall attention share on brand  
and attribute  at time ;  is the participant-level variance in attention shares;  
unobserved heterogeneity.  
The model specification for M4 is: 
 = + +  (D.7) 
Where  is the utility intercept of brand ;  is the subjective value of brand  as 
reflected by the share of attention on brand  ( ̅ ) relative to the expected share if attention 
is equally distributed between the brands (25%);  is a type I extreme value distributed 
utility shock.  
 = ̅ +  (D.8) 
Where  is the observed share of eye-fixations for participant  on brand  at time  as 
percent of the total number of eye-fixations for participant  at time ; ̅  is the attention 
share of participant  on brand  at time ; ̅ ~ ( ̅ , 2 ); ̅  is the overall attention 
share for brand  at time ; and  is the participant-level variance in attention shares for brand  
at time . 




F. Chapter 4: Estimation results for choice tasks 1, 2, and 4 
Table F.1 Estimation results – attribute importance (choice task 1, lightbulbs) 
Choice task 1  
(light bulbs) 
Period 1 ( ) Period 2 ( ) Period 3 ( ) 
M SD p-value M SD p-value M SD p-value 
Performance-goal ( = 0, eq. 7-8) 
    Eco-attr. 
    Performance-attr. 





























Eco-goal ( = 1, eq. 7-8) 
    Eco-attr. 
    Performance-attr. 





























High time-pressure ( = 2, eq. 7-8) 
    Eco-attr. 
    Performance-attr. 





























Eco-goal x High time-pressure ( = 3, eq. 7-8) 
    Eco-attr. 
    Performance-attr. 




























Note: attr = attributes. Estimates in the “Period 2” column indicate changes in attribute attention shares relative 
to the “Period 1” column. Estimates in the “Period 3” column indicate changes in attribute attention shares 
relative to the “Period 1” and “Period 2” columns. Shares within a condition and time interval sum to 0. The 
values are as compared to the “fair share” based on the number of attributes of each type as compared to the 














Table F.2 Estimation results – attribute importance (choice task 2, travel mugs) 
Choice task 2  
(travel mugs) 
Period 1 ( ) Period 2 ( ) Period 3 ( ) 
M SD p-value M SD p-value M SD p-value 
Performance-goal ( = 0, eq. 7-8) 
    Eco-attr. 
    Performance-attr. 





























Eco-goal ( = 1, eq. 7-8) 
    Eco-attr. 
    Performance-attr. 





























High time-pressure ( = 2, eq. 7-8) 
    Eco-attr. 
    Performance-attr. 





























Eco-goal x High time-pressure ( = 3, eq. 7-8) 
    Eco-attr. 
    Performance-attr. 




























Note: attr = attributes. Estimates in the “Period 2” column indicate changes in attribute attention shares relative 
to the “Period 1” column. Estimates in the “Period 3” column indicate changes in attribute attention shares 
relative to the “Period 1” and “Period 2” columns. Shares within a condition and time interval sum to 0. The 
values are as compared to the “fair share” based on the number of attributes of each type as compared to the 















Table F.3 Estimation results – attribute importance (choice task 4, fridges) 
Choice task 4  
(fridges) 
Period 1 ( ) Period 2 ( ) Period 3 ( ) 
M SD p-value M SD p-value M SD p-value 
Performance-goal ( = 0, eq. 7-8) 
    Eco-attr. 
    Performance-attr. 





























Eco-goal ( = 1, eq. 7-8) 
    Eco-attr. 
    Performance-attr. 





























High time-pressure ( = 2, eq. 7-8) 
    Eco-attr. 
    Performance-attr. 





























Eco-goal x High time-pressure ( = 3, eq. 7-8) 
    Eco-attr. 
    Performance-attr. 




























Note: attr = attributes. Estimates in the “Period 2” column indicate changes in attribute attention shares relative 
to the “Period 1” column. Estimates in the “Period 3” column indicate changes in attribute attention shares 
relative to the “Period 1” and “Period 2” columns. Shares within a condition and time interval sum to 0. The 
values are as compared to the “fair share” based on the number of attributes of each type as compared to the 















Table F.4 Estimation results – subjective values of brand and attribute combinations (choice 
task 1, light bulbs) 
Choice task 1 
(light bulbs) 
Brand Period 1 ( ) Period 2 ( ) Period 3 ( ) 
M SD p-value M SD p-value M SD p-value 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(table continues from previous page) 
Choice task 1 
(light bulbs) 
Brand Period 1 ( ) Period 2 ( ) Period 3 ( ) 
M SD p-value M SD p-value M SD p-value 


























































































































































Note: Shares should sum to 0 within a condition, attribute type, and time interval. When shares do not sum to 
zero it is because some participants do not have fixations on any of the brands for the respective attribute-type 
within the time interval. Estimates in the “Period 2” column indicate changes in brand-and-attribute attention 
shares relative to the “Period 1” column. Estimates in the “Period 3” column indicate changes in brand-and-
attribute attention shares relative to the “Period 1” and “Period 2” columns. The values are as compared to the 
“fair share” of .25. 
 
Table F.5 Estimation results – subjective values of brand and attribute combinations (choice 
task 2, travel mug) 
Choice task 2 
(travel mug) 
Brand Period 1 ( ) Period 2 ( ) Period 3 ( ) 
M SD p-value M SD p-value M SD p-value 
 



































































































































































(table continues from previous page) 
Choice task 2 
(travel mug) 
Brand Period 1 ( ) Period 2 ( ) Period 3 ( ) 
M SD p-value M SD p-value M SD p-value 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: Shares should sum to 0 within a condition, attribute type, and time interval. When shares do not sum to 
zero it is because some participants do not have fixations on any of the brands for the respective attribute-type 
within the time interval. Estimates in the “Period 2” column indicate changes in brand-and-attribute attention 
shares relative to the “Period 1” column. Estimates in the “Period 3” column indicate changes in brand-and-
attribute attention shares relative to the “Period 1” and “Period 2” columns. The values are as compared to the 




Table F.6 Estimation results – subjective values of brand and attribute combinations (choice 
task 4, fridge) 
Choice task 4 
(Fridge) 
Brand Period 1 ( ) Period 2 ( ) Period 3 ( ) 
M SD p-value M SD p-value M SD p-value 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(table continues from previous page) 
Choice task 4 
(Fridge) 
Brand Period 1 ( ) Period 2 ( ) Period 3 ( ) 
M SD p-value M SD p-value M SD p-value 


























































































































































Note: Shares should sum to 0 within a condition, attribute type, and time interval. When shares do not sum to 
zero it is because some participants do not have fixations on any of the brands for the respective attribute-type 
within the time interval. Estimates in the “Period 2” column indicate changes in brand-and-attribute attention 
shares relative to the “Period 1” column. Estimates in the “Period 3” column indicate changes in brand-and-
attribute attention shares relative to the “Period 1” and “Period 2” columns. The values are as compared to the 




G. Chapter 5: Eye tracking hardware 
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